from cj puno to cj sereno #lookback

cj sereno’s quick rise to the judiciary’s highest post in 2012 was far from auspicious, coming as it did on the heels of the ignominiously controversial impeachment and conviction of her immediate predecessor, cj renato corona, in 2011.

and then, again, the reverse might also be true:  that pNoy’s appointment of sereno was auspicious because it was a matter of righting a wrong — the corona appointment by outgoing prez gloria arroyo was a (post)midnight appointment, expressly prohibited by the constitution; it was for incumbent prez benigno aquino III to appoint the replacement of cj reynato puno who was due to step down may 17 2010.

(Article 7, Section 15) “Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.”

katatapos ng may 10 2010 elections, obvious winner na si pNoy, pero presidente pa si gloria, when on may 12 she appointed corona sc chief justice — ni hindi pa bakante ang posisyon — with the backing of the puno supreme court, no less (even if puno himself abstained), and some very powerful figures in legal and political circles.

it was the culmination of a scheme initiated as early as december 2009 by arroyo diehard, rep matias defensor, so the backstory goes.  read marites danguilan vitug’s Inside the JBC: The appointment of the Chief Justice in 2010.  

Those who rallied for the appointment of a Chief Justice despite the ban during the election period stood on shaky ground. Their main argument hinged on an imagined scenario that revolved on a forthcoming novel experience. With the country’s first-ever automated polls, they foresaw confusion and a deluge of election protests that would eventually reach the Supreme Court. It was important, therefore, to have a Chief Justice to preside over the resolution of these contentious cases.

more than a decade earlier, says marites, cj andres narvasa was faced with the same kind of pressure but he withstood it.

Chief Justice Andres Narvasa refused to convene the JBC to fill up a vacancy on the Court because it fell during the appointments ban. He fiercely stood his ground despite pressure from Malacañang.”

unfortunately, cj puno was (is?) made of different stuff.

In March … In a 9-1 vote, the Court decided to exempt itself and the rest of the judiciary from the appointments ban. President Arroyo could appoint the next Chief Justice.

so accommodating of cj puno, diba? making an exception for arroyo, on such flimsy grounds, when an acting chief justice would have done as well during the transition.

what if

what if puno had done a narvasa instead.  what if he had stood firm about following the constitution?  he would have saved nation the aggravation and expense (!) of the corona impeachment and trial and, even, this whole sereno shebang.  i guess it tells us whose side former cj puno was really on then, and whose side he’s really on now, as he shepherds the crafting of a draft constitution.  (gma, is that you?)

matakot tayo.  magtanong tayo.  ano ba talaga ang agenda ni ex-cj puno?  who / what convinced him to be part of this scheme to sell charter change and federalism as the solution to all our problems, which are legion and complicated.  does it not bother him that many think him a sad sell-out?  is he?  pa-executive session executive session pa ang consultative commission (just heard it on dzmm).  what’s all the secrecy all about?  what do they think they’re cooking up.  other than more chaos and anarchy, mabuhay ang elite rule?

what if cj puno had insisted, first, on an intense multi-media information campaign, and shown some semblance of taking the time to listen to and discuss with the people.  twould  be great to have a national conversation about this.  and it’s what we need.

but back to cj impeachments  

if puno had not played along with arroyo, and if arroyo had not appointed corona cj when she did, then pNoy would have had to choose from a list that could not have yet included sereno dahil i-a-appoint pa lang niya ito as associate justice in august 16 2010.

malamang ay napilitan si pNoy to choose from the eminently more qualified and next-in-line, and the supremes might not now be so restive and vulnerable to political nudges from left right and center, what a shame.

which brings me to the 2012 sereno appointment and the perception that it was a good, an auspicious, beginning, because a matter of righting a wrong.  i have a real problem with this.

the wrong done was the midnight appointment, the wrong was done by president arroyo with the complicity of cj puno and the supremes.  BUT the wrong found and for which corona was punished — undeclared wealth — had nothing to do with the midnight-appointment itself that was a brazen violation of the constitution.

bakit ganoon ang nangyari?  because no one dared take gma to court?  or it was easier, took less courage, if a lot of money, to find fault with corona, anything that would get him out of the way?

in my final analysis, corona was faulted and removed for accepting the arroyo appointment — he could have said no, it was against the constitution, he’d take his chances with the new prez.  ironically enough, sereno too might well be faulted and removed for accepting the aquino appointment — she could have said no, she was too young, she had no court experience.

neither anticipated that their SALNs would be under scrutiny.  after all, according to senator rene saguisag who helped craft the law, violation of the SALN law was NOT an impeachable offense until the enrile senate sitting as an impeachment court dared declare it so in the 2011 trial.

in any case, pareho lang si corona at si sereno, it would seem.  and she, too, deserves her day/s in court, let the chips fall where they may.

at itigil na please ang quo warranto eklat na iyan, mr. solicitor-general.  nagmamalinis naman masyado ang duterte admin.  after six months of impeachment hearings in the lower house that practically tore apart the cj, let s/he who is without sin cast the next stone.  i would so like to meet him  and shake his hand.

pNoy, erwin erfe, ninoy’s killers

i thought it was just another house of reps dengvaxia hearing, even if rather star-studded with pNoy himself and butch abad sitting next to da janet garin, and across them the kontrabidas (or is it the other way around) PAO’s persida acosta and erwin erfe and tony leachon.  but i was only half-listening, parang i had heard it all before.

i didn’t realize until after, from news reports, that things had heated up pala.  nagkainitan, with dr. erwin erfe’s forensic expertise questioned again and again.  erfe’s response after was to publicly remind aquino: “I reviewed your dad’s murder.”

Defending his credentials, Erfe noted that he was tapped in 2004 to review the forensic evidence in the assassination of Aquino’s father, slain senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. when his convicted killers sought a re-opening of his murder case before the Supreme Court.

“Noong 2004 po, kinuha po kami ng Public Attorney’s Office para pag-aralan ang assassination ni Senator Ninoy Aquino… Alam po iyun ng dating Presidente,” Erfe told DZMM.

The Aquino camp’s lawyer, former senator Rene Saguisag, had coordinated with PAO experts and presented their findings to the high court, he added.

that night erfe posted on his fb wall:

they humiliated me several times today — Pres Aquino and Cong Lagman. For a moment i thought I was the one under investigation

cryptic, at malaman, ang dating sa akin ng paalala ni erfe kay pNoy that he was part of the 2004 re-investigation of ninoy’s death…  the unsaid being:  meron akong alam…?  it could be just my fertile imagination, but why else would erfe bring up ninoy’s assassination out of the blue, e dengvaxia ang pinag-uusapan.  pNoy as common denominator?

my seniorcit memory bank drew a blank on PAO’s case in behalf of the convicted soldiers in 2004, but in 2009  i blogged on ninoy’s killers.  this was sometime after the release of the jailed soldiers, thanks to president gma’s grant of clemency.  the aquinos were upset because the ex-convicts continued to declare their innocence, point to galman as the culprit, and to danding as the mastermind.

at the time it seemed clear that ninoy was shot sa hagdan pa lang, and given the bullet’s downward trajectory, that the gunman was the soldier behind ninoy.  but now i’m not sure, not after watching this 2003 Saksi segment  NINOY AQUINO Assassination Theories: Did Rolando Galman do it?!  with UP prof jerome bailen who led the PAO team.  the audio is terrible so i transcribed it here.

V.O.  Ayon sa Sandiganbayan… si Constable 1st Class Rogelio Moreno ang napatunayang pumatay kay Ninoy.

Nasa likod ni Ninoy si Moreno nang mabaril ito.  Pero sa pagsisiyasat ni Professor Jerome Bailen, isang forensic expert, mali raw ang interpretasyon ng Agrava Commission na ginamit ng Sandiganbayan para desiyunan ang kaso ng mga sundalo.

Imposible raw na sa kaliwang bahagi ng ulo tatama ang bala kung ang bumaril ay right-handed, tulad ni Moreno.

Ang nakita ni Bailen na posibleng bumaril kay Ninoy ay si Rolando Galman dahil siya ang nasa kaliwa ni Ninoy.

BAILEN:  “Hindi puwedeng si Moreno ang bumaril niyan … it should be from the left.”

VO Imposible rin daw na sa hagdan binaril si Ninoy gaya ng paniniwala ng Agrava Commission dahil kung totoo ito, dapat ay sa harap ng hagdan mismo bumagsak ang katawan ng dating senador.

Natagpuan ang katawan ni Ninoy sa kaliwa ng hagdan, ilang metro ang layo sa hagdanan, na tugma sa sinasabi ng mga sundalo na binaril siya sa tarmac.

Isa pang punto, sa impact daw ng pagsabog ng bala sa ulo ni ninoy, malamang daw na magnum .357 revolver ang ginamit na armas, taliwas sa tingin ng Agrava Board na .38 o .45 caliber pistol ang ginamit.

the davide court, however, refused to re-open the case in 2005, saying that no new evidence was presented by the PAO team.

… we are not moved by petitioners assertion that the forensic evidence may have been manipulated and misinterpreted during the trial of the case. Again, petitioners did not allege concrete facts to support their crass claim. Hence, we find the same to be unfounded and purely speculative.

but check out these videos that raise the galman angle, see / sense why the galman-killed-ninoy school of thought refuses to die.

HISTORY™ (4 of 5) The Assassination of Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. 
Who killed Ninoy
Ninoy Aquino Assassination: The Mystery Behind Rolando Galman’s .357 Magnum! 

it would be great to hear it from dr. erfe: why was the PAO team so sure it was rolando galman who shot ninoy?  puwede nga na hindi sa hagdan binaril si ninoy, it just means they went down those stairs pretty fast, or just faster than the prosecution would have us believe.  and the magnum .357 story is so mixed up it makes sense, if you’re trying to hide something.

but but but how does one explain what the crying lady, rebecca quijano, says she saw:  that ninoy was shot on the stairs, by the soldier behind him, which testimony was confirmed by other eyewitnesses and believed by the court.

one theory is, galman was brought in by one faction of the military to kill ninoy sa tarmac, but the soldiers escorting ninoy, from another faction, were given instructions to kill him on the stairs.

posible ba na kinaladkad na lang si ninoy down the rest of the stairs and then some of the way toward the van? habang pinapatay si galman ng iba pang faction?  but then there would be signs of the kaladkaran.  and why ba didn’t they make ninoy sakay in the van right away?  photo-op muna, to show ninoy and his alleged killer galman, and galman’s magnum .357?

the real question is, why is it so unbelievable that galman killed ninoy?  why did the supreme court consider it a “crass claim,” not to be entertained?

actually it’s not galman killing ninoy that’s unbelievable, rather it’s who allegedly set up galman, who allegedly ordered / paid for the assassination.  sabi ng ilang sundalong nakulong, ang salarin daw ay si danding cojuangco, pinsang buo ni cory na number one business crony ni marcos.  ang problema, walang proof against danding.  he has never even had to deny it.  and the courts refuse to hear it.  out of respect ba for cory who refused to believe it?

the aquino children, too, do not believe that danding could have done such a thing, family and all that.  yeah, right.  so defensive for the uncle who allied with the dictator who jailed ninoy for 7 yrs 7 mos.  too bad “family” got in the way of the aquinos, but not in the way of danding?

which brings me back to dr. erfe.  pogi points for him and dr. leachon for being on the PAO side that’s calling out the DOH on conflict of interest; it tells me they’re clean, uninvested in big pharma, or they wouldn’t dare speak out?  i’d like to hear their official report on the alleged dengvaxia-related deaths, undiluted, unedited, uncensored by the PGH and DOH or any of their agencies.

after that, let’s hear from dr. erfe on the ninoy assassination.

EDSA cheers & jeers 2018

CHEERS to president rodrigo duterte for allowing the EDSA anniversary rallies.  i was afraid he might do a gloria arroyo — as in feb 24 2006, when she was so afraid of people power, post-garci, she declared a state of national emergency (Proclamation 1017), arrested randy david and others marching to EDSA, and filled EDSA protest sites with armed soldiers (sa makati kami naki-rally noon).

president duterte, of course, is fearless.  no doubt he sees how divided the opposition is.  in metromanila, kanya-kanyang rally on different days in different places instead of coming together in one big protest rally.  i wonder what it will take for the liberal party’s tindig to join hands with, and take the lead in uniting, civil society’s cause-oriented groups behind an alternative program of government.

JEERS to DDS bloggers mocha uson and thinking pinoy whose creds are at an all-time low, uson intimating that we just made up the EDSA story of nuns stopping tanks.  the nerve!  The EDSA Revolution Happened, No Matter What Your Poll Says!  and tp saying the nuns were just making gaya the tiananmen scene, kung saan hindi naman gumagalaw ang tangke… i didn’t stay to hear more… hey nieto, tiananmen happened 3 years after EDSA.

ika nga ni daniel patrick moynihan:

… you are entitled to your own opinions, but you are not entitled to your own facts.  

CHEERS to journalist ed lingao for setting the record straight on that iconic people power moment when the marines were stopped in their tracks by crowds ready to die for country.  it was viewed by a stunned world via satellite TV and signalled the end of marcos.

JEERS to everyone who agrees with the UP poli-sci professor who says that EDSA was a chimera, meaning, an illusion, a dream, a fantasy.  meaning what, na-engkanto lang tayong lahat, including the world that was watching?  parang milagro kasi na bigla na lang umalis si marcos?  JEERS also to the UP cssp prof who recently posted an essay he wrote in 2014 for an oxford univ book, airing the allegation that marcos was totally non-violent all through the four days.  argh.

academics with no time to read about EDSA.  it’s all over google, peeps.  whatever your school of thought, there’s really no excuse for not having a factual sense of EDSA — so we can level up the discourse naman — unless you’re just not interested in knowing more?  it’s all too subversive, maybe?

and so CHEERS and MABUHAY! to the historian xiao chua, the one academic i know who has read all the books and materials on EDSA including mine, and who is very good at telling the (hi)story of people power 1986, nuances and all, with a mean vocal impersonation of marcos to boot :-)

non-violent tactics #EDSA’86

read UP professor amado mendoza jr‘s ‘People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983-86,  chapter 11 of the book  Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present by adam roberts & timothy garton ash, published by oxford university in 2009.

… It might have been expected that the Marcos regime would be overthrown violently by the ongoing communist insurgency or a military coup.  Scholars of regime change have long argued that neo-patrimonial dictatorships are particularly vulnerable to violent overthrow by armed opponents.

The peaceful outcome in the Philippines is therefore a puzzle.  Thompson argued that Marcos’s removal was the result of moderate forces successfully out-manoeuvring the different armed groups.  Boudreau acknowledged the competitive and complementary relationship between the armed and unarmed anti-dictatorship movements, but believed that the creation of an organized non-communist option that regime defectors could support was decisive. [180-181]

very interesting, and informative of poltical mindsets circa ’83-’86:

Exiled to the US in 1980, Senator Aquino returned in August 1983 hoping to persuade an ailing Marcos to step down and allow him to take over.  His brazen assassination at Manila international airport unleashed a broad civil resistance movement which eventually outstripped the communist insurgency in terms of media coverage and mass mobilization.  The Catholic Church, led by Cardinal Jaime Sin, played an active role in bringing together the non-communist opposition and Manila’s business elite.  Pro-opposition mass media outlets were opened and a citizens’ electoral watch movement was revived.  Aquino’s death also prompted US State Department officials to assist political moderates and pressure Marcos for reforms.  Marcos tried to divide the opposition anew through the 1984 parliamentary elections.  While some moderates joined a communist-led boycott, others (supported by the widowed Corazon Aquino) participate—and won a third of the contested seats despite widespread violence, cheating, and government control of the media. 

Emboldened moderates consequently spurned a commnist-dominated anti-dictatorship alliance in 1985 to form their own coalition.  While Marcos called for ‘snap’ presidential elections, they united behind Mrs. Aquino’s candidacy.  The communists, hoping to worsen intra-elite conflicts, called for another boycott.  Military officers associate with Enrile formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and tacitly supported Aquino’s candidacy while preparing for an anti-Marcos coup.  Faced by a vigorous opposition campaign, Marcos resorted to fraud and systematic violence.  The combination of a now unmuzzled press and the presence of election observers sparked large-scale civil disobedience.  The Church declared that Marcos has lost the moral right to rule.

The end-game was precipitated by a RAM coup attempt.  Pre-empted by loyalist forces, rebel officers led by Enrile and Ramos defected to Aquino on 22 February 1986 and recognized her as the country’s legitimate leader.  These events led to an internationally televised standoff between loyalist troops and millions of unarmed civilian protesters who had gathered to protect the rebels.  As the regime came under pressure, it lost the will to survive.  Defections mounted and the Reagan administration finally withdrew its support.  On 25 February 1986, the Marcos family and entourage were airlifted to exile in Hawaii.  [182-183]

indeed non-violence won the war, but whether or not it was the result of deliberate strategies and manoeuvres by the non-communist anti-marcos moderates remains to be known.  what deserves mention is that ninoy was on non-violent mode when he came home from exile in aug ’83, his homecoming speech citing ghandi no less:

According to Gandhi, the willing sacrifice of the innocent is the most powerful answer to insolent tyranny that has yet been conceived by God and man.

perhaps he had discussed gandhi and non-violence with cory, who may have relayed the message to ninoy’s brother butz, whose august twenty-one movement (ATOM)’s protest rallies were decidedly non-violent from start to finish.

so was cory’s huge Tagumpay ng Bayan rally in luneta where she declared victory in the snap elections, sabay launch ng non-violent civil disobedence and crony-boycott campaign that coryistas couldn’t wait to be part of.  by day six of the boycott, the economy was reeling and the crony-business community was looking to negotiate, but with whom?  day seven of the boycott (EDSA saturday), enrile and ramos defected.  hmmm, di ba.  enrile was a top crony, next only to danding.  with whom na nga ba?

as in august ’83, butz rose to the occasion that EDSA saturday night.  it was butz who first sounded the call for people to come to EDSA and shield the defectors with their bodies, no guns.  cardinal sin seconded the call for a nonviolent solution an hour or so later, and cory the next day, from cebu.  ATOM was all over EDSA, butz dealing directly, facing off, with police general alfredo lim (who was ordered to disperse the crowds) and then marine commander alfredo tadiar (who was ordered to ram through! the crowd).

i’ve always wondered who, if any, advised cory and butz on non-violent tactics.  that luneta rally was sheer genius.  bentang benta sa moderate forces who liked the drama of non-violence:  nasa bahay ka lang pero feeling part of the struggle ka, and feeling revenged na rin on the regime — goodbye manila bulletin hello inquirer, goodbye san miguel beer, hello lambanog, goodbye cocacola, hello buko juice — what fun.  and that call to EDSA to shield the rebels from the dictator’s forces was inspired — was it pure butz?  was he winging it? — basta walang armas, be ready to die!  and the people were.  ready to die.  (huwag ismiran, mocha uson!)

contrary to popular perception, however, enrile did not defect to join cory nor did he recognize her as the duly-elected president right away.  enrile wanted to be president, and the aborted coup plot set for 23 feb 2 AM would have quickly installed him in malacañang.  in short, he meant to beat cory in a race to the palace,  una-unahan lang.  but ver got wind of honasan’s plans, and honasan got wind of ver’s plans (arrest orders, among others), which drove enrile and RAM to hole up in camp aguinaldo, better to die fighting, while hoping against hope to win the people’s support — after all, he was more qualified to be president.

but by day two, EDSA sunday, the day the people stopped the tanks in ortigas, it was clear that the people were there for cory — shielding enrile yes, but chanting cory’s name, wearing cory’s colors, waving cory’s flags — and it was obvious that they expected cory and enrile to join forces vs. marcos.  sometime over that long night, enrile and ramos, separately, met with cory in her sister’s house in greenhills.  i suppose that’s when the two asked for the top defense positions, an end to the crony-boycott, and immunity from suit in exchange for their armed support.

it disappoints, of course, that prof mendoza characterizes the dictator’s response during the key days as “inexplicably lame and non-violent.”  as though there had been no real threat of violence?  which is to diminish, even if unintentionally, the people’s role in that stunning revolt.

the dictator’s orders were neither lame nor non-violent.  on day 3, EDSA monday, twice marcos gave orders to bomb camp crame, except that air force col. sotelo and the entire 15th strike wing defected instead, and col. balbas and the marines (like commander tadiar the day before), after much delaying, defied orders, and returned to barracks instead.

true, the dictator’s forces could have struck immediately at the rebel military “before a protective civilian cocoon had been mobilized to protect them”, but marcos actually thought he could woo enrile back to the fold.  he had no idea that there was no turning back for enrile who was off on a new trip, navigating uncharted waters, and reinventing himself.

of course, he regretted giving way to cory, but i’m glad he did.

of course cory must have regretted giving him immunity, and i’m sorry she did.

next time, we the people should have a better sense — in real time —  of what’s happening behind-the-scenes and what’s being promised / compromised in our name.  we shouldn’t make bitaw too quickly or trust in our leaders so blindly.  i would think that non-violent engagement can be sustainable and long-term.