angara’s APECO

Poorly planned, poorly executed
By Solita Collas-Monsod

IF it had happened, say, during the watch of then NEDA Director General Romulo Neri, when NEDA had reached the nadir of its reputation, speculation would have been rife about the role of partisan politics in the situation. But it is happening under a NEDA headed by Arsi Balisacan, who not only is extremely competent but is not known for any political savvy or partisan leanings, so I am ready to give it the benefit of the doubt.

By “it,” I am referring to the delay in the release of the NEDA review on the Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority (APECO), as ordered by PNoy last December. The Reader will recall that after opponents of APECO marched for 17 days to cover a 350-kilometer distance from Aurora to Manila, PNoy, after meeting with them, ordered NEDA to conduct an independent review of the project, to be accomplished in seven days.

Of course there was no way that NEDA could accomplish that task — if only because the creation of APECO was enacted into law without the benefit of any feasibility study (none could be produced, anyway) that would at least provide some starting point for the review. Moreover, NEDA had had no involvement whatever in the formulation of the project. Both of which circumstances already raise very grave doubts about the propriety or even the advisability of approving such a project.

In any case, after the end of seven days, NEDA submitted a report to the President, and asked for two more months (it became 2-3 months) so it could do a proper job of it. And the President granted the request.

That was on Dec. 17, 2012. The two-month mark occurred on Feb. 17, 2013, and March 17 marked the end of the three-month period. It is now April 11 — four months after PNoy first ordered the independent review. And nothing has been submitted.

Now one of the reasons I greatly admire NEDA (except for the unfortunate periods when it was headed by Neri and then by Ralph Recto, neither of whom are economists, with Recto having the added burden of being a politician) is because of its professional staff. And even though that number has unfortunately been dwindling (pirated by the private sector and international agencies), no way would a 2-3 month period for conducting a review have been asked for if that wasn’t a reasonable period, as determined by the staff.

In preparing for this column, I asked Director General/Secretary Balisacan why the delay. And the answer was prompt: it was still being “finalized.” Another question: estimated time of completion? Another answer: within two weeks from yesterday, yesterday being April 10. That means at the latest April 24.

I shouldn’t have pressed, but I did anyway. Third question: What bogged the study down? In another words, if March 17 was the outer limit of the review period, what caused the additional five weeks delay? No answer.

Again, as I implied earlier, if it were not Arsi Balisacan at the helm of NEDA, thoughts of partisan political motives for the delay would be dancing in my head. After all, it would be very convenient to postpone news that might redound to the disadvantage of administration stalwarts until after the election. But that would be un-Arsi like. And un-NEDA like, as a result. So I am withholding judgment.

But that doesn’t mean that I am not going to go over that report with a fine-tooth comb. Although I will be very surprised — shocked, more like — if the NEDA review were to give its imprimatur to APECO. Balisacan’s reputed closeness to Senator Angara should not be a factor (I myself am considered very close to the senator and worked with him when he was UP president, but that has nothing to do with the issue).

I say this because after having read all the documents on the issue I could lay my hands on, including complete transcripts of the Senate committee hearings on APECO, plus hearing arguments on both sides. Let me share with the Reader some of my more salient findings.

• A bill to create a special economic zone for Aurora was vetoed by President Ramos way back in 1997 or 1998 — this information courtesy of Ciel Habito, who was Ramos’s NEDA chief and who obviously was asked for his opinion.

• RA 9490, which created ASEZA and approved by Gloria Arroyo on July 29, 2007, was only for an area of 496 hectares. This, without any feasibility study backing up the project.

• Less than three years later, RA 10083, amending RA 9490, was passed. But it was not really an amendment, it was a sea change, because the area covered increased by more than 25-fold — from 496 hectares to almost 13,000 hectares. What’s more, in many respects, APECO was placed beyond the powers of the national government and local government units. Again, no feasibility study was ever produced to justify such changes.

• RA 10083 provisions violate at least four laws: the Local Government Code, the Indigenous People’s Rights Act, the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act, and the CARPER law, trampling on the rights of the local governments of the areas covered, as well as the rights of fisherfolk, farmers, and indigenous people in the area. Which was why the APECO march took place.

• It is noteworthy that RA 10083 was not signed into law by President Arroyo, but rather allowed to lapse into law — a Pontius Pilate act that does not absolve her of the blame for allowing the creation of the APECO.

• The implementation of APECO has resulted in any number of very costly mistakes, including the wrong use of land, the wrong choice of projects. Up to this point, almost six years after it was first approved, there is a dearth of investors. And justifiably so: anyone looking at a map of the area will see that Aurora is in a geographically very poor position to serve Central Luzon as compared to the other economic zones and free ports already located there.

In sum, it certainly looks like APECO was poorly planned and even more poorly executed — from the development point of view, that is.

surveys and the filipino elite

after reading randy david’s  Surveys and public opinion, i googled for more and found that, while it is conceded that election polls can influence voters in different ways:

The bandwagon effect, when voters rally to the leading candidate;
The underdog effect, when voters rally to the trailing candidate;
The demotivating effect, when voters decide not to vote because their candidate is already sure to win;
The motivating effect, when voters go to the precincts because the polls alerted them to the election; or
The free-will effect when voters cast their votes to prove the polls wrong.

and that, while even congress passed the Fair Election Act in february 2001, providing that

5.4. Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.

surprise, surprise, the davide supreme court ruled in may 2001 that

§5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

googled some more and stumbled on this find: The Politics of “Public Opinion” in the Philippines (2010) by Eva Lotte E. Hedman, research fellow, London School of Economics.  excerpts [bolds mine]:

Since the restoration of formal democratic institutions and practices in 1986 … the Philippines has seen a more gradual and limited transformation in the mobilisation of voters. This change is inextricably linked with the increasing circulation in Philippine politics and society of what is commonly referred to as “public opinion.” As argued in this paper, the sheer accumulation and anticipation of surveys, reflecting back to the (disaggregated) public their (aggregated) opinion, have become inextricably linked to dynamics of bandwagoning, as well as to efforts at what scholars have described as “political branding” (Pasotti 2009). [Journal Of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29(4), 97-118. 101. Retrieved April 8, 2013.

… “public opinion” has gained greater circulation as political discourse and social fact in Philippine politics and society, with the popularity and poll ratings of candidates – rather than the construction and maintenance of machines – viewed as an increasingly effective and decisive mode of voter mobilisation. This trend is perhaps most evident in the close correspondence between pre-election surveys and the performance of presidential contenders at the polls in the 2010 elections. However, the rise of public opinion has also come to influence the process of election campaigning itself, as seen in the floating and junking of candidates, the party-switching of politicians, and the unravelling of coalitions, all developments noted by informed observers of the presidential elections of May 2010.[103-104]

Indeed, in the wider context of multiple parties and candidates for office without political platforms or programmes of any real distinction, the apparition of an opinionated public in survey after survey is worthy of note as a phenomenon in its own right. That is, aside from the specific content of any one survey, public opinion polling has emerged as an institutionalised practice in the Philippines, an established social fact. As already noted, the sheer increase in surveys is ample testimony to this reality (Chua 2004). Beyond the increasing number and frequency of surveys, moreover, there is mounting evidence of considerable media interest in and political controversy over the “reported findings” of surveys, focused on the facts and figures of specific polls, but also, importantly, on the very claims to professional objectivity and scientific method that lie at the heart of the production of public opinion for public consumption. As the accumulation and anticipation of surveys have achieved both momentum and continuous reproduction and circulation, the significance of public opinion as such thus extends well beyond the (instrumental) uses and abuses of surveys to encompass (structural) effects of a different order in Philippine politics and society. [105-106]

Beyond the focus on technical problems and solutions associated with polling, or the attempts at restricting the practice itself, the rise of “public opinion,” as a phenomenon in its own right, appears in a very different light, as do its purported effects, when viewed through the critical lens of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, and others writing in a similar vein. As argued by Bourdieu more than thirty years ago, “public opinion” is “a pure and simple artefact whose function is to dissimulate the fact that the state of the opinion at a given moment is a system of forces, of tensions” (Bourdieu 1979). Polls and surveys, it has been argued, are thus instruments “not of political knowledge but of political action,” whose deployment inherently devalues other forms of collective action – strikes, protests, social movements – and rests on a “formally equalitarian aggregative logic” that ignores and obscures the profound realities of deprivation, poverty, and social inequality in countries such as the Philippines (Wacquant 2004; Champagne 1990). [110-111]

Viewed from this perspective, the rise of public opinion can be more readily seen to have coincided, at the outset, with the emergence of a new form of political action in the Philippines. This new political activism was directed, not merely at Marcos’ ailing dictatorship, but also, importantly, against the labour strikes, student protests and peasant movements that surfaced in the factories, the campuses, and the haciendas of the country, precisely at a time when the Communist Party of the Philippines, and its armed wing, the New People’s Army, emerged the single largest such organisation (in opposition, not in control, of state power) anywhere in the world. Long before the institutionalisation of “public opinion” through polls and surveys after the resurrection of democracy, it was this struggle for “hearts and minds” that unleashed the “will of the people” into Philippine political discourse, as seen in the high-profile campaigns to collect one million signatures on a petition for Cory Aquino to run for president in 1985, to organise as many volunteers for Namfrel (National Movement for Free Elections) in 1985-86, and, finally, to oust an authoritarian regime by means of People Power in February 1986.[110-111]

At first glance, it may appear that the funeral corteges and petition drives which helped to jump-start the presidential campaigns of two generations of Aquinos, a full quarter-century apart, remain a thing apart from the rise of public opinion as political discourse. Indeed, in the case of “Cory”, the public spectacle that propelled her into popular consciousness coincided with the first appearance of the Philippines’ foremost polling institution, the Social Weather Station (SWS) in 1985 and thus pre-dated the wider circulation of public opinion as political discourse under post-Marcos conditions of democratic elections. By contrast, public opinion surveys had already become firmly established aspects of Philippine election campaigns by 2010, when Noynoy’s successful presidential candidacy was acclaimed as something of a foundational moment and unique repertoire in the rise of public opinion in the Philippines [112]

While typically associated with progress and change, and, indeed, with “new citizens-cum-voters”, “People Power,” as an – perhaps all too – familiar repertoire of protest, may also have emerged as part of the obstacles to further democratization in the Philippines.

As for the new forms of voter mobilisation themselves, the May 2010 presidential victory of Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III also signals the limited transformative potential associated with the politics of “public opinion”.

Unsurprisingly, the nature of such change reflects, in key respects, broader patterns in Philippine politics, as shown above. However, the limits to the transformative potential of “public opinion” also stem from the very deployment of polls and surveys, with their formally equalitarian aggregative logic, and concomitant devaluation of other forms of collective action and solidarities. “When used as a gauge of ‘public opinion’ […] polls not only miss the mark but shift the target,” and, thus, it has been argued, “offer at best a naïve and narrow view of democracy” (Salmon and Glasser 1995: 449). In the context of the Philippines, this shifting of the target and narrowing of the view of democracy first came into its own during the widespread popular mobilisation surrounding the rise of the first Aquino presidency. With a second Aquino elected president of the country, “public opinion” may have emerged as social fact in Philippine politics and society, but for all the countless quality of life surveys and political polls conducted in the past quarter-century on a pluralistic one-person, one-vote basis, it is difficult to dismiss the charge levelled by critics that the practice of polling serves to obscure profound realities of deprivation, poverty, and social inequality in the country today. [115]

so there.  in effect the fiipino elite has managed to appropriate, co-opt, and spin “public opinion” and “people power” to serve only its interests.  political dynasties forever.   ironic, no, wicked, that it’s under cover of “freedom of expression.”

maybe we should just boycott elections, as in jose saramago’s Seeing (2007), where government held elections and nobody came.  maybe then the ruling elite will finally get the message: tama na, sobra na, palitan na ang bulok na sistema!

kristel, activism

Teditorial: Niña Aquino
Radikalchick: Activism

that rating upgrade

… is good news only for the minority rich, not for the majority poor.

check out cielito habito’s An early Easter gift

So what’s in the credit rating upgrade for the ordinary Filipino? It’s actually a mix of good news and bad news. The positive side is that more investments—both of the job creating (FDI) and the “hot money” kind—should be drawn into the country by this new vote of confidence; let’s hope there will be much more of the former. Government and firms could borrow funds more easily and more cheaply. Lower interest rates would mean lower costs for government debt, freeing up more funds for health, education, infrastructure and other public investments to uplift people’s lives.

But the negative side is that a major segment of our population faces the very real prospect of lower incomes. Families relying on remittances from abroad, or from earnings in import-substituting or export-oriented industries (including tourism) will be hurt by a rising peso induced by the surge in foreign inflows. Pensioners, retirees and other savers relying on interest earnings from fixed-income placements will also see their incomes drop further. A retiree recently wrote me complaining that his interest income had dropped 40 percent in the past year alone because of falling interest rates, and laments that he now faces a serious problem with making ends meet.

and ben kritz’s Curb the ratings upgrade euphoria

President Aquino’s statement described the positive outcomes of the ratings upgrade as lower interest costs on government debt, making Philippine securities more attractive to investors, and “fiscal space” from the savings on debt costs, savings that can be used “to sustain and further improve on social protection, defense, and economic stimulus, among others.” The only part of that statement that is completely accurate is the first part. The specific meaning of the rating is a judgment of the country’s ability to pay foreign-denominated debt on time and in full, and because the Philippines is now judged to be at lower risk of default by one agency, the government will not have to pay so much to incur debt; interest on direct loans will be a bit lower, as will yields on government bonds.

As for the “savings” that can be applied to other activities, that presumes the government will incur new foreign debt, which most would consider a rather novel conception of “savings.” Furthermore, in a memo released on March 17, Treasurer Rosalia de Leon informed bond dealers that the Treasury will be increasing its monthly auction of 3-, 5- and seven-year bonds and treasury bills from P120 billion to P150 billion through the second quarter, as part of an effort by the government to source all its debt locally for 2013. In other words, the government has no plans for now to access the foreign credit market where the impact of the ratings upgrade would be felt the most.

and gary olivar’s Early Easter gifts

Perhaps the most important thing to remember about this credit rating upgrade is this: At the end of the day, it really matters only to professional portfolio managers who may be restricted from putting their money in non-investment-grade credits. Even with its shiny new investment grade, the Philippines will still have to compete with its new peer group for portfolio attention. And direct foreign investors—the ones who really bring in the jobs—will be totally unimpressed since they’re concerned with an entirely different set of issues altogether.

The new rating—like any other credit rating—speaks only to the country’s ability to repay its foreign-denominated debt, nothing more. It says less about whether or not equity investors can expect to earn the right returns on bricks and mortar on a level playing field. And it says nothing about whether we are investing properly for future growth, or creating more jobs through the right kind of growth, or improving our productivity as the only way to sustain long-term growth.

Unfortunately, like most early gifts, the packaging may be nice and glitzy—as the Palace will try to hype it up—but what’s inside is not what we really need.

read, too, atty. dodo dulay’s What PNoy isn’t saying about PH’s rating upgrade