EDSA@40 Recalling the Boycott

Top of my Facebook feed 22 Feb was a video posted by quo-warranto’d CJ Meilou Sereno —  “Paano Kaya Nangyari ang EDSA People Power” — na tungkol lang sa Enrile-Ramos-RAM defection after Marcos cheated in the snap election, and how the people came to support them and stop tanks.  Di man lang nabanggit si Cory and her audacious non-violent civil disobedience campaign and the six days of crony boycotts that had the economy reeling in the run-up to EDSA.

Pinapalabas na all it took for the people to march to EDSA was Cardinal Sin‘s permission, hindi na bale si Butz Aquino na unang nag-call for a non-violent response, at nag-second-the-motion lang sort of si Cardinal, as in, “those of you who wish to help should do so…”  makalipas ang twenty minutes of pagdadalawang-isip. Walang acknowledgement o pagkilala na may pinanggalingan na higanteng protesta ang milyon-milyong Coryista; wala ring paliwanag kung bakit nga ba kumilos ang mga Coryista para protektahan si Enrile na “architect” of martial law — siya ang sumulat ng Proclamation 1081 — at kilalang crony ni Marcos.

Sa totoo lang, kung hindi sa higanteng protesta ni Cory, kung hindi siya nagtawag ng boycott of crony businesses to bring down the economy and compel Marcos to step down, na agad sinakyan ng milyon-milyong Coryista, malamang ay nilangaw ang EDSA.

Salamat sa biyuda ni Ninoy, kakaiba na noon ang ihip ng hangin. Mapanghimagsik na ang timpla ng taongbayan, punong-puno bigla ng pag-asa, sabik sa naamoy na pagbabago, noong bisperas ng EDSA. Kung walang naganap na defection, malamang ay sa Mendiola at Malacañang nagmartsa at umeksena ang People Power.

From Himagsikan sa EDSA–Walang Himala! (2000)
Mahalagang isaisip na noong nag-aklas sina Enrile at Ramos, pitong (7) araw nang nag-aaklas ang mga Coryista. Ibang klaseng pag-aaklas nga lang – hindi armadong pakikibaka kundi simpleng pagsuway sa Awtoridad at di-pagtangkilik sa mga produkto at serbisyo ng crony economy. Tandang-tanda ko pa ang maigting na sigla at tensyon ng panahong iyon. High na high at sakay na sakay sa kampanyang boykot ang sampung milyong Pilipino na bumoto kay Cory – binitawan ang nakasanayang peryodiko at lumipat sa mga diyaryo ng alternative press, iwinaksi ang paboritong beer at gin at nag-trip sa whiskey at lambanog, inisnab ang paboritong softdrinks at dairy products at nawili sa buko juice, dirty ice cream, at kesong puti. Naisip ko na tuwang-tuwa siguro ang mga nasyonalista’t aktibista pagkat sa isang iglap, naibaling ng madlang mamimili ang tangkilik sa mga produkto ng maliliit na negosyong Pinoy. Higit pa, nagustuhan namin ang natikman at nalanghap na pagbabago. Namulat sa katotohanang okey din pala ang lokal at puwede nga palang magbago ng ugali o kabihasnan.

From EDSA Uno, Dos Tres (2013)
The first six days of the boycott are always glossed over, remembered only, if at all, as prelude, along with the snap elections.

Yet those early days were extraordinary and quite memorable on a personal plane for the millions who voted for Cory in the Snap Election of 1986, and, when she was cheated, who merrily complied with her boycott call and changed consumption habits overnight. There was nothing ideological about it, no sense of alternative economics as a long-term option. Rather, it was purely political, to derail the economy, and only until Marcos conceded to Cory.

It was a heady, giddy, intoxicating time of engagement in political change, beyond the ballot. The boycott was in the realm of the personal, on the level of where to bank and shop, which newspapers to read, what dairy products to feast on, what softdrinks and beer to get high on. And because it wasn’t always clear which brands were tainted and which were not, some of us played safe and simply eschewed all advertised goods. We turned to unbranded homegrown stuff like kesong puti, “dirty” ice cream, fresh fruits and juices, and local spirits like lambanog. We reveled in it. I remember thinking how thrilled nationalists must be—finally Filipinos, whose buying habits were generally shaped by TV commercials, were finding out that local stuff by small entrepreneurs was good, too, if not better on all sorts of levels.

Best of all, Filipinos were finding that change, while daunting and disconcerting at first, could turn provocative and mind-blowing and consciousness-raising, reinforced by a mosquito press that daily reported how more and more people, left, right and center, rich and poor, were joining the bandwagon, and how crony banks and businesses were running and reeling.

The personal was political, indeed. What a revolutionary mind trip it was.

Of course, the boycott was too good to last. Big Business, crony and not, could not allow it to go on much longer. And to this day, no one likes to talk about it. Bakit kaya.

Marcoleta falls for 9-dash line fiction

About Senators Kiko Pangilinan’s and Rodante Marcoleta’s heated debate over the legitimacy of the West Philippine Sea. 

MARCOLETA FLUNKS ELEMENTARY CARTOGRAPHY
Marlen V. Ronquillo

…  The West Philippine Sea is for real. Philippine laws have codified a specific area called by that name, and maps have been drawn to reflect. In 2012, then-president Benigno Aquino III issued Administrative Order 29 that demarcated the West Philippine Sea as “the Luzon Sea, as well as the waters around, within and adjacent to the Kalayaan Island Group and Bajo de Masinloc, also known as the Scarborough Shoal.”

A law signed by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in November 2024 — Republic Act 12064, or the Philippine Maritime Zones Act — defined anew the portions covered by the West Philippine Sea. That law also asked the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority to prepare the corresponding map covered by that sea, then circulate that map in the country and beyond.

In her many warnings about China’s territorial ambitions in Southeast Asia, former United States secretary of state Hillary Clinton spoke about real threats faced by an area she called “the West Philippine Sea.”

The West Philippine Sea is a fact of nationhood, its existence amplified by the 2016 arbitral ruling that essentially said areas officially demarcated by the Philippine government under AO 29 and RA 12064 are, indeed, Philippine territory.

What accounts for Marcoleta’s refusal to recognize a basic fact of law, international ruling and cartography, the lay of the land in a nation of which he is a citizen and senator? That’s between Marcoleta and China. But to obviously take the side of China’s fictional nine-dash line over our historic and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea-validated West Philippine Sea is beyond the pale. In nations and polities protective of their territories, a stand like Marcoleta’s will be grounds for a form of censure. In China, Marcoleta’s stand may fall under the category of treason and may end up like Lin Biao.

Some dear and basic lessons in geography and territory raise additional and troubling questions on why Marcoleta is seemingly on China’s side on the West Philippine Sea issue. With all the land, seas, and vast dominion in its possession, China’s territorial aggression looks like overkill.

China’s map occupies 9.6 million square kilometers — approximately the size of Europe. In terms of land area, it is the third largest in the world, after Russia and Canada, and much of Canada is uninhabitable tundra. The Philippines is a land-short country the size of the US state of Arizona. China, according to basic geographical data, shares boundaries with 14 other countries, and territorial disputes often arise, especially with India, due to boundary issues.

It cannot be that Marcoleta is cutting China some slack because it needs more territory, and the Philippines should play the role of a generous neighbor.

Speaking of basic generosity, has China been a generous and economically supportive neighbor, an economic superpower with zero predatory practices in economic dealings with the Philippines?

No. On the contrary — and this can be validated by the loan terms during the term of former president Rodrigo Duterte — China has imposed high interest rates on loans to the Philippine government, about 2 percent or more higher than those from, say, Japan and the European Union. Former Bayan Muna party-list representative Neri Colmenares has a compilation of China’s harsh loan terms, including provisions that allow China to seize national treasures, such as Rizal Park, in case of loan defaults.

China overall has been imposing onerous terms on foreign borrowers. After a loan default, one Latin American country found out that China demanded 80 percent of its total oil output.

So while we trade heavily with China — the only countries that do not trade with it are the imaginary trading posts Donald Trump slapped with tariffs in his April 2, 2025, “Liberation Day” tariff order — we should not forget one thing: trade is one thing, territorial aggression is another. Areas like Bajo de Masinloc — Masinloc is a town in Zambales — have been ours since time immemorial. And for Marcoleta’s information, China’s nine-dash line is a late 20th-century concoction.

Facts and cartography and history and empiricism all say there is a West Philippine Sea. Marcoleta’s West Philippine Sea distractions, at the very least, are on the wrong side of history.

Impeachment & the Supremes

Sa madaling salita, pinakialaman at ginulo ng Korte Suprema ang proseso ng pag-i-impeach sa presidente, bise-presidente, supreme court justices, atbp. gayong malinaw na sinasabi ng 1987 Constitution na ang proseso ng impeachment ay saklaw ng Awtoridad ng Legislative branch, hindi ng Judicial branch.

FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO: It cannot be the case that the Supreme Court has the final word. Were this so, we would equivocate on “democracy.” The rule of law is not guaranteed by the Supreme Court alone but by all branches, offices and agencies of government. … [O]ur constitution does not quite clearly entrust the well-being of the nation and the Republic to unelected modern avatars of the Platonic Guardians! Besides, there is something paradoxical to the claim that the elected representatives of the people cannot be trusted to uphold the Constitution in the same way that unelected magistrates do. https://www.manilatimes.net/

Bakit nga ba tayo papayag na ang masusunod tungkol sa impeachment ay mga mahistrado na ni hindi natin ibinoto at hindi natin kilala, na panay impeachable rin? Are these more stringent rules to protect themselves, too, rather than the checks and balances essential to democracy?

Interesante na wala pa akong naririnig na calls or moves to impeach the Supremes even if many legal thinkers, including a 1986 Constitutional Commissioner, are aghast at the ruling. Dahil kaya it would mean impeaching all 13 justices of the “unanimous vote” leaving only two? Puwede namang the Chief Justice and ponente Leonen lang, why not, and everybody else on probation, or something like that, haha, we wish.

Naalala ko tuloy the times the House of Reps tried to impeach a chief justice. Back in Arroyo times, first Erap — over Edsa Dos — and then GiboTeodoro and Wimpy Fuentebella — over judiciary development funds — tried to have CJ Hilario Davide impeached, but no dice. In Duterte times, an impeachment complaint vs. CJ Lourdes Sereno— over failure to file SALN atbp. — was overtaken by a quo warranto petition declaring her unqualified for the office from the start, and she had to go. In PNoy times, there was CJ Renato Corona‘s case that went all the way to trial and saw him impeached over SALN secrets.

This one, in BBM’s time, that finds the Supremes brazenly tampering with the Constitution, is certainly more serious a transgression involving grave abuse of discretion and deserves to be disputed  by the Legislature and settled once and for all.

FR. RANHILIO: Senate President Tito Sotto expressed his dismay over the resolution of the Supreme Court — particularly what it meant for the power of the Senate in regard to impeachment proceedings. Quite expectedly, he has been slurred for pitting his educational background against Their Honors, the learned members of the Supreme Court. But that misses the point. Sotto was raising a matter of profound constitutional moment. He was asking whether, in the exercise of powers clearly granted Congress by the Constitution itself, the Supreme Court’s criteria, standards and positions could interdict the chambers of Congress. That is a question about the workings of our democracy — and it is neither trivial nor impertinent.

Pero hindi ako bilib sa panukalang charter change para daw linawin ang pagkakasaad ng eksklusibong saklaw ng Lehislatura sa impeachment process. Masalimuot na undertaking ang cha-cha. Constituent assembly ba o constitutional convention? Kung con-ass, pagtatalunan pa uli kung joint o separate voting. Kung con-con, katakut-takot na gastos at napakahabang proseso ng pagtatalo at pagdedebate ng mga isyung pangekonomiya at pampulitika. Meanwhile, what? Sunud-sunuran muna sa dictates ng Supremes, now that mayroon nang endorsed impeachment complaints vs. both PBBM and VP Sara sa House of Reps?

But what’s to prevent the counsels of PBBM and VP Sara from going to the Supremes and contesting, again, the constitutionality of the processes, or the sufficiencies in form and substance? Which would take the Supremes forever to decide, as usual. Walang katapusan, ika nga.

Sabi ni Rey Talimio Jr. sa comment thread ni Manolo Quezon sa Facebook
https://www.facebook.com/manolo.quezon/

When the Supreme Court is alleged to have committed grave abuse of discretion, the remedy is not defiance, not political pressure, and not ignoring the ruling. The remedies are institutional: a motion for reconsideration, future doctrinal correction by the Court itself, constitutional amendment, or in the most extreme case, impeachment of the Justices through the process defined by the Constitution. That is the design of checks and balances. Courts are not infallible.

Good to know that impeachment of the Justices is indeed an option in this most extreme case. #Impeach the Supremes

China, Mao, transparency

Former Defense Sec Orly Mercado, remembering Mao and the “heady 60s”, weighs in on the Chinese embassy’s steady stream of protests against what it calls Philippine “provocations” that suggests to him “performative indignation rather than the usual quiet diplomacy.” I’m not sure about “performative” though. Parang sincerely upset sila by our “transparency initiative”, i.e., the Philippine government’s strategy to control the narrative and expose China’s coercive and unlawful actions in the West Philippine Sea. Umuubra kasi?

WHEN MAO’S WORDS COME BACK TO HAUNT BEIJING 
by Orlando Mercado

IT was the heady 1960s. As a political science student, I developed more than a purely scholarly interest in the writings of Chairman Mao Zedong. Like many of my generation, I read revolutionary tracts not only to understand China, but to make sense of a world in upheaval — about Vietnam, student movements, anti-imperialist struggles, and the seductive certainties of ideology.

Those years were saturated with manifestos and slogans, with the conviction that history itself was bending under the weight of mass movements and moral clarity. We believed ideas mattered, that words could mobilize millions, and that power was never as permanent or as invulnerable as it appeared. In that charged atmosphere, Mao’s writings were read less as dogma than as tools, frameworks that could be used for interpreting conflict, resistance and reaction.

One Mao line, in particular, has stayed with me through the decades: “To be attacked by the enemy is not a bad thing but a good thing.” At the time, it sounded almost paradoxical, even counterintuitive, especially to young minds still inclined to equate criticism with failure. Yet the more one sat with it, the clearer its strategic logic became. Attack, in Mao’s formulation, was not merely hostility; it was information. It was evidence that one’s actions had registered, that they had crossed a threshold from harmless dissent to meaningful challenge.

That line came rushing back to me recently after reading reports that China summoned Philippine Ambassador to Beijing Jaime FlorCruz over statements made by Commodore Jay Tarriela, spokesman of the Philippine Coast Guard, on developments in the West Philippine Sea. Beijing has since doubled down, with its embassy in Manila issuing a steady stream of protests against what it calls Philippine “provocations.” The language has been sharp, repetitive and unusually public, suggesting performative indignation rather than the usual quiet diplomacy.

The immediate trigger is the Philippines’ so-called transparency initiative: the systematic public release of photos, videos and accounts of Chinese maritime actions in our waters. There is nothing radical about it. They’re not “fake news.” They’re only facts placed on record for the world to know. For years, their gray-zone tactics thrived in darkness and ambiguity. Now, they are being dragged into the spotlight for all to see.

Transparency, in this sense, is almost disarmingly modest. It does not rely on rhetoric, escalation, or counter-force. It relies on documentation. It assumes that visibility itself has power, and that when actions are observed, recorded and shared, they lose some of their deniability and much of their strategic advantage.

Mao would have understood this instinctively.

In a 1939 essay delivered in Yanan, Mao argued that enemy attacks were not merely inevitable, but also proof of effectiveness. If your adversary attacks you, it means you have drawn a clear line of demarcation. It means you have become a problem. Silence from the enemy is more dangerous than criticism, because silence suggests irrelevance.

In Maoist dialectics, struggle clarifies. Attacks sharpen contradictions. Overreaction reveals weakness. So, when the response is loud, it usually means something hit home. Noise, in this framework, is diagnostic. The louder the protest, the greater the likelihood that a sensitive nerve has been touched. Calm confidence rarely needs theatrical outrage.

Seen through that lens, China’s increasingly vocal protests are not signs of strength. They are signs of irritation, and perhaps anxiety. Transparency works precisely because it disrupts a longstanding advantage: control of narrative. Gray-zone operations depend on fog. Sunlight is their natural enemy.

Every diplomatic summons, every embassy statement, every angry denial does more than rebut a Philippine claim. It advertises to the region and to the world that something is being exposed, something Beijing would rather keep blurred, contested, or buried in competing versions of events. Ironically, the protests amplify the very material they seek to delegitimize, drawing attention to incidents that might otherwise have remained localized or transient.

This is where Mao’s old doctrine becomes strategically useful in a modern, democratic setting.

First, attacks validate impact. If Beijing is protesting loudly, it means the transparency initiative is biting. It is not being ignored. It is being felt.

Second, attacks clarify lines. The choice becomes starker for third parties: between openness and opacity, between documentation and denial, between rule-based processes and coercive gray zones.

Third, attacks shift the burden of explanation. Instead of Manila constantly defending its actions, Beijing is forced to explain why transparency, of all things, is so objectionable. What, exactly, is being hidden that sunlight makes so uncomfortable?

There is a deep irony here. Mao crafted this doctrine for revolutionary movements struggling against stronger powers. Today, a democratic Philippines is applying a version of that logic not with insurgency, but with cameras, facts and public accountability against a far more powerful state.

As someone who once pored over Mao’s writings in the ferment of the 1960s, I cannot help but note the twist of history. A doctrine meant to steel revolutionaries against imperial pressure now offers a lens for understanding why a major power bristles at transparency.

When Beijing reacts loudly, it may believe it is projecting resolve. However, in the dialectical logic that Mao himself embraced, loud attacks often signal that the pressure point has been identified. They suggest discomfort — an instinctive response to loss of control over narrative and perception.

In the West Philippine Sea, sunlight is not a provocation. It is a strategy. And every angry protest may be the clearest sign yet that the strategy is working.

US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis was right. Indeed, “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”