Category: marcos

tete-a-tete on EDSA

juan ponce enrile’s EDSA story has come in installments.  three (3) so far.  the first via presscons during EDSA and a lengthy interview soon after.  the second via his published memoir (2012).  and the third via that one-on-one with bongbong marcos on social media.

in the first installment in feb and march 1986, enrile consistently denied the RAM coup plot that marcos accused him of all through the 4 days, the one that would have installed him in the dictator’s place as head of a ruling junta.  enrile denied the coup plot because he knew that it would win him no sympathy from the public, given his architect-of-martial-law image, not to speak of marcos-crony tag.  instead the two bandidos slanted their statements to better call, vie for, the people’s attention.  there was cheating in cagayan, said enrile; they did not consider marcos a duly constituted authority any longer, said fvr.  at kiliting-kiliti naman ang mga coryista, who were already in the throes of non-violent revolution — the first day of EDSA was the 7th day of the crony boycott: banks were running, the economy was reeling.  the defection was icing on the cake, na parang hulog ng langit, wow, may armed force na si cory?!?  that he lied, and we believed him, is part of the EDSA story; if he had told the truth, that he sought to install himself in the place of marcos, coryistas would have left him to Ver’s tender mercies and ousted marcos without his help.

in the second installment 26 years later, enrile finally confessed to the failed coup plot, yes, he was all set to topple marcos, he really wanted to be president, kaya lang nabuking ni ver ang sabwatan, and fearing that orders for their arrest were out, he decided that, rather than run and hide, he and his men would hole up in aguinaldo, resist arrest, and die fighting — not that we didn’t know this already, thanks to historian alfred mccoy  and his research team whose exposey came out in 2 veritas extras in october 1986) — but then EDSA happened, umeksena at nangibabaw ang people power, and the “courageous and patriotic” rebel military was outshone, to enrile’s great chagrin.

in the third installment, enrile shares something “new”, sort of: that at the time he and the RAMboys plotted the (aborted) coup, it was to preempt “a group of generals who had also a political plan.”

ENRILE.  I’m sure your Father did not know, or your Mother, but they [the generals] had a political plan for the country.

actually it is quite likely that the father and the mother knew and were behind such plans, given facts such as this: (1) marcos started planning for the succession of imelda as early as june 1975 (the same month primitivo mijares testified in the u.s. congress on the conjugal dictatorship) when he wrote presidential decree no. 731 (never published): in case of his death or grave illness, he was to be succeeded by a commission headed by imelda [Waltzing with a Dictator 156], and (2) in august ’82, before leaving for the u.s. state visit, he had the batasan approve a law providing for a 15-member executive committee, including imelda, that would succeed him if he were to die or fall ill. [Marcos File 243]

ENRILE.  … to be truthful at that point [july 1985] we were organizing because I received an information that there was a military junta, and that I was supposed to be executed by that junta if something happens to the president.  I did not know that the president was sick at that time.

medyo hard to believe that he did not know marcos was sick.  it was kind of common knowledge even in 1983 when ninoy decided to come home, hoping to stop another military take-over, whether by imelda-ver or enrile-RAM.

E.  From my point of view, I had to do something about it at that point in our history because I was involved with the military, I was the head of the Department of Defense. I did not involve the generals of the military because they were involved, and so I had to work with young people in the military who were idealistic enough to agree to protect the interest of the country and the Filipino people without involving the people themselves. You see?

ah, yes, the young people in the military, the famous PMA’ers led by gringo honasan, I suppose?  this, from ninotchka rosca:  leftists, former political prisoners went to EDSA “only to be confronted by the faces of those who tortured them.” a heavy trip indeed.  [Endgame 144]

BONGBONG.  Why were you on the kill list of that junta?
E.  Probably because I was a hindrance to their political objective.
B.  So unbeknownst to many or most people, there was a plan for a military take over already?
E.  Correct.
B.  And the Junta was already organized?
E.  Yah.
B.  Can you tell us who the members of the Junta were?
E.  You will be surprised. The Chief of Staff, the head of the Philippine Army, the head of the Philippine Air Force, the head of the Philippine Navy, the head of the Philippine Coast Guard. Those were the members of the junta.

not surprising at all that it was afp chief of staff fabian ver’s cabal.  the head of the philippine army was josephus ramas whom ver appointed to lead the anti-EDSA ops in ’86.  the head of the philippine air force was vicente piccio whose son philip was married that saturday afternoon with ver and imelda standing as ninong and ninang.  the head of the philippine navy brillante ochoco was among the senior officers ver summoned to fort bonifacio for a tactical conference even while the enrile-ramos presscon was going on saturday evening.  can’t find anything on the head of the Philippine Coast Guard, not even a name.  twould be nice to hear from them all whether to corroborate and elaborate or to deny.  let’s hear it too from imelda.  what were ferdie’s instructions?  who else would have been asked to join that 15-member executive committee/ruling junta?

B.  How were they going to take over the reins of power?
E.  According to the information I received, if your Father died, they were not supposed to announce it at all.  They will keep it away from the knowledge of the public.  They will invite all the members of the cabinet in the name of your Father for a cabinet meeting.  And once we are in the Palace we will be quarantined, but in my case I will have to be executed.
B.  This is something that, again I don’t think… Maybe this is the first time that this information has seen the light of day.
E.  Well.
B.  So the uprising of what became EDSA was not a break with my Father, it was an opposition to this Junta.
E.  Correct.

hmm.  in the time of EDSA, maysakit si marcos pero alive and kicking pa, so to speak.  lumalabas pa sa TV, in-control pa rin daw, palaban pa rin.  ibig sabihin, imelda’s junta of generals was not yet operative, a non-entity to the end.

to my mind, enrile’s uprising that “became EDSA” was both a break with marcos whom he wanted to replace AND an attempt to preempt cory or, at the very least, to negotiate an end to the boycott (kahit hindi naman daw siya crony, wala siyang lll-gotten wealth, say niya sa memoir).  and to a certain extent he was successful.  he managed to get on the good side of cory, thanks to the people, and he helped freak the marcoses out of the palace, and that was the end of the boycott, mission accomplished.

B.  EDSA … this popular uprising has become already a part of the political narrative or the political methods of unseating a government or bringing a government down. In your view is that a good development? Should it be part of the narrative?  Should we choose our leaders this way?

E.  We cannot avoid prevent people from marching in the streets to peaceably assemble for redress of grievances, that’s constitutional.  But in the case of the first EDSA, the question is, why EDSA?  Who decided that the event must be in EDSA? Cory did not decide that, none of the Liberal Party people decided that. They were all gone, they were In Cebu. … It was there because we went to Camp Aguinaldo and that is where the confrontation took place.

this is enrile still laying a claim on EDSA.  the way he sees it, kung hindi sila nag-defect, walang EDSA.  totoo naman, to some extent.  kung hindi sila nag-defect, nag-people power pa rin tiyak, hindi nga lang sa EDSA, so we’d be calling it something else.

on that 7th day of the boycott, cory was in cebu rallying the people to join her civil disobedience campaign and adding to the list of crony products and services to boycott.  next stop davao.  the clamor for marcos’s resignation would have spread nationwide by the 10th day, and marcos’s inauguration would have brought out the people marching to mendiola, most likely, if not into the palace mismo, there to face tanks and the Marines as bravely, to stop the oathtaking.

if anything, the military defectors owed their lives and status, post-EDSA, to the people who not only saved their lives but also prevailed upon cory to avail of their armed services.

B.  Tito, All this time since 1986 I have been wanting to ask you a question and I have never found the opportunity to do it, and I think this is a good time.  After all that happened in EDSA, after all this uprising etc. … bakit hindi kayo ang nag-Presidente? You knew the characters that were involved and you were much more qualified than any of them.

E.  You know, your Dad was giving me the government in the morning of Tuesday February 25.

B.  I remember, Tito, I was there when he made the phone call to you.

E.  Corrrect.  He was asking me to ask Cory to postpone her oathtaking.  I told him I will try.

uy.  bago yang “I told him I will try.”  in earlier accounts it was more like, it’s too late, ang say niya kay marcos.  day 4 na iyon noong tawagan siya ni makoy; papunta na siya sa inagurasyon ni cory sa club filipino.

E.  You know, Bongbong, I did not intend to take over power, in the first place.  But while I was inside Camp Aguinaldo, and Camp Crame, I was thinking about what will happen.  I said if the military will take over, I will involve the country into a possible civil war.  Because the election was just finished. There was a big block of votes that voted for Cory, there was a big block of votes that voted for your Father, and I was not exposed to the electoral process at that point. I’m sure that if I did, if the military took over and I assumed power, I will have enemies inside my military organization also, then I will… There is a possibility that the two forces that fought in that election will combine. … And then you have the bulk of the military at that point who did not know where to where they will situate themselves. All of that I thought about it.

that is enrile being noble-kuno about giving way to cory to avoid bloodshed.  in fact, he had no choice, the people gave him no choice.  he didn’t even get a chance – there was simply no opening – to offer himself to the coryistas as the one better equipped to replace marcos.   and if he had dared, cory’s people would have withdrawn their support, i think, and watched him and ver wipe each other out.

E.  By the way Monday night I called for Jimmy Ongpin to come to Camp Crame and I said, with this event that is happening now, will be a protracted event, let us organize a provisional government to handle the running of our revolutionary government. I proposed five cabinet positions.  Defense, Finance, Local Govt, Justice and Foreign Affairs.  Sa inyo yung apat kako na posisyon, sa amin yung Defense. Because I wanted to balance their political forces against the military forces.  Alam mo ang ginawa nila, that night?  That is where I started to suspect them.  They filled all the positions in the Cabinet, they organized their own Cabinet.

B.  But you had an agreement previous to that.

E.  Yah, I had an agreement with Jimmy Ongpin. Eh kako hindi pala totoo na tao itong kausap ko.

this is enrile most unclear.  what kind of revolutionary government was he thinking of?  on day 2 he is said to have proposed to doy laurel a military-civilian junta that would include cory and doy and other civilians.  cory, of course, would not hear of it.  a junta arrangement was always more military than civilian.  why should cory allow herself to be sidelined when she had won the votes of 10 million pinoys, and enrile had not.

B.  It’s always been a mystery to me, because you were positioned perfectly to take over the reins of power and we were all a little surprised, watching this again from far away, and we were saying for sure I’m sure si Minister Enrile…

E.  I was afraid not for myself but for the country, that it will cause a bloodbath.

B.  I think you were similar in thinking to my Father because one of the reasons, and I asked him this directly: Why were you so hesitant to use force in 1986? Nung talagang papasukin na yung palasyo, binobomba na tayo, binabaril na tayo, ganon, marami naman kaming tropa, we were very well prepared, because as I said we received the information about imminent attack to on the Palace one week before you and General Ramos went to Crame and made your stand in Crame, so we had the chance to prepare.  So we were wondering why did we not fight back with force.  And he said, that would have been the beginning of a civil war.  Which I think is exactly the way you saw it.

E.  … GOD was with us because that event turned out to be bloodless because your father restrained himself.

no no no.  EDSA turned out to be bloodless not because marcos restrained himself but because certain officers defied, refused to follow, orders that would have harmed innocent civilians.  read untrue story, unsung heroes, of EDSA.

towards the end, enrile alleges that history was “totally distorted to favor one group.”  i submit that that’s exactly what enrile and bongbong are doing, totally distorting history to favor the memory of marcos.  i look forward to bongbong’s next, hopefully a tete-a-tete with imelda herself.  that would be one for the books.

whiffs of fiction, “public history” 2018

kakaiba ang timpla ng pro-marcos discourse, mas maanghang, mas palaban, mas mayabang.  para kaya maipaabot sa, and impress upon the, supremes where (they think) public sentiments lie, in aid of bongbong winning his PET case and taking over as veep?  next stop, the presidency?

sa social media, kaabang-abang ang tete-a-tete nina juan ponce enrile at ferdinand “bongbong” marcos.  on sept 20 tungkol sa martial law, on sept 22 tungkol sa EDSA.

i expect that the exercise is meant to glorify martial law and to villify EDSA.  it would be nice though if the two could be a little more candid and and even-handed. just as we, who are all set to scream revisionism!!! need to get a better handle on martial law and EDSA.  martial law was not all bad just as EDSA was not all good.

a question i hope is addressed in da tete-a-tete:  so, anong nangyari?  bakit pabagsak na ang ekonomiya by 1982, even before ninoy’s assassination?

sabihin pa natin, for the sake of argument, that marcos did all the right things re infrastructure (except for a lemon or two) and he was able to electrify almost half the archipelago (not all of it, not even close) and he got uncle sam to pay rent for the US bases (kahit binarat tayo nang katakut-takot) atbp, not to speak of how culture and the arts kinda blossomed because of (and despite) imelda:  bakit hindi na-sustain ang “progress”?  bakit biglang ayaw nang magpautang ng mga bangko?  bakit di tayo nakabayad ng mga utang?  bakit ba talaga hindi naging isang singapore ang pinas?

it would be great to hear nationalists in the academe — the historians, the political scientists, the economists — having tv tete-a-tetes with the populace and sharing their findings on questions like these.  we need answers based on facts, figures, records, documents.  so we all — the elected and the electorate alike — can learn the lessons we need to learn, so we can correct our mistakes, so we can move forward.

the last thing we need is a conference of historians perorating on a notion of “public history” (now ongoing 20-22 sept) that i fear would legitimize, validate fictional (partisan, and/or “creative”) accounts of historical events, among other historical and cultural horrors.

bakit wala silang criteria of any kind?  ano ito, let’s just be glad that we’re talking history, even if reeking of fiction and propaganda?  i would sit in judgment: is the opinion sound and balanced?  is it based on facts?  the slightest whiff of fiction should be red-flagged and merit automatic rejection from the annals of public history.

it’s not as if our historians have nothing else to do.  every september and february we hear it repeated that marcos did not give shoot orders that would have harmed civilians in EDSA.  credible eyewitness and first-person accounts say he did.  so who’s revising history?  our historians, academic or “public”, should be weighing in.  otherwise, anong silbi nila?

duterte is ready to step down

“I would suggest to the military, if you want a junta, or if you want yourselves to be in the junta, I say line up here, I’ll put you in your proper place.”

DU30 also said he was ready to be replaced by a “more competent” leader. “If you think there is somebody more competent, then by all means, put him in place. Or a group of persons who you think could bring prosperity to this nation.”

Finally, DU30 said he is opposed to a constitutional succession in case he vacates his office, and reiterated that he does not believe in the competence of Vice President Leni Robredo. “Were it not for the fact that I do not believe in the competence of the Vice President, I’m ready to go anytime,” he said.

hindi naman ito nakakagulat.  recall how reluctant he was to run for president in 2016.  i think he was finally convinced to run only because certain federalists promised that if as candidate and as president he pushed aggressively for federalism and CHANGE,  that it would be a piece of cake, a done deal by midterm elections, and he could step down and make way for a transitory head of state.

it is clear by now, early into his third year, that it ain’t gonna happen anytime soon, not federalism, much less a transition led by a politician of his choice.  it is clear that the leaders of the federalist pack miscalculated badly — akala nila duterte only had to run the country the way he ran davao city, and okay na.  NOT at all.  the drug war on the poor is atrocious and heartbreaking, the corruption grows unabated, and a con-ass is nowhere in sight.  clearly his orders are being defied at every level, even China Hasn’t Delivered on its $24 Billion Philippines Promise, sabi ng bloomberg, and digong must be feeling mighty frustrated, if not incompetent and useless.  running a country, after all, particularly this thirdworld basketcase of a country, is an extremely complicated matter, especially for one who ran on a promise of  CHANGE.

hindi rin nakakagulat na ibig ni digong na i-dictate kung sino ang papalit sa kanya.

The chief executive reiterated his doubts about Robredo’s competence to lead the country should he step down.

“I think deep in my heart, if you follow the succession and Robredo takes over, she can’t handle it. That’s my honest opinion. I wish it were someone in the likes of Escudero or Bongbong Marcos,” Duterte said.

i think maybe he was also promised that bongbong would win the vp election, but he lost, as did chiz.  and why chiz (is that you, danding cojuangco)?  of course bongbong’s contesting leni’s win, and it would be safe to suppose that digong is counting on the supremes’ PET ruling in favor of bongbong so he can take over as VP.  so why did digong even mention chiz?  or a military junta?  could it be that he is hedging his bets, in case bongbong proves to be unacceptable to the people because #NeverAgain a marcos as president?

talk is rife that the president’s health is failing and he would step down in a heartbeat if he were sure that he would not be charged with crimes and sent to jail.  but in aug 2016 he had no such fear.  read Duterte says his old age can help him avoid jail.

Old age may be a disadvantage to some but for President Rodrigo Duterte, it is a means to avoid imprisonment.

The tough-talking Duterte said that under the law, prisoners who are 70 years old or above should be released.

More than 400 people have [had] been killed in the government’s anti-drug operations, alarming human rights advocates who believe that the law enforcement operations may be used to justify extralegal killings.

“I don’t care about human rights. I said I have a problem to solve. I must first solve the problems of the country. I am already 71 years old and according to the Revised Penal Code, you have to be released once you reach 70,” the president said.

so what has changed?  sal panelo, digong’s chief legal counsel, says the president is shaking the tree … and talk of wanting to step down is “a foreshadow of radical things to come.”  i suppose this is why buhay na naman ang revgov peeps, urging digong to declare a revolutionary government that would ram a federal constitution and another marcos down our throats?  #godforbid  #taketothestreets

non-violent tactics #EDSA’86

read UP professor amado mendoza jr‘s ‘People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983-86,  chapter 11 of the book  Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present by adam roberts & timothy garton ash, published by oxford university in 2009.

… It might have been expected that the Marcos regime would be overthrown violently by the ongoing communist insurgency or a military coup.  Scholars of regime change have long argued that neo-patrimonial dictatorships are particularly vulnerable to violent overthrow by armed opponents.

The peaceful outcome in the Philippines is therefore a puzzle.  Thompson argued that Marcos’s removal was the result of moderate forces successfully out-manoeuvring the different armed groups.  Boudreau acknowledged the competitive and complementary relationship between the armed and unarmed anti-dictatorship movements, but believed that the creation of an organized non-communist option that regime defectors could support was decisive. [180-181]

very interesting, and informative of poltical mindsets circa ’83-’86:

Exiled to the US in 1980, Senator Aquino returned in August 1983 hoping to persuade an ailing Marcos to step down and allow him to take over.  His brazen assassination at Manila international airport unleashed a broad civil resistance movement which eventually outstripped the communist insurgency in terms of media coverage and mass mobilization.  The Catholic Church, led by Cardinal Jaime Sin, played an active role in bringing together the non-communist opposition and Manila’s business elite.  Pro-opposition mass media outlets were opened and a citizens’ electoral watch movement was revived.  Aquino’s death also prompted US State Department officials to assist political moderates and pressure Marcos for reforms.  Marcos tried to divide the opposition anew through the 1984 parliamentary elections.  While some moderates joined a communist-led boycott, others (supported by the widowed Corazon Aquino) participate—and won a third of the contested seats despite widespread violence, cheating, and government control of the media. 

Emboldened moderates consequently spurned a commnist-dominated anti-dictatorship alliance in 1985 to form their own coalition.  While Marcos called for ‘snap’ presidential elections, they united behind Mrs. Aquino’s candidacy.  The communists, hoping to worsen intra-elite conflicts, called for another boycott.  Military officers associate with Enrile formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and tacitly supported Aquino’s candidacy while preparing for an anti-Marcos coup.  Faced by a vigorous opposition campaign, Marcos resorted to fraud and systematic violence.  The combination of a now unmuzzled press and the presence of election observers sparked large-scale civil disobedience.  The Church declared that Marcos has lost the moral right to rule.

The end-game was precipitated by a RAM coup attempt.  Pre-empted by loyalist forces, rebel officers led by Enrile and Ramos defected to Aquino on 22 February 1986 and recognized her as the country’s legitimate leader.  These events led to an internationally televised standoff between loyalist troops and millions of unarmed civilian protesters who had gathered to protect the rebels.  As the regime came under pressure, it lost the will to survive.  Defections mounted and the Reagan administration finally withdrew its support.  On 25 February 1986, the Marcos family and entourage were airlifted to exile in Hawaii.  [182-183]

indeed non-violence won the war, but whether or not it was the result of deliberate strategies and manoeuvres by the non-communist anti-marcos moderates remains to be known.  what deserves mention is that ninoy was on non-violent mode when he came home from exile in aug ’83, his homecoming speech citing ghandi no less:

According to Gandhi, the willing sacrifice of the innocent is the most powerful answer to insolent tyranny that has yet been conceived by God and man.

perhaps he had discussed gandhi and non-violence with cory, who may have relayed the message to ninoy’s brother butz, whose august twenty-one movement (ATOM)’s protest rallies were decidedly non-violent from start to finish.

so was cory’s huge Tagumpay ng Bayan rally in luneta where she declared victory in the snap elections, sabay launch ng non-violent civil disobedence and crony-boycott campaign that coryistas couldn’t wait to be part of.  by day six of the boycott, the economy was reeling and the crony-business community was looking to negotiate, but with whom?  day seven of the boycott (EDSA saturday), enrile and ramos defected.  hmmm, di ba.  enrile was a top crony, next only to danding.  with whom na nga ba?

as in august ’83, butz rose to the occasion that EDSA saturday night.  it was butz who first sounded the call for people to come to EDSA and shield the defectors with their bodies, no guns.  cardinal sin seconded the call for a nonviolent solution an hour or so later, and cory the next day, from cebu.  ATOM was all over EDSA, butz dealing directly, facing off, with police general alfredo lim (who was ordered to disperse the crowds) and then marine commander alfredo tadiar (who was ordered to ram through! the crowd).

i’ve always wondered who, if any, advised cory and butz on non-violent tactics.  that luneta rally was sheer genius.  bentang benta sa moderate forces who liked the drama of non-violence:  nasa bahay ka lang pero feeling part of the struggle ka, and feeling revenged na rin on the regime — goodbye manila bulletin hello inquirer, goodbye san miguel beer, hello lambanog, goodbye cocacola, hello buko juice — what fun.  and that call to EDSA to shield the rebels from the dictator’s forces was inspired — was it pure butz?  was he winging it? — basta walang armas, be ready to die!  and the people were.  ready to die.  (huwag ismiran, mocha uson!)

contrary to popular perception, however, enrile did not defect to join cory nor did he recognize her as the duly-elected president right away.  enrile wanted to be president, and the aborted coup plot set for 23 feb 2 AM would have quickly installed him in malacañang.  in short, he meant to beat cory in a race to the palace,  una-unahan lang.  but ver got wind of honasan’s plans, and honasan got wind of ver’s plans (arrest orders, among others), which drove enrile and RAM to hole up in camp aguinaldo, better to die fighting, while hoping against hope to win the people’s support — after all, he was more qualified to be president.

but by day two, EDSA sunday, the day the people stopped the tanks in ortigas, it was clear that the people were there for cory — shielding enrile yes, but chanting cory’s name, wearing cory’s colors, waving cory’s flags — and it was obvious that they expected cory and enrile to join forces vs. marcos.  sometime over that long night, enrile and ramos, separately, met with cory in her sister’s house in greenhills.  i suppose that’s when the two asked for the top defense positions, an end to the crony-boycott, and immunity from suit in exchange for their armed support.

it disappoints, of course, that prof mendoza characterizes the dictator’s response during the key days as “inexplicably lame and non-violent.”  as though there had been no real threat of violence?  which is to diminish, even if unintentionally, the people’s role in that stunning revolt.

the dictator’s orders were neither lame nor non-violent.  on day 3, EDSA monday, twice marcos gave orders to bomb camp crame, except that air force col. sotelo and the entire 15th strike wing defected instead, and col. balbas and the marines (like commander tadiar the day before), after much delaying, defied orders, and returned to barracks instead.

true, the dictator’s forces could have struck immediately at the rebel military “before a protective civilian cocoon had been mobilized to protect them”, but marcos actually thought he could woo enrile back to the fold.  he had no idea that there was no turning back for enrile who was off on a new trip, navigating uncharted waters, and reinventing himself.

of course, he regretted giving way to cory, but i’m glad he did.

of course cory must have regretted giving him immunity, and i’m sorry she did.

next time, we the people should have a better sense — in real time —  of what’s happening behind-the-scenes and what’s being promised / compromised in our name.  we shouldn’t make bitaw too quickly or trust in our leaders so blindly.  i would think that non-violent engagement can be sustainable and long-term.