Category: history

noise barrage 1978, first People Power show

The people first made their presence known, loud and clear, five years into martial rule, on the 6th of April 1978. It was the eve of elections for Members of Parliament who would sit in the Interim Batasang Pambansa or National Assembly. Under pressure from the U.S. government, Marcos had allowed Ninoy to head a new party, Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) and from his prison cell to run for a seat in opposition to KBL’s frontrunner Imelda. A month before elections, Defense Minister Enrile went on TV and charged Ninoy of being both a communist and a CIA agent.

Ninoy demanded equal TV time and got it. It was his first ever appearance on public television in almost six years and the nation was enthralled (the streets were empty, everyone was indoors watching TV) and shocked at how much weight the once chubby senator had lost. For people who voted him into the Senate in ’71 there was a poignant sense, long overdue, of how terribly he must have suffered, and continued to suffer, under Marcos rule. And yet the man had lost neither his ardor nor his bite and the people took little convincing that Enrile lied, Ninoy was neither a communist nor a CIA agent.

Except for that one TV appearance, Ninoy’s campaign was left to his wife Cory and seven-year old Kris, whose rallying cry was, “Help my Daddy come home!”  On April 6, the eve of elections, Ninoy’s secret admirers from left, right, and center responded under cover of darkness with the historic noise barrage. At 7:00 P.M. on the dot, we took to Manila’s streets yelling, “Laban!” and making the L sign with thumb and index finger, accompanied by car horns shrieking, pots and pans banging, whistles blowing, sirens wailing, church bells pealing, alarm bells ringing, never mind if the dreaded military picked us all up. We had no idea then that it was organized by Communist Party leader Filemon Lagman a.k.a. Popoy,  and if we had known, we would have joined anyway just to spite the dictator.

The noise barrage did not win Ninoy the election that was marked by massive cheating, but it told him in no uncertain terms that there were Filipinos out there like him, anonymous but increasing in numbers, who were yearning for freedom.  These people were not to surface for another five years. [EDSA UNO (2013) “Marcos Times” pp 24-25]

March for Our Lives, ‘78 Laban Noise Barrage, and the fight vs. Duterte

from cj puno to cj sereno #lookback

cj sereno’s quick rise to the judiciary’s highest post in 2012 was far from auspicious, coming as it did on the heels of the ignominiously controversial impeachment and conviction of her immediate predecessor, cj renato corona, in 2011.

and then, again, the reverse might also be true:  that pNoy’s appointment of sereno was auspicious because it was a matter of righting a wrong — the corona appointment by outgoing prez gloria arroyo was a (post)midnight appointment, expressly prohibited by the constitution; it was for incumbent prez benigno aquino III to appoint the replacement of cj reynato puno who was due to step down may 17 2010.

(Article 7, Section 15) “Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.”

katatapos ng may 10 2010 elections, obvious winner na si pNoy, pero presidente pa si gloria, when on may 12 she appointed corona sc chief justice — ni hindi pa bakante ang posisyon — with the backing of the puno supreme court, no less (even if puno himself abstained), and some very powerful figures in legal and political circles.

it was the culmination of a scheme initiated as early as december 2009 by arroyo diehard, rep matias defensor, so the backstory goes.  read marites danguilan vitug’s Inside the JBC: The appointment of the Chief Justice in 2010.  

Those who rallied for the appointment of a Chief Justice despite the ban during the election period stood on shaky ground. Their main argument hinged on an imagined scenario that revolved on a forthcoming novel experience. With the country’s first-ever automated polls, they foresaw confusion and a deluge of election protests that would eventually reach the Supreme Court. It was important, therefore, to have a Chief Justice to preside over the resolution of these contentious cases.

more than a decade earlier, says marites, cj andres narvasa was faced with the same kind of pressure but he withstood it.

Chief Justice Andres Narvasa refused to convene the JBC to fill up a vacancy on the Court because it fell during the appointments ban. He fiercely stood his ground despite pressure from Malacañang.”

unfortunately, cj puno was (is?) made of different stuff.

In March … In a 9-1 vote, the Court decided to exempt itself and the rest of the judiciary from the appointments ban. President Arroyo could appoint the next Chief Justice.

so accommodating of cj puno, diba? making an exception for arroyo, on such flimsy grounds, when an acting chief justice would have done as well during the transition.

what if

what if puno had done a narvasa instead.  what if he had stood firm about following the constitution?  he would have saved nation the aggravation and expense (!) of the corona impeachment and trial and, even, this whole sereno shebang.  i guess it tells us whose side former cj puno was really on then, and whose side he’s really on now, as he shepherds the crafting of a draft constitution.  (gma, is that you?)

matakot tayo.  magtanong tayo.  ano ba talaga ang agenda ni ex-cj puno?  who / what convinced him to be part of this scheme to sell charter change and federalism as the solution to all our problems, which are legion and complicated.  does it not bother him that many think him a sad sell-out?  is he?  pa-executive session executive session pa ang consultative commission (just heard it on dzmm).  what’s all the secrecy all about?  what do they think they’re cooking up.  other than more chaos and anarchy, mabuhay ang elite rule?

what if cj puno had insisted, first, on an intense multi-media information campaign, and shown some semblance of taking the time to listen to and discuss with the people.  twould  be great to have a national conversation about this.  and it’s what we need.

but back to cj impeachments  

if puno had not played along with arroyo, and if arroyo had not appointed corona cj when she did, then pNoy would have had to choose from a list that could not have yet included sereno dahil i-a-appoint pa lang niya ito as associate justice in august 16 2010.

malamang ay napilitan si pNoy to choose from the eminently more qualified and next-in-line, and the supremes might not now be so restive and vulnerable to political nudges from left right and center, what a shame.

which brings me to the 2012 sereno appointment and the perception that it was a good, an auspicious, beginning, because a matter of righting a wrong.  i have a real problem with this.

the wrong done was the midnight appointment, the wrong was done by president arroyo with the complicity of cj puno and the supremes.  BUT the wrong found and for which corona was punished — undeclared wealth — had nothing to do with the midnight-appointment itself that was a brazen violation of the constitution.

bakit ganoon ang nangyari?  because no one dared take gma to court?  or it was easier, took less courage, if a lot of money, to find fault with corona, anything that would get him out of the way?

in my final analysis, corona was faulted and removed for accepting the arroyo appointment — he could have said no, it was against the constitution, he’d take his chances with the new prez.  ironically enough, sereno too might well be faulted and removed for accepting the aquino appointment — she could have said no, she was too young, she had no court experience.

neither anticipated that their SALNs would be under scrutiny.  after all, according to senator rene saguisag who helped craft the law, violation of the SALN law was NOT an impeachable offense until the enrile senate sitting as an impeachment court dared declare it so in the 2011 trial.

in any case, pareho lang si corona at si sereno, it would seem.  and she, too, deserves her day/s in court, let the chips fall where they may.

at itigil na please ang quo warranto eklat na iyan, mr. solicitor-general.  nagmamalinis naman masyado ang duterte admin.  after six months of impeachment hearings in the lower house that practically tore apart the cj, let s/he who is without sin cast the next stone.  i would so like to meet him  and shake his hand.

non-violent tactics #EDSA’86

read UP professor amado mendoza jr‘s ‘People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983-86,  chapter 11 of the book  Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present by adam roberts & timothy garton ash, published by oxford university in 2009.

… It might have been expected that the Marcos regime would be overthrown violently by the ongoing communist insurgency or a military coup.  Scholars of regime change have long argued that neo-patrimonial dictatorships are particularly vulnerable to violent overthrow by armed opponents.

The peaceful outcome in the Philippines is therefore a puzzle.  Thompson argued that Marcos’s removal was the result of moderate forces successfully out-manoeuvring the different armed groups.  Boudreau acknowledged the competitive and complementary relationship between the armed and unarmed anti-dictatorship movements, but believed that the creation of an organized non-communist option that regime defectors could support was decisive. [180-181]

very interesting, and informative of poltical mindsets circa ’83-’86:

Exiled to the US in 1980, Senator Aquino returned in August 1983 hoping to persuade an ailing Marcos to step down and allow him to take over.  His brazen assassination at Manila international airport unleashed a broad civil resistance movement which eventually outstripped the communist insurgency in terms of media coverage and mass mobilization.  The Catholic Church, led by Cardinal Jaime Sin, played an active role in bringing together the non-communist opposition and Manila’s business elite.  Pro-opposition mass media outlets were opened and a citizens’ electoral watch movement was revived.  Aquino’s death also prompted US State Department officials to assist political moderates and pressure Marcos for reforms.  Marcos tried to divide the opposition anew through the 1984 parliamentary elections.  While some moderates joined a communist-led boycott, others (supported by the widowed Corazon Aquino) participate—and won a third of the contested seats despite widespread violence, cheating, and government control of the media. 

Emboldened moderates consequently spurned a commnist-dominated anti-dictatorship alliance in 1985 to form their own coalition.  While Marcos called for ‘snap’ presidential elections, they united behind Mrs. Aquino’s candidacy.  The communists, hoping to worsen intra-elite conflicts, called for another boycott.  Military officers associate with Enrile formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and tacitly supported Aquino’s candidacy while preparing for an anti-Marcos coup.  Faced by a vigorous opposition campaign, Marcos resorted to fraud and systematic violence.  The combination of a now unmuzzled press and the presence of election observers sparked large-scale civil disobedience.  The Church declared that Marcos has lost the moral right to rule.

The end-game was precipitated by a RAM coup attempt.  Pre-empted by loyalist forces, rebel officers led by Enrile and Ramos defected to Aquino on 22 February 1986 and recognized her as the country’s legitimate leader.  These events led to an internationally televised standoff between loyalist troops and millions of unarmed civilian protesters who had gathered to protect the rebels.  As the regime came under pressure, it lost the will to survive.  Defections mounted and the Reagan administration finally withdrew its support.  On 25 February 1986, the Marcos family and entourage were airlifted to exile in Hawaii.  [182-183]

indeed non-violence won the war, but whether or not it was the result of deliberate strategies and manoeuvres by the non-communist anti-marcos moderates remains to be known.  what deserves mention is that ninoy was on non-violent mode when he came home from exile in aug ’83, his homecoming speech citing ghandi no less:

According to Gandhi, the willing sacrifice of the innocent is the most powerful answer to insolent tyranny that has yet been conceived by God and man.

perhaps he had discussed gandhi and non-violence with cory, who may have relayed the message to ninoy’s brother butz, whose august twenty-one movement (ATOM)’s protest rallies were decidedly non-violent from start to finish.

so was cory’s huge Tagumpay ng Bayan rally in luneta where she declared victory in the snap elections, sabay launch ng non-violent civil disobedence and crony-boycott campaign that coryistas couldn’t wait to be part of.  by day six of the boycott, the economy was reeling and the crony-business community was looking to negotiate, but with whom?  day seven of the boycott (EDSA saturday), enrile and ramos defected.  hmmm, di ba.  enrile was a top crony, next only to danding.  with whom na nga ba?

as in august ’83, butz rose to the occasion that EDSA saturday night.  it was butz who first sounded the call for people to come to EDSA and shield the defectors with their bodies, no guns.  cardinal sin seconded the call for a nonviolent solution an hour or so later, and cory the next day, from cebu.  ATOM was all over EDSA, butz dealing directly, facing off, with police general alfredo lim (who was ordered to disperse the crowds) and then marine commander alfredo tadiar (who was ordered to ram through! the crowd).

i’ve always wondered who, if any, advised cory and butz on non-violent tactics.  that luneta rally was sheer genius.  bentang benta sa moderate forces who liked the drama of non-violence:  nasa bahay ka lang pero feeling part of the struggle ka, and feeling revenged na rin on the regime — goodbye manila bulletin hello inquirer, goodbye san miguel beer, hello lambanog, goodbye cocacola, hello buko juice — what fun.  and that call to EDSA to shield the rebels from the dictator’s forces was inspired — was it pure butz?  was he winging it? — basta walang armas, be ready to die!  and the people were.  ready to die.  (huwag ismiran, mocha uson!)

contrary to popular perception, however, enrile did not defect to join cory nor did he recognize her as the duly-elected president right away.  enrile wanted to be president, and the aborted coup plot set for 23 feb 2 AM would have quickly installed him in malacañang.  in short, he meant to beat cory in a race to the palace,  una-unahan lang.  but ver got wind of honasan’s plans, and honasan got wind of ver’s plans (arrest orders, among others), which drove enrile and RAM to hole up in camp aguinaldo, better to die fighting, while hoping against hope to win the people’s support — after all, he was more qualified to be president.

but by day two, EDSA sunday, the day the people stopped the tanks in ortigas, it was clear that the people were there for cory — shielding enrile yes, but chanting cory’s name, wearing cory’s colors, waving cory’s flags — and it was obvious that they expected cory and enrile to join forces vs. marcos.  sometime over that long night, enrile and ramos, separately, met with cory in her sister’s house in greenhills.  i suppose that’s when the two asked for the top defense positions, an end to the crony-boycott, and immunity from suit in exchange for their armed support.

it disappoints, of course, that prof mendoza characterizes the dictator’s response during the key days as “inexplicably lame and non-violent.”  as though there had been no real threat of violence?  which is to diminish, even if unintentionally, the people’s role in that stunning revolt.

the dictator’s orders were neither lame nor non-violent.  on day 3, EDSA monday, twice marcos gave orders to bomb camp crame, except that air force col. sotelo and the entire 15th strike wing defected instead, and col. balbas and the marines (like commander tadiar the day before), after much delaying, defied orders, and returned to barracks instead.

true, the dictator’s forces could have struck immediately at the rebel military “before a protective civilian cocoon had been mobilized to protect them”, but marcos actually thought he could woo enrile back to the fold.  he had no idea that there was no turning back for enrile who was off on a new trip, navigating uncharted waters, and reinventing himself.

of course, he regretted giving way to cory, but i’m glad he did.

of course cory must have regretted giving him immunity, and i’m sorry she did.

next time, we the people should have a better sense — in real time —  of what’s happening behind-the-scenes and what’s being promised / compromised in our name.  we shouldn’t make bitaw too quickly or trust in our leaders so blindly.  i would think that non-violent engagement can be sustainable and long-term.

of “mini-EDSAs” and the inability “to explain” the big one #EDSA’86

read boying pimentel‘s Never mind EDSA: Remember the battles before the uprising.  i agree with most of pimentel’s sentiments except  the “Never mind EDSA” part of the title  and, in the essay itself, these lines:

Celebrating EDSA has typically been about remembering only the last three years of the Marcos nightmare.

That’s not enough. That has even hurt our ability to explain what happened.

Time to go beyond EDSA.

fine to focus on the 10 years of martial law previous to ninoy’s assassination —  years of silence, fear, terror, and defiance, indeed.  and good to remind that the unrest and the dissidence that culminated in EDSA ’86 started long before ninoy was assassinated.  that three years into martial law, la tondena workers dared go on strike :

One of the first major open acts of rebellion against the dictatorship happened in October 1975 when about 500 workers at La Tondena went on strike, the first during martial law.

Led by former student activist Edgar Jopson and veteran labor activists, it was a bold, extremely dangerous move.  The regime, in the early years of martial law, cracked down hard on even the mildest form of dissent.

The strike was broken up. Strikers were arrested. But word of the protest action spread, and La Tondena became one of the symbols of resistance.

In fact, the strike slogan — “Tama Na! Sobra Na! Welga Na!” — would later be modified to become the battle cry of the final battle against Marcos: “Tama Na! Sobra Na! Palitan Na!”

read, too, carlos maningat‘s Before EDSA 1 was the 1975 La Tondeña strike

Defying the protest ban during the Marcos dictatorship, around 800 workers of then Palanca-owned La Tondeña distillery in Tondo, Manila launched a paralyzing strike on Oct. 24, 1975 as they called for an end to contractualization. In particular, they demanded the regularization of contractual workers, as well as the reinstatement  and regularization of all fired contractual workers. Amid the overwhelming presence of the military and goons, the workers stood their ground for at least 44 hours to assert their demands.

…In the course of the three-day strike, nuns, priests and seminarians stood guard and held a vigil, supplying food for workers and distributing manifestos to passers-by.  Student leader Edgar Jopson, former president of the National Union of Students of the Philippines, also supported the workers’ strike.

… Hundreds were arrested in La Tondeña alone. Their strike proved to be successful nevertheless as the management gave in to some of their demands, including the regularization of around 300 workers. On a larger context, the strike tore down Marcos’ autocratic ban on protest actions and signaled the outburst of more daring protests, culminating in general strikes up to the People Power uprising in 1986.

good to remind, too, of the 1978 noise barrage, but it happened on the eve of the April 7 elections, not after.  the jailed Ninoy was running for the batasang pambansa, as was imelda.  read tingting cojuangco‘s Flashback: Ninoy and the 1978 elections.

One day, a chain letter to Peping surfaced at a rally. “At seven in the evening, I will go out to the street and make noise by beating a pan, blowing a horn, or even shouting in protest.” It was a terrific idea and Peping endorsed it. So thousands of mimeographed copies of the letter were distributed in all the churches on Sunday. What a monumental success and it happened on the eve of election day. Ninoy even heard it from his prison cell in Fort Bonifacio.

i remember those exciting times.

Except for one TV appearance, Ninoy’s campaign was left to his wife Cory and seven-year old Kris, whose rallying cry was, “Help my Daddy come home!”  On April 6, the eve of elections, Ninoy’s secret admirers from left, right, and center responded under cover darkness with the historic noise barrage.  At 7:00 PM on the dot, we took to Manila’s streets yelling, “Laban!” and making the L sign with thumb and index fingers, accompanied by car horns shrieking, pots and pans banging, whistles blowing, sirens wailing, church bells pealing, alarm bells ringing, never mind if the dreaded military picked us all up.  We had no idea then that it was organized by Communist Party leader Filemon aka Popoy Lagman, and if we had known, we would have joined anyway just to spite the dictator.

The noise barrage did not win Ninoy the election that was marked by massive cheating, but it told him in no uncertain terms that there were Filipinos out there, anonymous but increasing in numbers, who like him were yearning for freedom.  These people were not to surface for another five years.  [EDSA Uno: A Narrative and Analysis with Notes on Edsa Dos and Tres (1913). 25]

pimentel does not move on to the next “mini-EDSA” five years later, when ninoy came home from US exile and was assassinated, while under military escort, in broad daylight.

Ninoy never saw the yellow ribbons adorning trees and street posts or heard the people, anonymous no longer, sing “Tie a Yellow Ribbon” in welcome. Ninoy is dead, long live Ninoy! Yellow was the color of the people and Radio Veritas the voice of the opposition. Veritas, owned and operated by the Catholic Church, was the only radio station that dared broadcast the assassination and relay the nation’s shock and dismay. No one doubted that Marcos was to blame, never mind who pulled the trigger. Even the elite minority was offended—if he could do it to Ninoy he could do it to them.

The message of Ninoy’s sacrifice was not lost on the people. Ninoy’s courage touched them, roused them from their apathy, rekindled their sense of collective worth. The Filipino is worth dying for. Then and there, thousands of his admirers who joined the ’78 noise barrage under cover of darkness dared step forward in the light of day and be counted among the grieving. They came in droves to Ninoy’s and Cory’s home in Times Street, Quezon City and quietly, bravely, lined up for a glimpse of his bloody remains and to bid their fallen hero goodbye; thousands more followed his remains to Sto. Domingo Church. On the day of the funeral, millions left their homes and workplaces to march and line the streets where Ninoy’s casket would pass, and they raised their fists, sang “Bayan Ko,” cried, “Ninoy, hindi ka nag-iisa!” [31-32]

and just to complete the narrative:  two years and some six months later came the feb 7 1986 snap elections that saw coryistas guarding ballot boxes and reporting cheating and other irregularities nationwide, broadcast by radio veritas.  eight days later the batasang pambansa declared marcos the winner anyway, and the very next day, feb 16, cory held that giant protest rally in luneta where she claimed victory and rolled out the hugely successful crony-boycott and civil disobedience campaign.  the people were already in the throes of revolution, and ripe for EDSA, when the final four days of the boycott began to unfold.  [43]

NEVER MIND EDSA?

… it’s easier for the Marcos forces to dismiss the significance of EDSA if we remember only the festive four days, the flowers and the confetti and the nuns with rosaries kneeling before tanks … but not the sacrifices of young Filipinos who were fighting back when it wasn’t fashionable and extremely dangerous to do so.

let’s face it, guys.  it’s easy for the marcos forces to dismiss the significance of EDSA not because we remember, and celebrate, only the “festive four days” but because all these years later, we still don’t really know, wala pa ring collective sense of, what really happened during those final four days. 

something the marcoses are quite happy about, of course.  the more magulo the story, the better for them.  and so the marcos-ver camp, halimbawa, continues to pedddle the lie that marcos did not issue shoot-to-kill orders, and mainstream and social media continue to be complicit in keeping the lie alive, even when the contrary — marcos gave the kill-order — is duly documented in many publications:  while on TV marcos was ordering ver not to shoot, in camp aguinaldo the marines  were receiving orders from the palace to fire! bomb camp crame, never mind the civilians. (day 3, EDSA monday, mid-morning)

and what about enrile who from day one EDSA saturday obfuscated about why they had defected, and when accused by marcos of an aborted coup plot, absolutely denied it even if it was true.  he lied about it all through the four days and long after, admitting to it only 26 years later, in his 2012 memoir (na sino naman ang nakabasa) but without explaining why he lied.

my theory has always been that admitting to the aborted coup plot would have been to admit that he and RAM wanted himself, and no one else, to replace marcos — and that would have turned off coryistas, especially cory (enrile was ninoy’s jailer).  on day two EDSA sunday, when cory returned from cebu, she wanted to call the coryistas to luneta instead but she was dissuaded from doing so as it would have divided the coryistas, the very same ones who were already stopping tanks on ortigas.

i could go on and on about all the things we don’t know yet about those four days — like how sick was marcos really?  if he was so sick, why was he still calling the shots?  what were the dynamics like with ver, with imelda, with bongbong, with imee and irene, tommy and greggy?  who wanted to go, who wanted to stay?  was paoay a real option?

but not having answers to those questions does not mean that we don’t know enough about EDSA to glean lessons from it.  the mini-EDSAs are almost-as-nothing in the magnificent light of EDSA.  if we would only read up, and give it some thought.  we ousted marcos, what a feat!  what did we do right?  what did we do wrong?

because we can actually do it better, as in, note the patterns.  level-up the goal/s.  upgrade the tactics.  but first we need to get a handle on EDSA.

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Remembering people power still matters by Bryan Dennis Gabito Tiojanco