Category: martial law

EDSA ’86 — Aquino vs. Marcos lang daw ?!?

SABI-SABI NG MGA MARCOS #1

Ang EDSA daw ay hindi pag-aalsa laban kay Marcos nung 1986.  Ang EDSA daw ay laban lang ng dalawang political families: Aquino vs Marcos.

HINDI TOTOO.

Ang EDSA ay pag-aalsa ng taongbayan kontra-Marcos nang dinaya ni Marcos ang snap election.

Dati nang gawi ni Marcos ang pandaraya sa  mga referendum at eleksyon in the 14 years of Martial Law – lutong Makoy, ika nga.

Yung 1986 snap election ang naging last straw.  Agad kasing napatunayan ng taongbayan na may nagaganap na dayaan nung mag-walk-out ang computer technicians ng COMELEC — iba daw ang vote-count nila sa vote-count na ibinibigay sa mga media na hawak ni Marcos.

Balita pa ng NAMFREL, sa mga balwarte ng Oposisyon may tatlong milyong rehistradong botante ang hindi nakaboto – nag-disappear na lang ang names nila sa voters’ lists.  Icing on the cake na lang ang confession ni Enrile nung Feb 22 na dinaya nila si Cory sa Cagayan.

Taongbayan na dinaya ang kalaban ni Marcos noong EDSA.

Taongbayan na sawang-sawa na sa panunupil at korapsyon ang nanindigan laban kay Marcos noong EDSA.

KUNG AWAY-PAMILYA LANG ang kina Marcos at Ninoy … gusto lang ni Marcos na mapatahimik si Ninoy … bakit buong bansa ang isinailalim sa Martial Law?

Kung si Ninoy lang ang problema, bakit umabot si Marcos sa Proclamation 1081 at Batas Militar?

ANG TOTOO:  Ang goal talaga ni Marcos ay mamuno sa Pilipinas habangbuhay.  Bagong Lipunan = Marcos Dynasty.  Marcos Forever.  Pagkatapos niya, si Imelda.  At pag-ready na, si Imee.  Na puwede lang mangyari kung walang Ninoy at kung tuloy-tuloy ang Batas Militar.

Pero dahil may isang astig na Ninoy Aquino na nanindigan laban sa diktador, na siya niyang ikinamatay, lalong namulat ang taongbayan sa tapang at kabayanihan ni Ninoy at sa kalupitan, panunupil, at panlilinlang ng rehimeng Marcos.

ANG TAONGBAYAN AT SI CORY

Taongbayan na mulat sa demokrasya at kalayaan ang nag-udyok kay Cory na tumakbong pangulo noong 1986.

At nang dayain ni Marcos ang snap election, taongbayan ang nagbigay-buhay sa crony boycott ni Cory.  Ika-pitong araw na ng boykot nang mag-defect sina Enrile at Ramos.  [Humahabol much?]

Sa kainitang iyon ng boykot, parang hulog ng langit ang datíng ng military defection.  Wow.  May armed forces na si Cory?!?  Agad sumaklolo sa EDSA ang taongbayan.

Ayun pala, hindi type ni Cory ang dalawang bandido, and vice versa,

Si Ramos ang nagpa-aresto kay Ninoy close to midnight of September 22 1972. Si Enrile ang “jailer” ni Ninoy 1972-1980.

Kung si Cory ang nasunod noong nag-defect sina Enrile, sa Luneta niya yinaya ang supporters niya, hindi sa EDSA.  Mas gusto niya sanang manood lang from the sidelines habang nagbabanatan at nagpapatayan ang puwersang repormista at puwersang loyalista. [Imagine. What if.]

Pero napangunahan ng taongbayan si Cory.  Sumusugod na sila sa EDSA nang nabalitaan ni Cory ang defection.  Humaharang na sila sa tangke nang bumalik si Cory from Cebu.

PEOPLE POWER

Sa huli, nang kumaripas ng takbo ang mga Marcos, hindi ito dala ng takot sa lumalakas na armadong puwersa ng kaaway – nagmamadali silang umexit dala ng matinding takot sa (unarmed) People Power na nagbabadya sa gates ng Malacañang.

People Power din, na nagbabadya sa gates ng Clark Air Base, ang ikinatakot ni Gen. Teddy Allen kaya siya humingi ng permiso sa Washington DC na ilipad paalis ng Pinas, sa lalong madaling panahon, ang  barkadang Marcos-Danding-Ver.

Ibang klase ang powers ng taongbayan kapag mulat, maraming marami, at nagkakaisa.  Walang armas, pero matapang at umaasinta.  Who knows what People Power can do?  Or make happen?

Iyan ang fear ni Marcos nung Pebrero 25 1986.  Hindi na siya in-control.  Mabigat  ang kalaban.  Anything could happen.  Kaya sila tumakbo.

BLACK PROP

Siyempre baliktad ang version of the story ng Marcos heirs.  Wala-lang daw ang EDSA, pulitika lang, away ng dalawang pamilya, kinidnap nga sila, kawawa naman sila.

Ang kakapal.

Ang kampanya ni Marcos Jr. is built on huge lies that paint the Marcoses all good and the Aquinos and EDSA all evil. 

Anything to justify a return to the Palace. 

Grabe ang riches at stake, ill-gotten and all. 

Worth na worth lying for, in the Marcos playbook.

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read the marcos curse https://stuartsantiago.com/the-marcos-curse- 

The Unbelievable Irwin Ver (updated)

Being reposted on Facebook is Esquire magazine’s 2017 essay “Strange Bedfellows: A Martial Law Love Story” by Aurora N. Almendral. It’s about the romance of the author’s mom, Gemma Nemenzo (sister of Francisco “Dodong” Nemenzo, high-ranking communist in the ’60s and ’70s) and former colonel Irwin Ver (son of Marcos’s AFP chief of staff Gen. Fabian Ver in the time of martial law).

No offense meant to Gemma, whom I met in 1983, Sesame days  (she was the media liaison of the Philippine Sesame Street Project), but Irwin Ver’s pronouncements about Ninoy Aquino and the dictator Ferdinand Marcos are nakaka-offend, being clearly of a piece with Bongbong Marcos’s flippant dismissal of anything negative about his father. In effect, Irwin and Bongbong paint their fathers innocent of any crimes and unjustly ousted by the people.

ON NINOY’S KILLING 1983 | “No, I don’t think he was involved”

Irwin’s story is that, like his father the general, he was at home when Ninoy was shot.

He was watching TV when his father barged into his quarters dressed in pambahay, to tell him something had happened at the airport.

“If he knew that something like that would happen,” Irwin said, to me, to my mother, to my mother’s friends and family, to everyone who has asked him, “he would have been in uniform. He would have been at his office, monitoring the situation. But he was as shocked as the rest of us. No, I don’t think he was involved.”

But But But. According to the Agrava Fact-Finding Board, at around 1:30 PM, AVSECOM commander Gen. Luther Custodio  “reported the incident [read assassination] by telephone to General Fabian Ver who was at the time in his office at Malacañang Park.”

There is no doubt that Gen. Ver was monitoring the situation. Two days previously, August 19, his order to Custodio was to “return Aquino to his point of origin on board the same aircraft he took in coming in.” He must have realized after that there was no way China Air Lines could simply immediately turn around and fly Ninoy back to Taipei. Early on the morning of August 21, he revised his instructions, ordered Custodio to: “Arrest Aquino and turn him over to the Military Security Command in Fort Bonifacio.”

That the general was nakapambahay lang, as Irwin claims, means nothing. It was a Sunday, after all, and his office was right next to his home in Malacañang Park (correct me if i’m wrong). How he was dressed, or not, has no bearing on whether or not he was monitoring the situation. Unless it was deliberate, if true, to give the impression, in case the shit hit the fan, that he was off-duty and completely uninformed and uninvolved and innocent, or something silly like that.

In November 1984 the Agrava Board’s Majority Report (that so displeased the dictator) unequivocally named Fabian Ver (and 25 others) indictable for the “military conspiracy in the premeditated killing” of Ninoy Aquino.

ON MARCOS IN THE TIME OF EDSA 1985 | “He did not want to kill his own people”

Irwin’s kuwento is that he was at the Palace sometime after Marcos’s high-noon oath-taking.

The same day, Colonel Irwin Ver, head of the presidential guard, favored son of General Fabian Ver, Marcos’s most loyal aide and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, was at Malacañang Palace. Irwin saluted Marcos, who was still dressed in the barong he wore for the cameras. Despite the oath-taking performance, Marcos seemed to have already accepted defeat. Irwin had not. Our position is still defensible, Irwin reported, ready to fight off an attack from the rebels. “No,” Marcos said. He did not want to kill his own people. Irwin recalled seeing the sadness in Marcos’s eyes, and for a moment he feared that he himself might cry.

Drama queens. Question is, what were they so sad about?  Were they sad about not killing their own people? Or were they sad because their officers were defying orders to kill the people.

Surely Irwin Ver remembers the very eventful morning of February 24, Day 3 of the four-day EDSA uprising. By then, Enrile and RAM had left Camp Aguinaldo and joined Ramos in Camp Crame.

Early that morning, according to Alfred McCoy [Veritas Special Edition, Oct 1986], Fabian Ver gave the signal for an all-out attack on Camp Crame by riot police using tear gas, Marine artillery, helicopter gunships, and low level jet bombers.

Riot police teargassed the human barricades in Libis / Santolan and cleared the way so that two battalions of Marines led by Col. Braulio Balbas were able to enter Camp Aguinaldo, from there to take positions within sight of Camp Crame.

Meanwhile, Sikorsky gunships were ordered to fly to Camp Crame and bomb two helicopters parked there to prevent Enrile and Ramos from escaping by air. Instead Col. Antonio Sotelo led the 15th Strike Wing’s seven gunships bristling with rockets and cannon to Camp Crame and defected wholesale.

CAMP AGUINALDO ► Looking down from the high ground of Aguinaldo’s golf course, Balbas had awesome firepower “boresighted” on the rebel headquarters only 200 meters away: 3 howitzers, 28 mortars, 6 rocket launchers, 6 machine guns, and 1000 rifles. [McCoy]

CAMP AGUINALDO, 9:00 AM ► General Josephus Ramas gave Balbas and his Marines the “kill order.” With his artillery ready to fire at pointblank range, Balbas lied to Ramas. “We are still positioning the cannons and we are looking for maps.” Ramas: “The President is on the other line waiting for compliance!” [McCoy]

CAMP AGUINALDO, 9:20 AM ► Ramas again barked the command through the radio: “Colonel, fire your howitzers now!” Balbas replied, “Sir, I am still positioning the cannons.” [Cecilio T. Arillo. Breakaway. 1986. page 77]

At some point Balbas radioed Tadiar, made certain that the order had been cleared with / by  Marcos. But even so, the Marines could see that even Camp Crame’s grounds were teeming with people.  Balbas just could not order his men to fire. “We will be hurting a lot of civilians,” he said to Tadiar.

Just about then, over at the Palace, a Sikorsky gunship sent by rebel chief Fidel Ramos to rattle not harm the Marcoses, fired six rockets on the Palace grounds. Damage was negligible but the Marcoses and the generals freaked out.

CAMP AGUINALDO ► Balbas got a “frantic call” from Col. Irwin Ver, Commander of the Palace Guard, ordering a “full attack” on the rebels. Lying boldly, Ver said the Palace was hit and they suffered 10 casualties. [McCoy]

Yes, Irwin Ver himself, who would have us believe that Marcos did not have the heart to kill his own people.

That Malacanang presscon where Marcos tells Ver that his order was NOT to attack Crame? That was pure palabas. As in moro-moro. Dramarama sa umaga. The dictator saying one thing and doing the opposite. Messing up the narrative, as always.

ON FABIAN VER & MARTIAL LAW | “It felt like a war situation”

As a son, Irwin is loyal to his father’s memory and defends his reputation. … He knows there were many regrettable abuses of power at the lower levels of government, but insists that Marcos never ordered foot soldiers to commit arrests, torture, and disappearances. “It felt like a war situation, a combat situation. We were both on the offensive and the defensive. It is not uncommon that would happen,” said Irwin, “that some soldiers would act on their own.”

True. Marcos had nothing to do with foot soldiers, but he had everything to do with the generals who lorded it over the police and military forces, the Rolex 12—topped by Ver, Enrile, and Danding–in particular, who implemented his orders and  benefitted greatly (got rich) in / over the 14 years of martial law.

General Ver became the fall guy for the Marcoses. He went into hiding and spent his life on the run, using fake passports and assumed identities, in part because he could not afford defense lawyers for the cases the American and Philippine governments were mounting against him. He died without seeing his family again.

… In the accounting of misdeeds after the fall of Marcos, General Ver was associated with the corruption that came with unfettered power—and his sons have inherited an on-going case for plunder.

Irwin would have us believe that his Dad didn’t share any secrets with the family. Like, who was the mastermind of the Ninoy murder?

Irwin believes his father did find out, but he took the knowledge to his grave. “It’s better you don’t know,” General Ver told him, “You’re still in your military career.”

And yet Irwin Ver has stories that make me wonder. Take this one about Marcos and Ninoy in Inquirer‘s “Marcos: ‘My best successor is Ninoy'” by Fe Zamora back in August 2008:

On at least four occasions before May 8, 1980, Marcos sent his most trusted officer, AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Fabian C. Ver, to deliver a note to Aquino at his detention cell in Fort Bonifacio. On the last two visits, Ver asked his son, Col. Irwin Ver, commander of the Presidential Guards, to join him.

Ver told his son they were to bring a letter to the detained senator. The younger Ver expressed surprise; he thought all along that Marcos and Aquino hated each other’s guts. Ver explained that Marcos actually admired Aquino, that Marcos even saw him as “brilliant enough to be president someday.”

Selective sharing? Propaganda? Anything to help along the story that Marcos could not have ordered Ninoy killed because he admired Ninoy, Ninoy was his friend? Anything to help Bongbong get elected in 2022? Anything to bring back the happy days when the Marcoses reigned supreme and the Vers, too, in their own fashion?

I wonder how the Nemenzos really feel about that. #NeverAgain #NeverForget

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Sources

“Strange Bedfellows: A Martial Law Love Story” by Aurora N. Almendral. Esquire Magazine. Sept 22 2017. https://www.esquiremag.ph/long-reads/notes-and-essays/strange-bedfellows-a-martial-law-love-story-a1999-20170922-lfrm3

Reports of the Fact-Finding Board on the Assassination of Senator Benigno S. Aquino Jr. Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co. 1984. pp 205, 40.

Veritas Special Edition. “Coup!” by Alfred McCoy, Marian Wilkinson, Gwen Robinson. Oct 1986. http://edsarevolution.com/chronology/day3.php

Chronology of a Revolution 1986. Vol. 1 of DUET FOR EDSA. Published by Eggie Apostol (1996). Edited by Lorna Kalaw-Tirol.  http://edsarevolution.com/chronology/

 

More like, Sept 22 #MartialLaw

MARCOS. My countrymen, as of the 21st of this month, I signed Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under martial law. This proclamation was to be implemented upon my clearance, and clearance was granted at 9 o’clock in the evening of the 22nd, last night. [AF-001: Proclamation No. 1081 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZWu46IyLKwI ]

Signed on the 21st, ordered implemented on the 22nd, announced on the 23rd. Marcos would celebrate it on the 21st and we continue to mark it as the September day when Martial Law was declared, even as Manolo Quezon in “Declaration of Martial Law” insists on the 23rd as the correct date:

… the actual date for Martial Law was not the numerologically-auspicious (for Marcos) 21st, but rather, the moment that Martial Law was put into full effect, which was after the nationwide address of Ferdinand Marcos as far as the nation was concerned: September 23, 1972. By then, personalities considered threats to Marcos (Senators Benigno S. Aquino Jr., Jose Diokno, Francisco Rodrigo and Ramon Mitra Jr., and members of the media such as Joaquin Roces, Teodoro Locsin Sr., Maximo Soliven and Amando Doronila) had already been rounded up, starting with the arrest of Senator Aquino at midnight on September 22, and going into the early morning hours of September 23, when 100 of the 400 personalities targeted for arrest were already detained in Camp Crame by 4 a.m. [Undated. Official Gazette. https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/declaration-of-martial-law/]

But Ninoy Aquino, who was arrested close to midnight of the 22nd, noted it as the day Marcos went totalitarian.

NINOY. On September 22, 1972, Mr. Marcos established a totalitarian regime. On that fateful day, he proclaimed himself dictator. He issued General Order No. 1 in which he proclaims that: “I shall govern the nation and direct the operation of the entire government, including all its agencies and instrumentalities, and shall exercise all the powers and prerogatives appurtenant and incident to my position as … Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

He placed his acts beyond the reach of the courts. In General Order No. 3, issued that September 22, 1972, Mr. Marcos decreed that “the Judiciary shall continue to function in accordance with its present organization and personnel, and shall try and decide in accordance with existing laws all criminal and civil cases, except the following: Those involving the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order, or acts issued, promulgated or performed by me or by my duly designated representative purusant to Proclamation 1081, dated September 21, 1972.”

On the same September 22, 1972, Mr. Marcos killed press freedom in the Philippines. In his Martial Law Letter of Instruction No. 1, he ordered the secretaries of information and national defense “to take over and control or cause the taking over of all such newspapers, magazines, radio and television facilities and all other media of communications, wherever they are, for the duration of the present national emergency, or until otherwise ordered by me or by my duly designated representative.”

This tore away – in one stroke of the Marcos pen – the constitutional shield that safeguarded press freedom.

Freedom of the press, as we knew it—the people’s right to know, the very bedrock of democracy—died with that martial law LOI #1. The independent Manila Times and its sister publications, echo chambers of the people’s sentiments since the early American colonial rule, and the weekly magazine Philippines Free Press, always fearless and historically an unpleasant thorn in the side of those who governed, were closed by the martial law Brown Shirts at midnight September 22, the first day of the Marcos martial rule.

Also on September 22, 1972, Mr. Marcos dealt the common people’s freedom a series of mortal blows. Organized labor was singled out for the most devastating blow. He outlawed strikes, the only potent weapon in the puny arsenal of the workingman, and, as for the rest of the populace, he decreed as “strictly prohibited” any and all rallies, any and all demonstrations, any and all “other forms of group action”—under pain, for violators, of arrest and incarceration “for the duration of the national emergency” in General Order No. 5.  [Testimony from a Prison Cell. 1984. pp 43-48]

The writer and editor Gregorio C. Brillantes in “Brief History of Martial Law” is also quite certain about the 22nd.

It was not September 21, but September 22, 1972, that signaled the actual start of Ferdinand Marcos’ martial law regime. To be exact, 9:11 p.m. on that day 17 years ago … and the exact hour of the commencement of that infamy, are provided us by I.M. Escolastico, our friend and press brod of long standing (though he prefers to take things sitting down). … Ticong cites as his primary source or authority for the martial law data no less than the extraordinary author of Proclamation 1081: Ferdinand Edralin (Ferdie, Andy, Apo, Tuta, Hitler) Marcos, who in 1980 or eight years after the event found the gall, cost, and ghost to write, in Notes on the New Society, now mercifully out of print, that “the instrument ‘Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines’ had been signed on the 21st of September and transmitted to the Defense Authorities for implementation … clearance for which was given at 9:00 p.m., 22nd of September, after the ambush of Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile at 8:10 p.m. at Wack Wack Subdivision, Mandaluyong, Rizal.” [Esquire Magazine. Sept 21 2017. https://www.esquiremag.ph/long-reads/notes-and-essays/a-brief-history-of-martial-law-a1789-20170921-lfrm3 ]

And so is journalist Sol Jose Vanzi in “Little known events of dark September, 1972 come to light.”

On the evening of September 22, 1972, I watched the discreet unloading from military trucks of armed men in uniform at major intersections in Metro Manila. An unusually large number of police patrol cars roamed the streets. Overhead, helicopters were circling the city.

I knew Philippine military choppers were not certified for night flight. It was too dark so see any markings that would identify the aircraft. I sensed something big was happening, something that political observers had been talking about for years but never really expected to see: martial law had been imposed.

To confirm my suspicions, I phoned the Manila Times switchboard and got a curt military-sounding male; the same thing happened when I tried the office of Vic Maliwanag, Manila Bureau Chief of United Press International, then the world’s leading news agency.

All TV stations were off the air, save for KBS (Benedicto-owned Kanlaon Broadcasting System) which was showing cartoons. Privately-owned radio stations were likewise silent; government radio stations Voice of the Philippines and PBS were playing nothing but old songs. [Manila Bulletin. Sept 21 2020. https://mb.com.ph/2020/09/21/little-known-events-of-dark-september-1972-come-to-light/ ]

Birthdays and anniversaries are all about the beginning, not the “full effect” of some stage of implementation. It doesn’t matter that Marcos disclosed the declaration of martial law only a day later, on the 23rd. It doesn’t matter when, what date, a birth is announced. What matters, what is marked and remembered, is the beginning, the birthday itself, the starting point. By most accounts this was an hour or so after JPE was ambushed kunó by communists kunó the evening of September 22 1972. #NeverAgain

The legal argument against martial law

Oscar Franklin Tan

Who sends Tyrion Lannister to a sword fight and Jaime Lannister to a negotiating table? Sadly, this is what the most vocal legal critics of martial law have done in the past 18 months.

Martial law is our most formidable emergency power. Deploying it merits serious political and legal questions.

The political asks: Is martial law correct? The legal asks a more basic question: Is it even permitted given the facts?

Law sets minimums but cannot decide for us.

How confused has the legal debate been?

Initially, for example, critics argued a president may not declare martial law if not recommended by his defense secretary.

No judge could accept this. Our Constitution has no such requirement and it is illogical because a president may overrule or even replace his defense secretary any time.

Sensible legal advocates frame:

1. What actual powers does martial law grant?

2. How has martial law actually been used since May 23, 2017?

3. What military plans for 2019 cannot be pursued without martial law?

Visualize the Marawi siege.

At its height, Mayor Majul Gandamra and policemen barricaded themselves in Marawi’s City Hall, preventing the Islamic State flag from being flown there. City hall reopened days later, although it was too dangerous for staff to come to work daily.

This is the extreme scenario martial law solves. With the mayor fighting for his life and other officials dead or in hiding, martial law empowers a general to intervene and restore government.

But this picture equally demonstrates when martial law is irrelevant.

If no bullets are flying and City Hall is open, what does martial law authorize the general to do that he cannot normally do? Remember, the military already has broad powers, to match its broad responsibilities.

Article VII, Section 18 of our Constitution primarily requires an “actual” — this is the technical legal term, contrasted with threatened or imminent — rebellion to declare martial law.

Our Supreme Court’s Lagman decision, in February 2018, allowed a second martial law extension. It accepted that an “actual” rebellion tried to remove territory from the government. The military is still chasing rebels across Mindanao as they try to regroup, recruit new members and restart the fighting.

How does one dissect planned action in 2019 in a legal context?

If the plan is for a general to run Marawi due to a new attack, this may meet Article VII, Section 18.

But if the plan is to chase rebels into mountains and swamps, troops may be transferred to Mindanao under normal powers. And generals do not need to temporarily take control of mountains and swamps from civilian leaders.

If the plan is to step up intelligence and counter terrorist recruitment, the military is also already authorized. And only new legislation, not martial law, would give them additional budgets and new legal tools for intelligence.

If the plan is to improve peace and order and scour the countryside for loose firearms, then this is a job for police, not the military. Peace and order is a civilian task and the police is a civilian agency.

Remember, the military may be deployed to assist police under normal powers, without martial law, as they are to help build roads in remote areas and rescue flood victims.

One concludes martial law is the wrong legal tool to achieve many military goals, as opposed to new legislation, increased budgets and troop redeployments. It is thus crucial to set politics and egos aside and have the separate legal debate free
of drama.

The goal must be to deploy the best legal tools to allow our soldiers to complete their mission safely and allow Marawi to rebuild with dignity.

Further, we have an obligation to the next generation to document how the new martial law was implemented in fidelity to our Constitution.

But we must understand the difference between political and legal arguments, as we do the difference between standing beside Tyrion and beside Jaime in a sword fight.