Category: foreign relations

CHITO STA. ROMANA (1948-2022)

I never met him personally  but I had known of the Sta. Romana twins, Chito and Nelin, since high school days in St. Scho Manila (HS’66).  I’d see the two, tall and lean in their La Salle uniforms, usually standing by the gate just inside the pergola (where we all waited for our sundô), meeting up (I assumed) with their Kulasa sisters Neni and Chona for the trip home.

In U.P. Diliman when student ferment rose to a pitch in the late ’60s, I would hear Chito’s name mentioned in the same breath as that of Ed Jopson — student leaders from conservative exclusive schools La Salle and Ateneo, who started out as “moderates” compared to the U.P. radicals of Kabataang Makabayan led by Joma Sison, and who were all part of the First Quarter Storm when students protested the guns goons and gold that won Marcos re-election in ’69, and warned about Marcos’s plans for a prohibited third term via a constitutional convention.

But first, Martial Law. In ’76 when Eman Lacaba, poet-turned-armedrebel was reported killed by government forces, and again in ’82 when it was the turn of EdJop (who had turned radical in ‘72), I wondered about Chito. When I heard through the grapevine that he was in China, stranded into exile, I was just glad he was safe. I wondered, too, about Nelin, but there was no one to ask.

I read of Chito’s happy homecoming in 1986, of course. But it was only in 2011, when friend Sylvia Mayuga posted on Facebook an article about her cousin Chito retiring from ABC News | Beijing, that I finally got to ask about Nelin the twin, and Sylvia assured me he was fine, too. It was good to know that both had survived the Marcos years.

In November 2011, I got email from Nelin. He heard daw from Chito that I had asked Sylvia about him on Facebook and we agreed to meet, as it happened, on the 25th of Feb 2012 at Via Mare | EDSA Shang where he treated me and Katrina to lunch. It was like catching up with an old friend (in a past life, for sure).

Then in August 2015  I needed advice. Was it a good time for Katrina to go on a junket to China, not exactly the Philippines’ best friend in PNoy’s time, what with China’s belligerent ways in the West Philippine Sea, reclaiming rocks, harvesting Philippine marine life, driving Filipino fishermen away. We reached out to Chito via Nelin and Facebook.

ME.  I hope you don’t mind but you’re the only China specialist we “know.”  Manila Times, for which Katrina writes a column, wants to send her to China end of the month. Given the latest medyo nakaka-praning statements from Chinese officials, I’m thinking it might not be a good time? It might compromise her, in some way? Attached are two pages of the invite.  [12 Aug 2015]

CHITO.  Hi Angela, the Chinese are evidently stepping [up] their outreach to Philippine media. I have met several Pinoy journalists who have either gone or are going on trips to China upon invitation by the Chinese embassy. All these are part of their public diplomacy campaign to improve their image in the Philippines. If Katrina really feels uneasy about going, then I would advise her to wait until she is up to it.  I think the China invites will keep coming in the months & years to come.

But if she has not been to China & would like to see the “other side of the story,” so to speak, then I think she should accept the invite. Having seen her writings, I actually think she can think & analyze independently and so I would advise that she go ahead with the China visit from the perspective of “knowing the other side & understanding their mindset” so as to better analyze & rebut their propaganda.

Of course I could not resist a tiny rant.

ME.  So now, parang they’re being nice and reaching out to our media, pero tuloytuloy ang pag-challenge sa Pilipinas over the Spratleys?  I wonder if it’s an indication of how pliant they think our media people are. Just thinking out loud.

CHITO. I do agree that the Chinese actions in WPS are unacceptable & will simply trigger a counter-alliance vs them. I usually divide the dispute into 3 dimensions: territorial, maritime & geopolitical. The maritime aspect will hopefully be solved or at least clarified by the Arbitral Tribunal, if at all. The tribunal cannot [resolve] the territorial issue & it will be with us for a fairly long time, while the geopolitical issue (US-Japan vs China) will probably escalate in the foreseeable future. Hence the need to understand the Chinese strategy, their mindset. Which is what I am hoping Katrina will gain from the trip. I have seen others who have returned & become “cheerleaders” for China, which I am confident will not be the case for Katrina. My two cents worth.  [12 August 2015]

On Day 5 of 7, Katrina sent email from Beijing that I forwarded, un-redacted, to Chito and, later, Nelin. As it turned out, she was with a media group mostly older than she, and mostly old hands at the China gig. Posting excerpts here [redacted by her].

KATRINA.  This is their standard junket yata. Parang they’ve been on these trips together often enough, and they were surprised that I was even here. And today, after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the talk with the Asian Affairs head, parang malinaw na rin that they are all anti-US … Feeling nila it’s important that the media is brought to China on trips like this, and China needs to give payola to media to balance out the money that America pays media raw … so that when they go back to the Philippines they can change the perceptions about China, etc. etc. And I’m like: lahat naman sila matatanda na and tainted na by their politics and biases. Too many of them are pro-Bongbong. May tendency rin to put down the Philippines among themselves.  … I want to tell nga the embassy girl na sana, next time, to get younger writers and columnists.

And oh my goodness, did I tell you? They fall asleep right in front of the people we meet with! As in humihilik and all. And P_ almost hit her head on the table as she fell asleep in front of the descendants of that Sultan of Sulu who’s buried in China. … And I get naman the ribbing and joking around. Pero talaga, minsan overboard. And the falling asleep in front of people. I wonder what the Chinese think of that.

Interesting naman that Tomb of the King of Sulu. But I don’t know that that specific moment stands for the kind of China, and the kind of Philippines, we are in the present. Oo nga, it was friendly, he died on his way back to Sulu and is the only foreign leader to be buried in China. And yes, his family members and descendants are Chinese citizens. Pero wala rin namang effort culturally for these descendants to care about the Philippines, or PH-China relations. Parang wala lang. May roots lang na gano’n. Tapos tapos na.  [11 Sept 2015]

CHITO. Thanks a lot, Angela, for sharing, Will keep this account “for my eyes only.” I did see a TV report on ANC by Willard [Cheng] on the Sultan of Sulu’s tomb in China, but didn’t know Katrina was part of the group. Her account of the visit is very interesting, insightful & extremely hilarious! She is right about the need to have younger writers be part of future groups. It must have been quite a scene to behold, to have the “seniors” dozing off & snoring during the briefings! Looking forward to Katrina’s columns & postings when she gets back. [13 Sept 2015]

When Chito was appointed Philippine Ambassador to China in 2016, it felt so right – like it was meant to be. It was where Chito pala was headed all along—from the First Quarter Storm to that first China trip, and exile, and immersion, and a lot of hard work and hard study that eventually made him the news bureau chief and scholar that he was, top of the heap, no less, in China studies and PH-China relations.

JAIME FLOR CRUZ.  Some three years into our forced exile, when Imelda Marcos visited Beijing, we received feelers through her Chinese hosts that she wanted to bring us home. Chito and our group thought the offer through, but quickly figured out the agenda of the dictator’s wife: she would bring us home as political trophies. We rebuffed the offer.

RAISSA ROBLES. [China’s Ambassador to Manila] Huang Xilian noted that Sta. Romana was “among the first Filipinos to visit the new China when he headed the visiting Philippine Youth Delegation in 1971”, after which he spent the next five decades as the country’s long-time resident, first as a student of Mandarin in Beijing, and then as ABC News’ China correspondent for over 20 years, before becoming the Philippine ambassador.

FLOR CRUZ. Chito mastered Mandarin, dived deep into China’s history and kept abreast with its current state of affairs. He made many friends and kept a rolodex of Chinese contacts. He learned how things worked in China—and why. He knew China inside out.

ROBLES. The late envoy played a key role in repairing once-tattered bilateral relations by advocating a more nuanced approach to the Philippines’ neighbour, after the 2016 arbitration ruling nullified Beijing’s claims to nearly all of South China Sea

FLOR CRUZ.  He knew, of course, that no one wanted the posting. “It’s a tough job,” he told me in a chat soon after he became ambassador.

In a last public address on March 5 this year, says Robles, the Ambassador advised the next president to hold firm to Ph’s strategy of engagement with China.

STA. ROMANA. It’s a combination of cooperation as much as possible, and pushback whenever necessary.

In private, John Silva, an old friend from La Salle days, tells of trying to find out how Chito felt about representing a government that’s at times indifferent to Chinese intrusion in Ph waters, and also the weakest of all ASEAN in safeguarding our territorial integrity.

JOHN SILVA.  Chito would reveal a nugget here and there and given Big Brother, the assumed bugging of the embassy, and the provided Chinese chauffeur, his remarks would be in near whispers.

The sum of his revelations were indicative of Chito’s style. He measured his comments so as not to be controversial to the listener. He though affirmed Chinese expansionism and rolled his eyes on the latest gaffes from the homeland, but that’s as much [as] one could expect from a diplomat.

I would have loved to see Chito rolling his eyes… over the latest gaffes once he was back in the homeland. Alas, he has gone ahead, gone too soon.

I wasn’t prepared for the sadness that came over me when I read of his passing. It is nothing, certainly, compared to the grief of Chito’s family and close friends, but grief nonetheless. The only other time I felt this kind of sadness was over the death of PNoy, whom I knew, too, only from afar. PNoy was a good man, he meant well. Chito was a good man, he did well. It’s all about nation.

***

Remembering Chito Sta. Romana by Jaime Flor Cruz
Tributes pour in for late Philippine ambassador hailed as ‘good friend’ of China by Raissa Robles
Remembering Ambassador Chito Sta. Romana by John Silva

For whom the bells toll

Amelia HC Ylagan

… When Amb. Kim made his speech for the turnover of the bells, he made no apologies, no explanations for the confiscation of the bells by the US. He simply said, “In World War II and in Korea, our soldiers fought, bled, died, and sacrificed side by side. Together they made possible the peace and prosperity we enjoy today… Our relationship has withstood the tests of history and flourishes today. And every day our relationship is further strengthened by our unbreakable alliance, robust economic partnership, and deep people-to-people ties” (usembassy.gov, Dec 11, 2018).

Somehow, Amb. Kim’s careful diplomatic allusions to “our relationship” cannot but call back Pres. Duterte’s oft-repeated open disdain for the US (specially for past US President Barack Obama and for immediate-past Ambassador Philip Goldberg). Duterte’s rejection has progressively been made more painful to the US, juxtaposed to his open and gushy declaration of love for Chinese President Xi Jinping and all things Chinese. In the current heightened US-China global trade and political war, the suddenly rushed return of the Balangiga bells might plaintively ring: but we two — the Philippines and the US — we are friends, are we not?

… And insistently, triumphantly, the bells will toll again at Balangiga. But for whom, and for what will the bells toll?

The once-silenced Balangiga bells must peal and boom even more urgently now than in the chilling wars of betrayal and treachery for dominance and power in the early 1900s. The jubilation for national pride redeemed by the return of the symbolic bells is confused by the sickening feeling in the pit that the horned specter of dominance and greed still hovers, in the appearance of the Filipino’s own skin and mien. For colonization and dominance, and its treachery and betrayals can also be by our own leaders.

So many issues in our country that overwhelm us at yearend: is there really democracy guided by the rule of law, in the insuppressible and persistent “rumors” of extrajudicial killings and transgressions of human rights, protested and called down locally and by foreign observers?

Have we not observed and experienced first-hand how the constitution and the laws have been turned upside down in shockingly unorthodox little-known legal trickeries like the quo warranto to remove a Chief Justice; and the revocation of amnesty granted to one particular ex-putschist senator and present critic of the administration? Why are other politicians accused of plunder and other high crimes pardoned? What about the fate of another senator languishing in jail for alleged drug involvement? And are we not chilled by the continuous extension of martial law in Mindanao, justified by an Armed Forces who should have been doing its job as it is supposed to be competently doing?

Are we not aghast and terrified at the blatant dishonesty and corruption that are dismissed lightly for “friends” of those in power versus the persecution by evidently trumped-up charges for the vulnerable non-friends or those “unfriended” for lost utility? And we are overwhelmed in anxiety for a 2019 budget not yet approved, discovering in painful bits and pieces the self-serving “insertions” and allocations of “savings” in hidden pork barrel that was already deemed unconstitutional in the previous administration. Players in the controlling “team” seem to be fighting each other in sibling rivalry for opportunistic control of the resources of government — nay, the resources of the people.

But the unkindest cut of all by the “new colonizers” that we may call those who want to perpetuate themselves in economic and political power, is rushing the charter change for federalism to be transfused into our life veins. We will not be a free people anymore if the Hadean concepts are installed and institutionalized of unlimited terms for government positions, allowed political dynasties forever, and the divide-and-rule over federal regions controlled by a president practically for life, with a convenient vice-president of the president’s own party and personal subservience — among other self-serving and opportunistic insurances of control and impunity by those already in power.

The Balangiga bells must toll for freedom and democracy in the Philippines.

the china challenge

How China’s military play in disputed waters could torpedo Rodrigo Duterte’s foreign policy shift  Richard Heydarian writes that the fate of the Philippine president’s post-America foreign policy likely is to be decided by what happens in the contested South China Sea

On SCS: Let us help our President  Former Secretary of Foreign Affairs (2011-2016) Albert del Rosario humbly suggests that we all ask him to be more proactive and assertive in defending our territory

West Philippine Sea / Part 2 – Search for Options Centrist Democrat Lito Monico Lorenzana endorses the five-point approach of Associate Justice Antonio Carpio  

1. “File a strong formal protest against China’s building activity. This is the least that the President can do. This is what the Vietnamese did recently when China sent cruise tours to the disputed Paracels.

2. “Send the Philippine Navy to patrol Scarborough Shoal. If the Chinese attack Philippine navy vessels, then the President can invoke the Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty, which covers any armed attack on Philippine navy vessels operating in the South China Sea.

3. “Ask the United States to declare that Scarborough Shoal is part of Philippine territory for purposes of the Mutual Defense Treaty since the shoal has been part of Philippine territory even during the American colonial period. The US has declared the Senkakus as part of Japanese territory for purposes of the US-Japan mutual defense treaty.

4. “Accept the standing US offer to hold joint naval patrols in the South China Sea, which includes Scarborough Shoal. This will demonstrate joint Philippine and US determination to prevent China from building on Scarborough Shoal.

5. “Avoid any act, statement or declaration that expressly or impliedly waives Philippine sovereignty to any Philippine territory in the West Philippine Sea. This will preserve for future generations of Filipinos their national patrimony in the West Philippine Sea.” [Rappler, March 20 ,2017]

The first point could be tweaked, like what Vietnam did, to signal the Chinese that we are opting “…for a policy of cooperation… we all look forward to a ‘Code of Conduct’ to guide the various nations on the South China Sea (SCS). Vietnam’s statement was made in the form of a request to China, appealing to its sense of responsibility as a large country. It was just an expression of concern over militarization activities which are supposed to be avoided in the proposed Code of Conduct.”

“Sometime ago President Duterte said that before his term ends in 2022 – four years from now – he will have to assert the Philippine victory in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague in 2016”. [Manila Bulletin, May 16, 2018]

But why wait four years? This is simply passing the ball to the next administration and postpone the pain and responsibility. Some quarters, even among the ranks of Duterte allies, see this as downplaying our victory in exchange for economic benefits from China. Laying aside our sovereignty may not exactly be rape. But for lucre, we might as well call it for what it is. An apt word perhaps would be prostitution.

THE HAGUE MEMORANDUM: Towards a Philippine South China Sea Policy Based on Kadagat Thinking

Sass Rogando Sasot

Part 1: The real problem of Filipino fishermen operating in the South China Sea: dwindling fish stocks

In May 2016, Filipino fishermen were arrested by the Malaysian navy near the waters around Commodore Reef, one of the disputed features in the South China Sea. These fishermen are from Zambales. Why did they go as far as that? The same reason Chinese fishermen can now be found near Indonesia: dwindling fish stocks. Every coastal community in the South China Sea has been overfishing and engaging in destructive fishing practices (see Boom or Bust: The Future of Fish in the South China Sea)

The Global International Waters Assessment (GIWA) has already emphasised this in their 2006 report, Challenges to International Waters – Regional Assessments in a Global Perspective, published by the United Nations Environment Programme. The fishing communities bordering the South China Sea have been engaging in unsustainable practices as their governments “publicly exhort their fishermen to fish disputed waters, which has resulted in a number of conflicts, notably in the waters around the Spratly Islands. Illegal fishing, overfishing, and poaching of rare species are common in the South China Sea region.”

Last year, Rashid Sumaila, director of the Fisheries Economics Research Unit of the University of British Columbia, issued a warning call about the severity of the problem:

“The South China Sea is…under threat from various sources. We need to do something… There are lots of peoples bordering the South China Sea…when you don’t cooperate, everybody races for the fish because the thinking is if you don’t catch the fish, someone else [from another country] will catch it…The most scary thing is the level of decline we have seen over the years. Some species (are facing) technically extinction or depletion.”

The problem of dwindling fish stocks cannot be solved by any international court. It is not a legal problem but an ecological crisis. Its solution depends on the cooperation of the coastal States of the South China Sea – China, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia.

To insist on dividing the sea is akin to splitting the child in the story of Solomon and the two women. Applying the gist of Solomon’s decision, a more constructive approach to the South China Sea conflict should not start from the self-interests of the states but from the superordinate interest: the best interest of the South China Sea. Realising this superordinate interest is a necessary condition for the competing coastal states and, most specially, their coastal communities, to sustainably enjoy the bounties of the sea in the long run.

Recommendations:

Joint stewardship. The South China Sea is a system and it must be managed as such. Establishing maritime boundaries would be disastrous for the management of the marine environment of the sea. This is because the boundaries of any ecosystem are ecologically rather than politically and economically determined. Consequently, the best option for the competing states is to have an integrated approach to managing the marine environment and resources of the South China Sea. This can only be done if the coastal States would forego their myopic interests based on the notion of sovereignty in favour of the joint stewardship of their common Sea. Shared stewardship acknowledges that individual interests are so intertwined as to defy separation, while territorial sovereignty is all about excluding others. The best interest of our fishermen is intertwined with the best interest of the South China Sea, which demands that we work together with our coastal neighbours to protect it.

Reclaiming tradition. Transcend the notion of territorial sovereignty by recognising that every coastal community in the South China Sea has that sea as their traditional fishing grounds. Thus, no country can exclude another country because tradition dictates that the Sea is a shared resource since time immemorial. And long before Europeans invented the contemporary notion of “freedom of navigation,” our common ancestors had already been practicing it. The concept of owning the sea is preposterous to them; and our quibble about the Sea, stupid and childish. As what Sultan Alauddin said to the Dutch East India Company in 1615: “God created earth and sea. Land was distributed among human yet ocean was given to all. That a journey by the sea is forbidden for certain race is unheard of.”

Kadagat thinking. Reframe our relationship with other States bordering the South China Sea. They are not our enemies we must destroy but our kadagat we need to engage. Kadagat is a word I coined. I use it in the same vein as kabayan, belonging to the same land. Kadagat has the sea as its reference point; it means belonging to the same sea. The Philippines and the rest of the coastal States belong to the South China Sea. Together with our kadagat, we are not its owner but its custodian. If there is bayan muna bago sarili, then there is dagat muna bago ang pambansang interes.

Multilateral fishing agreement. Negotiate a multilateral fishing agreement with all our kadagat. The agreement can have provisions on fishing activities regulations, quotas, forbidden practices, and the creation of a supranational body that would implement the agreement. More importantly, the agreement must be based on reciprocity: fishermen from any coastal State can operate in any area of the South China Sea.

Part 2: Are we giving up our territory by transcending the notion of territorial sovereignty in favour of joint stewardship?

We need to finally realise that the Spratly Islands, the meat of our claim in the South China Sea, are not being stolen from us. We have interests over the Spratlys, but that doesn’t make it our territory. We are competing with other countries for ownership rather than retrieving something that belongs to us. To understand this, a survey of the history of the Spratly Islands disputes and the origin of our claim is necessary.

During World War II, the Japanese Empire occupied the Spratly Islands for economic, exploiting it for its guano, and military-strategic reasons. After the war, the Allied powers entered into a peace treaty with Japan, the 1951 San Francisco Treaty. Article 2 (f) of the Treaty states that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.” It didn’t state to whom Japan was renouncing those islands.

During their meeting in Beijing in 1971, Prime Minister Chou En Lai pointed this out to Henry Kissinger, who was then the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Prime Minister Chou wanted to know who drew the treaty because it didn’t specify to whom the Spratly Islands, as well as other islands, belong.

The most plausible reason why the treaty didn’t mention it can be found in the memorandum prepared by Robert A. Fearey of the US State Department Office of Northeast Asian Affairs in response to the questions of the Australian government regarding the treaty. Together with other islands, Fearey said that the title to the Spratly Island “has been disputed between France and China.” Furthermore, Fearey said that Japan’s claim “to this inhabited spot is not believed important enough to warrant mention in the treaty. The negotiations over the peace treaty with Japan wasn’t the proper venue to resolve a territorial dispute.

In 1956, the French protested against the actions of Tomas Cloma, the Filipino who occupied some features in the Spratly’s and thereafter called them “Freedomland,” believing they were terra nullius. On June 10, 1956, the New York Times wrote about this issue. France asserted that the Spratlys belonged to her and that she had not ceded the Spratlys to Vietnam. It’s interesting to note the lack of comment from the Foreign Ministry of the Philippines: no belligerent “the islands are ours” pronouncements, which we often hear now.

During the 50’s, the Sino-Soviet alliance brought the Cold War to Asia. This alliance collapsed into a crisis in the 1960s. Fearing Soviet expansionism, China formed a de facto alliance with the US. Meanwhile, Vietnam “invited the Soviet navy…to take over the former French, Japanese, and US facilities in Cam Ranh Bay.” China took advantage of its rapprochement with the US and expanded its naval presence in the South China Sea. In the 70’s after China gained full control of the Paracels, the unified Vietnam retaliated by occupying more islands in the Spratlys. This is the reason why Vietnam dominates the Spratlys. They currently occupy 23 features – almost equivalent to the combined occupied features by the Philippines (9), China + Taiwan (8), and Malaysia (7). Arguably, the aid flowing from the Soviet Union made this dominance possible.

In the 1970s, President Ferdinand Marcos appropriated Tomas Cloma’s claims. On January 23, 1973, Philippine Foreign Affairs secretary Carlos Romulo sent an aide memoire to the US Ambassador to the Philippines regarding the Spratly Islands. The aide memoire was based on the statement President Marcos delivered in a press conference on July 10,1971. Paragraph 5 is one of the striking features of this aide memoire, it reads:

IN 1957, WE AFFIRMED THAT THE SPRATLEY ISLAND GROUP FALLS UNDER THE DE FACTO TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ALLIED POWERS BY VIRTUE OF THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY SIGNED AND CONCLUDED IN SAN FRANCISCO ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1951, WHEREBY JAPAN RENOUNCED ALL HER RIGHTS, TITLE AND CLAIM TO THESE ISLANDS. BY VIRTUE OF THAT TRUSTEESHIP NO ONE MAY INTRODUCE TROOPS ON ANY OF THESE ISLANDS WITHOUT THE PERMISSION AND CONSENT OF THE ALLIED POWERS. OUR POSITION ON THIS MATTER REMAINS FIRM.

Yet despite having this position, the Philippines built the Rancudo Airfield in Thitu Island (Pagasa) in 1975, without the permission and consent of the allied powers of which China was a member. A clear violation of the “agreement” the Philippines was referring to. The Philippines is actually the first claimant to ever build an airstrip. Vietnam followed suit; then Malaysia. China is a latecomer.

It wasn’t the lofty goal of patriotism but the prospect for profit that motivated Marcos Sr to be aggressive in staking a claim over these islands. Oil concessions in these areas – specially the oil rich Reed Bank – were awarded by the government. And “several leading Manila entrepreneurs, including Marcos’ friend and in-law Herminio Disini, have invested in the oil exploration” conducted with the Swedish and Americans (14 March 1978,Washington Post).

In a 1976 US diplomatic cable, William Healy Sullivan, US Ambassador to the Philippines, also highlighted the oil interests of the Philippines. Despite the competing claims other countries, Ambassador Sullivan said

“Philippines has steadily increased its interest in [the] islands….it has kept oil exploration under active consideration and a Philippine-Swedish joint venture is in process of working out service contract to commence operations in Reed Bank Area. In addition, it has placed military forces on islands and built some permanent structures.”

During the negotiations of US bases in the Philippines in the 70s, President Marcos threatened to “not authorize a Romulo/Kissinger meeting until first receiving [an] answer to the Philippines aide memoire concerning applicability of the [1956 Mutual Defense treaty] to the Spratley Island and Reed Bank areas.” Marcos used the Spratly and Reed Bank areas as a bargaining chip. The Americans remained neutral on the territorial disputes and considered them outside the terms of the treaty. Nonetheless, the Philippines was still able to expand and strengthen its foothold on the islands “with the help of American-made arms” (14 March 1978, Washington Post).

Besides the prospect for oil, another factor that intensified the power struggle over the islands was the UN Convention on the Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS). The EEZ concept embedded in the Convention added a new layer to the conflict; it gave the conflicting states a new set of fangs.

The UNCLOS was adopted in 1982 and entered into force in 1994. Within that time period, a number of actions were taken by the littoral states which aimed at supporting their claims or weakening those of their adversaries. These included “the deployment of military troops to additional features in the Spratly area, the enactment of domestic maritime legislation, and the signing of contracts with foreign companies to explore and exploit hydrocarbons.” Eventually, this intensified scramble for the South China Sea islands lead to the March 1988 naval battle between China and Vietnam after the former “established a physical presence there in the previous year” (Song and Tønnesson, The Impact of the Law of the Sea Convention on Conflict and Conflict Management in the South China Sea).

Perhaps fearing that the Sino-Vietnamese naval clash would be a prelude to a division of the features of the SCS only among these two after the dust settled, other claimants became more assertive about their claims. They beefed up their military presence in their occupied features, leading to a series of violent clashes, pitting the Philippines against Taiwan, and the Philippines against Malaysia.

Just like in the 70s, one the major driving forces of the aggressive claim of the Philippines over these islands are the interests of the oligarchs. This time the key oligarch is Manuel V. Pangilinan, the chairman of Philex Petroleum Corporation, the company that won a contract to explore for oil in the Reed Bank.

Then foreign affairs secretary, Albert del Rosario was profiled by Inquirer as a “longtime business ally of tycoon Manuel Pangilinan, as evidenced by his directorships in the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT), BusinessWorld Publishing Corp., First Pacific Co. (Hong Kong), PT Indofood Sukses Makmur (Indonesia), Metro Pacific Investments Corp., Philex Mining Corp., Metro Pacific Tollways Development Corp. (MPTDC), Manila North Tollways Corp. (MNTC) and ABC Development Corp. (ABC 5)—all Pangilinan-controlled firms.”

In 2012, during the renewed tensions in the South China Sea,del Rosario “sort of encourage Pangilinan” to go to talk with the China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) officials.

According to Rappler “Pangilinan had admitted meeting with CNOOC officials in China…Malacañang, including the Department of Energy, was aware of it. At the time, this meeting was being considered as efforts to address the territorial dispute through a possible commercial deal.” But why would del Rosario send someone who obviously has a conflict of interest?

From its inception, the Spratly claim of the Philippines is intimately linked with the aspirations of oligarchs. Our sense of nationalism has been mobilised by the oligarchs and their backers in the position of power in order to advance their own interests. We have to overhaul our Spratly policy and make it more responsive to the needs of our people.

Recommendations:

Keep the oligarchs out of it. Philippine oligarchs should no longer be allowed to direct our Spratly Islands policy. Don’t turn the Spratlys into an Iraq.

Joint development of offshore oil and gas. The Philippine government doesn’t have much capability in exploiting the offshore oil and gas reserves in this area. Thus, it should enter into an agreement with China (or with any other claimants) similar to the 1958 Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Boundary Agreement: Saudi Arabia exploits the oil resources and grants Bahrain one half of the net revenues. The government can then invest this on the needs of our people.

Joint tourism ventures. The Philippines should urge other claimants to convert some areas of the Spratlys as marine parks, which will be jointly managed by countries that have presence in the archipelago. Revenues from this venture can be used to fund conservation projects in the South China Sea.

Establish a multilateral South China Sea Anti-Piracy Force. Our enemy is not our kadagat but the rising incidents of piracy in this region. It’s expected to rise as Asian economies continue to grow. The military installations in the Spratly Archipelago should be converted into anti-piracy outposts, manned by an inter-coastal force that can also conduct search/rescue operations.