Category: filipino elite

Why the Philippines Failed?

… In Why Nations Fail, economists Acemoglu and Robinson provide a brilliant explanation on how progress and development is largely a function of ‘inclusive’ — as opposed to extractive — governance. Using their dichotomy, the Philippines clearly falls within the extractive category, whereby the core-elite have blocked appropriate policies, which would have made the country a true democracy, anchored by a large middle class, an entrepreneurial sector, and strong institutions spurring growth and innovation. Therefore, in many ways, the developmental failure of the Philippines has something to do with its weak and divided state, which seldom had the right ‘policy space’ to make optimal economic decisions. Throughout the post-War period, the Philippine state has either been at the mercy of entrenched elites, pushing for particularistic interests and blocking policies/legislations aimed at national development, or international financial institutions (IFIs), which have prescribed counterproductive policies, notably ‘Structural Adjustment Programs’ (SAPs), causing tremendous poverty, social dislocation, agricultural decline and ‘de-industrialization’ across the developing world. Sometimes, the Philippines was at the mercy of both...

~ Richard Javad Heydarian

surveys and the filipino elite

after reading randy david’s  Surveys and public opinion, i googled for more and found that, while it is conceded that election polls can influence voters in different ways:

The bandwagon effect, when voters rally to the leading candidate;
The underdog effect, when voters rally to the trailing candidate;
The demotivating effect, when voters decide not to vote because their candidate is already sure to win;
The motivating effect, when voters go to the precincts because the polls alerted them to the election; or
The free-will effect when voters cast their votes to prove the polls wrong.

and that, while even congress passed the Fair Election Act in february 2001, providing that

5.4. Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election.

surprise, surprise, the davide supreme court ruled in may 2001 that

§5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.

googled some more and stumbled on this find: The Politics of “Public Opinion” in the Philippines (2010) by Eva Lotte E. Hedman, research fellow, London School of Economics.  excerpts [bolds mine]:

Since the restoration of formal democratic institutions and practices in 1986 … the Philippines has seen a more gradual and limited transformation in the mobilisation of voters. This change is inextricably linked with the increasing circulation in Philippine politics and society of what is commonly referred to as “public opinion.” As argued in this paper, the sheer accumulation and anticipation of surveys, reflecting back to the (disaggregated) public their (aggregated) opinion, have become inextricably linked to dynamics of bandwagoning, as well as to efforts at what scholars have described as “political branding” (Pasotti 2009). [Journal Of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29(4), 97-118. 101. Retrieved April 8, 2013.

… “public opinion” has gained greater circulation as political discourse and social fact in Philippine politics and society, with the popularity and poll ratings of candidates – rather than the construction and maintenance of machines – viewed as an increasingly effective and decisive mode of voter mobilisation. This trend is perhaps most evident in the close correspondence between pre-election surveys and the performance of presidential contenders at the polls in the 2010 elections. However, the rise of public opinion has also come to influence the process of election campaigning itself, as seen in the floating and junking of candidates, the party-switching of politicians, and the unravelling of coalitions, all developments noted by informed observers of the presidential elections of May 2010.[103-104]

Indeed, in the wider context of multiple parties and candidates for office without political platforms or programmes of any real distinction, the apparition of an opinionated public in survey after survey is worthy of note as a phenomenon in its own right. That is, aside from the specific content of any one survey, public opinion polling has emerged as an institutionalised practice in the Philippines, an established social fact. As already noted, the sheer increase in surveys is ample testimony to this reality (Chua 2004). Beyond the increasing number and frequency of surveys, moreover, there is mounting evidence of considerable media interest in and political controversy over the “reported findings” of surveys, focused on the facts and figures of specific polls, but also, importantly, on the very claims to professional objectivity and scientific method that lie at the heart of the production of public opinion for public consumption. As the accumulation and anticipation of surveys have achieved both momentum and continuous reproduction and circulation, the significance of public opinion as such thus extends well beyond the (instrumental) uses and abuses of surveys to encompass (structural) effects of a different order in Philippine politics and society. [105-106]

Beyond the focus on technical problems and solutions associated with polling, or the attempts at restricting the practice itself, the rise of “public opinion,” as a phenomenon in its own right, appears in a very different light, as do its purported effects, when viewed through the critical lens of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, and others writing in a similar vein. As argued by Bourdieu more than thirty years ago, “public opinion” is “a pure and simple artefact whose function is to dissimulate the fact that the state of the opinion at a given moment is a system of forces, of tensions” (Bourdieu 1979). Polls and surveys, it has been argued, are thus instruments “not of political knowledge but of political action,” whose deployment inherently devalues other forms of collective action – strikes, protests, social movements – and rests on a “formally equalitarian aggregative logic” that ignores and obscures the profound realities of deprivation, poverty, and social inequality in countries such as the Philippines (Wacquant 2004; Champagne 1990). [110-111]

Viewed from this perspective, the rise of public opinion can be more readily seen to have coincided, at the outset, with the emergence of a new form of political action in the Philippines. This new political activism was directed, not merely at Marcos’ ailing dictatorship, but also, importantly, against the labour strikes, student protests and peasant movements that surfaced in the factories, the campuses, and the haciendas of the country, precisely at a time when the Communist Party of the Philippines, and its armed wing, the New People’s Army, emerged the single largest such organisation (in opposition, not in control, of state power) anywhere in the world. Long before the institutionalisation of “public opinion” through polls and surveys after the resurrection of democracy, it was this struggle for “hearts and minds” that unleashed the “will of the people” into Philippine political discourse, as seen in the high-profile campaigns to collect one million signatures on a petition for Cory Aquino to run for president in 1985, to organise as many volunteers for Namfrel (National Movement for Free Elections) in 1985-86, and, finally, to oust an authoritarian regime by means of People Power in February 1986.[110-111]

At first glance, it may appear that the funeral corteges and petition drives which helped to jump-start the presidential campaigns of two generations of Aquinos, a full quarter-century apart, remain a thing apart from the rise of public opinion as political discourse. Indeed, in the case of “Cory”, the public spectacle that propelled her into popular consciousness coincided with the first appearance of the Philippines’ foremost polling institution, the Social Weather Station (SWS) in 1985 and thus pre-dated the wider circulation of public opinion as political discourse under post-Marcos conditions of democratic elections. By contrast, public opinion surveys had already become firmly established aspects of Philippine election campaigns by 2010, when Noynoy’s successful presidential candidacy was acclaimed as something of a foundational moment and unique repertoire in the rise of public opinion in the Philippines [112]

While typically associated with progress and change, and, indeed, with “new citizens-cum-voters”, “People Power,” as an – perhaps all too – familiar repertoire of protest, may also have emerged as part of the obstacles to further democratization in the Philippines.

As for the new forms of voter mobilisation themselves, the May 2010 presidential victory of Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III also signals the limited transformative potential associated with the politics of “public opinion”.

Unsurprisingly, the nature of such change reflects, in key respects, broader patterns in Philippine politics, as shown above. However, the limits to the transformative potential of “public opinion” also stem from the very deployment of polls and surveys, with their formally equalitarian aggregative logic, and concomitant devaluation of other forms of collective action and solidarities. “When used as a gauge of ‘public opinion’ […] polls not only miss the mark but shift the target,” and, thus, it has been argued, “offer at best a naïve and narrow view of democracy” (Salmon and Glasser 1995: 449). In the context of the Philippines, this shifting of the target and narrowing of the view of democracy first came into its own during the widespread popular mobilisation surrounding the rise of the first Aquino presidency. With a second Aquino elected president of the country, “public opinion” may have emerged as social fact in Philippine politics and society, but for all the countless quality of life surveys and political polls conducted in the past quarter-century on a pluralistic one-person, one-vote basis, it is difficult to dismiss the charge levelled by critics that the practice of polling serves to obscure profound realities of deprivation, poverty, and social inequality in the country today. [115]

so there.  in effect the fiipino elite has managed to appropriate, co-opt, and spin “public opinion” and “people power” to serve only its interests.  political dynasties forever.   ironic, no, wicked, that it’s under cover of “freedom of expression.”

maybe we should just boycott elections, as in jose saramago’s Seeing (2007), where government held elections and nobody came.  maybe then the ruling elite will finally get the message: tama na, sobra na, palitan na ang bulok na sistema!

media & the moneyed

The Luisita issue aside, the real problem these days is that PR men have so much clout in media that they can always get their lies told in the guise of news. That, I think, is, in large measure, a function of a generally uncritical attitude among media practitioners toward the rich, famous, and powerful. In interviews, whether for print or broadcast media, such rich, famous, and powerful personalities are lobbed powder-puff questions by reporters or talk show hosts, and their answers, however self-serving, inane, or mind-boggling, are accepted without question or critical rejoinder.

This reflects either media’s inferiority complex when in the presence of the rich, famous, and powerful or the simple recognition (and acceptance) of who actually butters media’s bread. In either case, the country and the people are worse off for this.

that’s from rene azurin‘s “News, lies, and videotape” on media’s spin re luisita distribution.  glowing legacy, my foot!

Rent seeking

By Calixto V. Chikiamco

What’s wrong with Philippine society is that its economic system is primarily characterized by rent seeking. So, what’s rent seeking? It’s the non-market extraction of surplus or profit. It means the profit is generated from licenses, quotas, monopolies, protection, and other government granted privileges.

It differs from true capitalism where the profit or surplus is extracted from the market, usually through innovations in product or marketing and distribution. True capitalism is dynamic because it results in innovations and increases in consumer welfare. Society benefits as a result. In rent seeking, there’s no innovation, nor additional value to the consumer. Instead, there’s unearned extraction from the consumer. Welfare is diminished.

Rent seeking in the Philippines hasn’t stopped. It just takes new forms.

A vivid example of this is the Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) rate to be given to Renewable Energy Developers under the Renewable Energy Act. Under the proposal of the National Renewable Energy Board, all electricity consumers must pay an additional 12 centavos per kilowatt hour, amounting to 8 billion pesos per year, to subsidize Renewable Energy developers.

Why the need for a subsidy? Because the cost to produce energy by RE developers is much higher than conventional sources. The price for conventional sources (coal, natural gas, geothermal, big hydro) averages about P5 per kilowatt hour while the price to be paid for run of the river hydro is P6.15, biomass at P7.0, wind at P10.37 and solar at P17.95.

The difference between the price of conventional sources and the price to be paid for Renewable Energy must be made up by the FIT Rate, which is really a surcharge on consumers.

Some may ask: shouldn’t the Philippines do its share to halt carbon-induced global warming?

No, because the country’s contribution to carbon emissions is only less than 1% (.48%s). Hence, unlike the rich, developed countries, it has no moral or legal obligation to slow down global warming. Furthermore, the share of renewables in its energy mix is already 32%, much more than the 10% in the US and other countries.

But here’s the cake: Not only are we poor consumers being coerced to pay three times as much for solar energy and two times as much for wind, but in addition the developers are guaranteed a generous rate of return for the next 20 years! No risk on their part, even of technological obsolescence, because that risk has been passed on to us poor consumers who must pay the same FIT Rate for the next 20 years even if the cost to produce solar energy drops by 50%.

The guaranteed rate of return is not the only form of rent seeking. Under the proposal of the NREB, there will be no auction, whether among the different technologies (run-of-the-river hydro, biomass, wind, and solar) or among suppliers within a specific technology. Everything will be negotiated (wink, wink). No competition either on price or on time period (i.e., for a time frame less than 20 years) will be allowed.

Aside from that guaranteed rate of return and the no-sweat, no-competition policy, the developers will be enjoying a seven-year income tax holiday, duty-free importation, special realty tax rate, zero VAT on sales and purchases, cash incentives, 10% tax rate after income tax holiday, and so on.

The high-costing wind and solar energy producers are resisting a dispatch policy of cheapest first because they say that the country must have a “portfolio strategy.” It’s a conceit to think that the government can ever place bets on a particular technology. Should the government have subsidized the pager industry? Or the typewriter industry? The only valid criterion is value for money or efficiency. The market, not NREB, must determine the winners.

Besides, solar and wind are unstable and unreliable sources of energy, dependent as they are on weather and other climatic conditions. They would be poor choices for a diversification strategy. They can never be energy sources for industrialization.

Also, why the rush? A policy of waiting when solar prices are expected to come down to grid parity in five years would better serve the power consumers, but the NERB wants to hand out contracts and lock in the profits of developers for the next 20 years now. We can only speculate why.

Rent seekers usually cloak themselves with noble aspirations to mask their predation. Since the 1950s, rent seekers have raised the lofty banner of nationalism in order to keep out competition and to mask their government granted monopolistic privileges.

Today, the new cloak is not nationalism but “environmentalism.” But it’s the same old predation. Different color perhaps (green), but the same old predation.

What’s disturbing is that the manufacturing sector, already suffering from the highest power cost in Asia, will have to bear this burden in addition to the lifeline rate and other impositions. This is the road to perdition because societies collapse when the productive sectors of society are “taxed” to subsidize the inefficient, non-productive sectors.

The scourge of Philippine society is not corruption per se, but rent seeking. What the NREB proposal shows is that the scourge has not been eliminated. It’s just taking new forms. Pity us poor consumers. We can only say, “Please, moderate the greed.”