Category: edsa

non-violent tactics #EDSA’86

read UP professor amado mendoza jr‘s ‘People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983-86,  chapter 11 of the book  Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present by adam roberts & timothy garton ash, published by oxford university in 2009.

… It might have been expected that the Marcos regime would be overthrown violently by the ongoing communist insurgency or a military coup.  Scholars of regime change have long argued that neo-patrimonial dictatorships are particularly vulnerable to violent overthrow by armed opponents.

The peaceful outcome in the Philippines is therefore a puzzle.  Thompson argued that Marcos’s removal was the result of moderate forces successfully out-manoeuvring the different armed groups.  Boudreau acknowledged the competitive and complementary relationship between the armed and unarmed anti-dictatorship movements, but believed that the creation of an organized non-communist option that regime defectors could support was decisive. [180-181]

very interesting, and informative of poltical mindsets circa ’83-’86:

Exiled to the US in 1980, Senator Aquino returned in August 1983 hoping to persuade an ailing Marcos to step down and allow him to take over.  His brazen assassination at Manila international airport unleashed a broad civil resistance movement which eventually outstripped the communist insurgency in terms of media coverage and mass mobilization.  The Catholic Church, led by Cardinal Jaime Sin, played an active role in bringing together the non-communist opposition and Manila’s business elite.  Pro-opposition mass media outlets were opened and a citizens’ electoral watch movement was revived.  Aquino’s death also prompted US State Department officials to assist political moderates and pressure Marcos for reforms.  Marcos tried to divide the opposition anew through the 1984 parliamentary elections.  While some moderates joined a communist-led boycott, others (supported by the widowed Corazon Aquino) participate—and won a third of the contested seats despite widespread violence, cheating, and government control of the media. 

Emboldened moderates consequently spurned a commnist-dominated anti-dictatorship alliance in 1985 to form their own coalition.  While Marcos called for ‘snap’ presidential elections, they united behind Mrs. Aquino’s candidacy.  The communists, hoping to worsen intra-elite conflicts, called for another boycott.  Military officers associate with Enrile formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and tacitly supported Aquino’s candidacy while preparing for an anti-Marcos coup.  Faced by a vigorous opposition campaign, Marcos resorted to fraud and systematic violence.  The combination of a now unmuzzled press and the presence of election observers sparked large-scale civil disobedience.  The Church declared that Marcos has lost the moral right to rule.

The end-game was precipitated by a RAM coup attempt.  Pre-empted by loyalist forces, rebel officers led by Enrile and Ramos defected to Aquino on 22 February 1986 and recognized her as the country’s legitimate leader.  These events led to an internationally televised standoff between loyalist troops and millions of unarmed civilian protesters who had gathered to protect the rebels.  As the regime came under pressure, it lost the will to survive.  Defections mounted and the Reagan administration finally withdrew its support.  On 25 February 1986, the Marcos family and entourage were airlifted to exile in Hawaii.  [182-183]

indeed non-violence won the war, but whether or not it was the result of deliberate strategies and manoeuvres by the non-communist anti-marcos moderates remains to be known.  what deserves mention is that ninoy was on non-violent mode when he came home from exile in aug ’83, his homecoming speech citing ghandi no less:

According to Gandhi, the willing sacrifice of the innocent is the most powerful answer to insolent tyranny that has yet been conceived by God and man.

perhaps he had discussed gandhi and non-violence with cory, who may have relayed the message to ninoy’s brother butz, whose august twenty-one movement (ATOM)’s protest rallies were decidedly non-violent from start to finish.

so was cory’s huge Tagumpay ng Bayan rally in luneta where she declared victory in the snap elections, sabay launch ng non-violent civil disobedence and crony-boycott campaign that coryistas couldn’t wait to be part of.  by day six of the boycott, the economy was reeling and the crony-business community was looking to negotiate, but with whom?  day seven of the boycott (EDSA saturday), enrile and ramos defected.  hmmm, di ba.  enrile was a top crony, next only to danding.  with whom na nga ba?

as in august ’83, butz rose to the occasion that EDSA saturday night.  it was butz who first sounded the call for people to come to EDSA and shield the defectors with their bodies, no guns.  cardinal sin seconded the call for a nonviolent solution an hour or so later, and cory the next day, from cebu.  ATOM was all over EDSA, butz dealing directly, facing off, with police general alfredo lim (who was ordered to disperse the crowds) and then marine commander alfredo tadiar (who was ordered to ram through! the crowd).

i’ve always wondered who, if any, advised cory and butz on non-violent tactics.  that luneta rally was sheer genius.  bentang benta sa moderate forces who liked the drama of non-violence:  nasa bahay ka lang pero feeling part of the struggle ka, and feeling revenged na rin on the regime — goodbye manila bulletin hello inquirer, goodbye san miguel beer, hello lambanog, goodbye cocacola, hello buko juice — what fun.  and that call to EDSA to shield the rebels from the dictator’s forces was inspired — was it pure butz?  was he winging it? — basta walang armas, be ready to die!  and the people were.  ready to die.  (huwag ismiran, mocha uson!)

contrary to popular perception, however, enrile did not defect to join cory nor did he recognize her as the duly-elected president right away.  enrile wanted to be president, and the aborted coup plot set for 23 feb 2 AM would have quickly installed him in malacañang.  in short, he meant to beat cory in a race to the palace,  una-unahan lang.  but ver got wind of honasan’s plans, and honasan got wind of ver’s plans (arrest orders, among others), which drove enrile and RAM to hole up in camp aguinaldo, better to die fighting, while hoping against hope to win the people’s support — after all, he was more qualified to be president.

but by day two, EDSA sunday, the day the people stopped the tanks in ortigas, it was clear that the people were there for cory — shielding enrile yes, but chanting cory’s name, wearing cory’s colors, waving cory’s flags — and it was obvious that they expected cory and enrile to join forces vs. marcos.  sometime over that long night, enrile and ramos, separately, met with cory in her sister’s house in greenhills.  i suppose that’s when the two asked for the top defense positions, an end to the crony-boycott, and immunity from suit in exchange for their armed support.

it disappoints, of course, that prof mendoza characterizes the dictator’s response during the key days as “inexplicably lame and non-violent.”  as though there had been no real threat of violence?  which is to diminish, even if unintentionally, the people’s role in that stunning revolt.

the dictator’s orders were neither lame nor non-violent.  on day 3, EDSA monday, twice marcos gave orders to bomb camp crame, except that air force col. sotelo and the entire 15th strike wing defected instead, and col. balbas and the marines (like commander tadiar the day before), after much delaying, defied orders, and returned to barracks instead.

true, the dictator’s forces could have struck immediately at the rebel military “before a protective civilian cocoon had been mobilized to protect them”, but marcos actually thought he could woo enrile back to the fold.  he had no idea that there was no turning back for enrile who was off on a new trip, navigating uncharted waters, and reinventing himself.

of course, he regretted giving way to cory, but i’m glad he did.

of course cory must have regretted giving him immunity, and i’m sorry she did.

next time, we the people should have a better sense — in real time —  of what’s happening behind-the-scenes and what’s being promised / compromised in our name.  we shouldn’t make bitaw too quickly or trust in our leaders so blindly.  i would think that non-violent engagement can be sustainable and long-term.

of “mini-EDSAs” and the inability “to explain” the big one #EDSA’86

read boying pimentel‘s Never mind EDSA: Remember the battles before the uprising.  i agree with most of pimentel’s sentiments except  the “Never mind EDSA” part of the title  and, in the essay itself, these lines:

Celebrating EDSA has typically been about remembering only the last three years of the Marcos nightmare.

That’s not enough. That has even hurt our ability to explain what happened.

Time to go beyond EDSA.

fine to focus on the 10 years of martial law previous to ninoy’s assassination —  years of silence, fear, terror, and defiance, indeed.  and good to remind that the unrest and the dissidence that culminated in EDSA ’86 started long before ninoy was assassinated.  that three years into martial law, la tondena workers dared go on strike :

One of the first major open acts of rebellion against the dictatorship happened in October 1975 when about 500 workers at La Tondena went on strike, the first during martial law.

Led by former student activist Edgar Jopson and veteran labor activists, it was a bold, extremely dangerous move.  The regime, in the early years of martial law, cracked down hard on even the mildest form of dissent.

The strike was broken up. Strikers were arrested. But word of the protest action spread, and La Tondena became one of the symbols of resistance.

In fact, the strike slogan — “Tama Na! Sobra Na! Welga Na!” — would later be modified to become the battle cry of the final battle against Marcos: “Tama Na! Sobra Na! Palitan Na!”

read, too, carlos maningat‘s Before EDSA 1 was the 1975 La Tondeña strike

Defying the protest ban during the Marcos dictatorship, around 800 workers of then Palanca-owned La Tondeña distillery in Tondo, Manila launched a paralyzing strike on Oct. 24, 1975 as they called for an end to contractualization. In particular, they demanded the regularization of contractual workers, as well as the reinstatement  and regularization of all fired contractual workers. Amid the overwhelming presence of the military and goons, the workers stood their ground for at least 44 hours to assert their demands.

…In the course of the three-day strike, nuns, priests and seminarians stood guard and held a vigil, supplying food for workers and distributing manifestos to passers-by.  Student leader Edgar Jopson, former president of the National Union of Students of the Philippines, also supported the workers’ strike.

… Hundreds were arrested in La Tondeña alone. Their strike proved to be successful nevertheless as the management gave in to some of their demands, including the regularization of around 300 workers. On a larger context, the strike tore down Marcos’ autocratic ban on protest actions and signaled the outburst of more daring protests, culminating in general strikes up to the People Power uprising in 1986.

good to remind, too, of the 1978 noise barrage, but it happened on the eve of the April 7 elections, not after.  the jailed Ninoy was running for the batasang pambansa, as was imelda.  read tingting cojuangco‘s Flashback: Ninoy and the 1978 elections.

One day, a chain letter to Peping surfaced at a rally. “At seven in the evening, I will go out to the street and make noise by beating a pan, blowing a horn, or even shouting in protest.” It was a terrific idea and Peping endorsed it. So thousands of mimeographed copies of the letter were distributed in all the churches on Sunday. What a monumental success and it happened on the eve of election day. Ninoy even heard it from his prison cell in Fort Bonifacio.

i remember those exciting times.

Except for one TV appearance, Ninoy’s campaign was left to his wife Cory and seven-year old Kris, whose rallying cry was, “Help my Daddy come home!”  On April 6, the eve of elections, Ninoy’s secret admirers from left, right, and center responded under cover darkness with the historic noise barrage.  At 7:00 PM on the dot, we took to Manila’s streets yelling, “Laban!” and making the L sign with thumb and index fingers, accompanied by car horns shrieking, pots and pans banging, whistles blowing, sirens wailing, church bells pealing, alarm bells ringing, never mind if the dreaded military picked us all up.  We had no idea then that it was organized by Communist Party leader Filemon aka Popoy Lagman, and if we had known, we would have joined anyway just to spite the dictator.

The noise barrage did not win Ninoy the election that was marked by massive cheating, but it told him in no uncertain terms that there were Filipinos out there, anonymous but increasing in numbers, who like him were yearning for freedom.  These people were not to surface for another five years.  [EDSA Uno: A Narrative and Analysis with Notes on Edsa Dos and Tres (1913). 25]

pimentel does not move on to the next “mini-EDSA” five years later, when ninoy came home from US exile and was assassinated, while under military escort, in broad daylight.

Ninoy never saw the yellow ribbons adorning trees and street posts or heard the people, anonymous no longer, sing “Tie a Yellow Ribbon” in welcome. Ninoy is dead, long live Ninoy! Yellow was the color of the people and Radio Veritas the voice of the opposition. Veritas, owned and operated by the Catholic Church, was the only radio station that dared broadcast the assassination and relay the nation’s shock and dismay. No one doubted that Marcos was to blame, never mind who pulled the trigger. Even the elite minority was offended—if he could do it to Ninoy he could do it to them.

The message of Ninoy’s sacrifice was not lost on the people. Ninoy’s courage touched them, roused them from their apathy, rekindled their sense of collective worth. The Filipino is worth dying for. Then and there, thousands of his admirers who joined the ’78 noise barrage under cover of darkness dared step forward in the light of day and be counted among the grieving. They came in droves to Ninoy’s and Cory’s home in Times Street, Quezon City and quietly, bravely, lined up for a glimpse of his bloody remains and to bid their fallen hero goodbye; thousands more followed his remains to Sto. Domingo Church. On the day of the funeral, millions left their homes and workplaces to march and line the streets where Ninoy’s casket would pass, and they raised their fists, sang “Bayan Ko,” cried, “Ninoy, hindi ka nag-iisa!” [31-32]

and just to complete the narrative:  two years and some six months later came the feb 7 1986 snap elections that saw coryistas guarding ballot boxes and reporting cheating and other irregularities nationwide, broadcast by radio veritas.  eight days later the batasang pambansa declared marcos the winner anyway, and the very next day, feb 16, cory held that giant protest rally in luneta where she claimed victory and rolled out the hugely successful crony-boycott and civil disobedience campaign.  the people were already in the throes of revolution, and ripe for EDSA, when the final four days of the boycott began to unfold.  [43]

NEVER MIND EDSA?

… it’s easier for the Marcos forces to dismiss the significance of EDSA if we remember only the festive four days, the flowers and the confetti and the nuns with rosaries kneeling before tanks … but not the sacrifices of young Filipinos who were fighting back when it wasn’t fashionable and extremely dangerous to do so.

let’s face it, guys.  it’s easy for the marcos forces to dismiss the significance of EDSA not because we remember, and celebrate, only the “festive four days” but because all these years later, we still don’t really know, wala pa ring collective sense of, what really happened during those final four days. 

something the marcoses are quite happy about, of course.  the more magulo the story, the better for them.  and so the marcos-ver camp, halimbawa, continues to pedddle the lie that marcos did not issue shoot-to-kill orders, and mainstream and social media continue to be complicit in keeping the lie alive, even when the contrary — marcos gave the kill-order — is duly documented in many publications:  while on TV marcos was ordering ver not to shoot, in camp aguinaldo the marines  were receiving orders from the palace to fire! bomb camp crame, never mind the civilians. (day 3, EDSA monday, mid-morning)

and what about enrile who from day one EDSA saturday obfuscated about why they had defected, and when accused by marcos of an aborted coup plot, absolutely denied it even if it was true.  he lied about it all through the four days and long after, admitting to it only 26 years later, in his 2012 memoir (na sino naman ang nakabasa) but without explaining why he lied.

my theory has always been that admitting to the aborted coup plot would have been to admit that he and RAM wanted himself, and no one else, to replace marcos — and that would have turned off coryistas, especially cory (enrile was ninoy’s jailer).  on day two EDSA sunday, when cory returned from cebu, she wanted to call the coryistas to luneta instead but she was dissuaded from doing so as it would have divided the coryistas, the very same ones who were already stopping tanks on ortigas.

i could go on and on about all the things we don’t know yet about those four days — like how sick was marcos really?  if he was so sick, why was he still calling the shots?  what were the dynamics like with ver, with imelda, with bongbong, with imee and irene, tommy and greggy?  who wanted to go, who wanted to stay?  was paoay a real option?

but not having answers to those questions does not mean that we don’t know enough about EDSA to glean lessons from it.  the mini-EDSAs are almost-as-nothing in the magnificent light of EDSA.  if we would only read up, and give it some thought.  we ousted marcos, what a feat!  what did we do right?  what did we do wrong?

because we can actually do it better, as in, note the patterns.  level-up the goal/s.  upgrade the tactics.  but first we need to get a handle on EDSA.

*

Remembering people power still matters by Bryan Dennis Gabito Tiojanco

“facebook is the new EDSA” ?!? LOL

this is to disabuse the duterte diehard who, at the senate’s jan 30 fake news hearing, dared suggest, propound, push the notion that facebook is the new EDSA.  it is NOT.  and i’m glad, on the one hand, that no senator dignified the statement by making patol —  committee chair poe was more interested in how many followers the guy had, even promising that from 30,000 it would be more than double that after the hearing.

on the other hand, it makes me wonder if it was her underhanded way of making patol sort of?  as in, you know, it’s all about the numbers?  as in 60 million fb users! say ng diehard, which is more believable, i must say, than ressa’s 97% of pinoys (!) because that’s like saying even the poorest of the poor? are online a lot?  with what, the 4Ps pantawid cash?  but i digress.

even if it were true that practically all pinoys (except the very young and the very old?) are active online, such great numbers would far from an edsa make.  EDSA 86 was about throngs of unarmed people gathering in the streets, united behind, and ready to die for, a common cause: ousting marcos.  on facebook there is no getting behind a common cause.  duterte diehards are forever bickering among themselves while the various opposition factions can’t get their act together on anything under the sun.

and if the duterte diehard was thinking of the arab spring revolts in tunisia and egypt in early 2010 that we thought were waged and won on and through facebook and twitter, think again.  facebook was more like the GPS lang.  read So, Was Facebook Responsible for the Arab Spring After All? 

… Facebook is what guided the protests, but the true vehicle for change was the protests themselves.

… In the end, no matter the importance of the online tools, “history happened on the streets” … But how those streets became flooded by so many, well, it wasn’t random, and social media’s role boils down to two simple but central accomplishments: First, Facebook and elsewhere online is where people saw and shared horrifying videos and photographs of state brutality that inspired them to rebel. Second, these sites are where people found out the basic logistics of the protests — where to go and when to show up.

in EDSA 86 everyone was on the same page — pro-marcos peeps knew enough to stay away because they would be booed out, like nora aunor was, just because she had been identified with the marcoses at one time or another; in fairness, bumalik siya anyway and eventually got through to enrile in camp aguinaldo and was welcomed with open arms.

but wait, meron din nga palang fake news sa EDSA!  on day 3, monday 24 feb, soon after the defection of sotelo’s 15th strike wing, when fvr and enrile had opened the gates of crame to let the people in, there came the BIG NEWS from june keithley via radyo bandido that the marcoses had left the palace.  nakoryente si ketly, but so were fvr and cory who also received, and believed, the news.

it was a psy-war kind of thing, say ni fvr after.  the hope probably was that the fake news would send the crowds home — tapos na ang boksing — leaving only enrile and fvr and RAM in crame so that the marines (positioned in camp aguinaldo’s golf course) could proceed to bomb them without hurting civilians.

fortuitously, the crowds grew larger in number instead, and there was dancing in the streets until an hour or so later when it was confirmed that the marcoses were still holed up in the palace, and it was back to the barricades, no prob.  lalo pa ngang dumami ang tao sa EDSA.  it was as if the people smelled victory and were bent on making the fake news true.  and they did, some 30 hours later.

in that sense, ok din ang fake news, like when it gives you something great to aspire for?

artists and writers for freedom and democracy, circa 1986

katawatawa that on facebook a statement from duterte apologist rebecca añonuevo and other “concerned writers” supporting SEC’s takedown of rappler has been judged “unoriginal” and “pathetic” — as if the statement by let’s organize for democracy and integrity in support of rappler / press freedom were any less pathetic?  read press freedom for what? press freedom for whom?

worse, anoñuevo daw might as well have re-issued na lang a “pro-dictatorship pro-marcos paid advertisement” of jan 28 1986.  LOL.  obvious naman na pilit na pilit ang paghahalintulad ng dalawang isteytments, the cause of SEC vs. rappler being quite puny in comparison with the cause of COWAFD (pilit na pilit rin ang COWARD, guys, seeing as they were more like losers after the fact).  halata namang ibig lang halukayin (at pahiyain? as if?) ang signatories ng 1986 declaration na mostly luminaries, including national artists no less.  though in either case it would be interesting to see the signatures mismo (even if forgeries are a possibility, too, alas).

but thanks anyway for resurrecting the COWAFD (parang covfefe) declaration that reminds of what it was like 32 years ago in the run-up to the snap elections that paved the way to EDSA.  the ad came out 10 days before the snap elections that had newbie cory aquino with former senator and member of parliament (MP) doy laurel challenging the dictator ferdinand marcos and former senator and MP arturo tolentino for the top posts of the land.

the opening paragraphs are obligatory preliminaries, romanticizing diversity of opinions, claiming openness to “alternative national futures.”  nothing on the joys of censorship, of course, rather, on the need to stand up, and be identified, for the dictator.  or else.  or else?

but the whole of it is a precious artifact, a document of historical interest wherein the best and the brightest, our most privileged of artists and intellectuals in the time of martial law, clearly articulated what exactly they feared about the prospect of cory and doy replacing marcos, AND even dared envision an “enlightened and transformed national leadership” under the marcos-tolentino team.

“When great issues are joined in the life of a people and life-and-death choices present themselves in political terms, the writers and artists must take a stand and must not seek refuge and false comfort in total political anonymity.

“We believe that the special presidential elections on February 7, 1986 present us with one of two choices: to reestablish Philippine democracy on a new and more enduring level, with its guarantees of individual freedom and social responsibility, or to risk a future dominated by the spectre of unending social strike (sic; strife?), hate, vengeance and perhaps a bloody fratricide the ferocity of which has never been known in our history.

“The plain and simple fact is that we, as writers and artists, have serious apprehension about the candidates of the opposition. We are apprehensive about the fact that they have nothing to offer than a dubious promise of sincerity and an even more dubious promise to hand government over to an unidentified cadre of advisers. These are no more than niggardly excuses for a lack of a coherent program of government.

“In view of the crises that threaten the economic security and the cultural serenity of our nation, we can only regard such representation from them as symptomatic of a reluctance to come to grips with reality and an indifference to the need for wisdom and maturity.

“As such, this coalition seeks to preserve what has already been achieved in terms of cultural advancement and to proceed further under an enlightened and transformed national leadership equipped to face the pressures of change and advance our national and spiritual progress. We believe that the leadership of President Ferdinand E. Marcos is out only guarantee for survival at this point.

“Indeed, we believe we can best achieve our national interests and realize our aspirations of writers and artists with the triumph of the Marcos-Tolentino team.”

hindi ko iyan nabasa noong 1986.  my parents and i, and my in-laws, too, were big fans of ninoy (dilawan kami noon) so we must have dropped the hans-menzi-marcos-crony-owned manila bulletin by then in favor of the feisty eggie apostol’s philippine daily inquirer.

at kahit pa nabasa ko ang paid ad na iyan, it wouldn’t have changed my mind about voting for cory and doy.  yes, on sheer faith.  there was no paying attention to marcos shrugging off cory as a mere housewife.  e ano kung walang karanasan, andyan naman si doy, a laurel, tutulungan siya, aalalayan siya.  we were so naive.  on that and a lot more.

but so also were the artists and intellectuals, the best and brightest.  naive.  imagine, promising an “elightened and transformed leadership” under marcos, the only one  “equipped to face the pressures of change and advance our national and spiritual progress.”  even, that he was “the only guarantee for survival” at that point.

parang hindi nila alam na malubha ang sakit ni marcos noon.  even if he had been reelected, unquestionably, in feb 1986, marcos was going to be replaced anyway, if not by enrile with the backing of fvr’s integrated national police (honasan had twice postponed that coup d’etat), then by imelda with the backing of ver’s afp.

parang naniwala rin sila sa sariling propaganda about the nation’s “economic security” (matagal nang bagsak ang ekonomiya, na lalong lumubha nang patayin si ninoy, thanks to capital flight atbp.) and “cultural serenity.”  cultural serenity?  susmaryosep.  jorge arago must have sniggered snickered simpered at that, if he really signed it, that is, and he may have.  at the time he and i were putting out environmentalist junie kalaw’s journal Alternative Futures (Vol. III Decentralization).  i suspect that he was responsible for getting “alternative national futures” into that declaration, maybe an ex-deal for his signature, haha.  he was like that.  for the record.