Category: cory

when enrile crossed edsa to join ramos in crame

“The military spokesperson, Brig. Gen. Jose Mabanta Jr., said the 2,000 soldiers and two tanks will take part in reenacting the salubong or the welcome given by the crowds gathered at EDSA to military forces who turned against then dictator Ferdinand Marcos.”

how romantic the spin on enrile leaving camp aguinaldo and crossing edsa on day 2, feb 23.   indeed it was quite a dramatic event because it was the first time the people saw enrile, and ramos, who met him at the crame gate, whom they’d been shielding from marcos, and of course they went crazy, chanting johnny johnny johnny, lauding the defense minister who had dared defy the dictator to support cory aquino, or so they thought.

The people linked arms, creating a protective wall for the reformist troops. Col. Honasan forged ahead to shield Minister Enrile as they crossed the street. Honasan was very scared when they started out. But when they hit the first row of people, and the people started to wipe the soldiers’ brow, give them food, and thank them, Honasan knew they had won. “All my fears disappeared. The worst scenario, for me, was not that we would have been bombed but that the people might turn against us.”

enrile had decided to join ramos in crame to consolidate forces, camp crame being smaller, easier to defend.   but in fact ramos had suggested the move early that morning when he jogged over to aguinaldo, and enrile and honasan had said no.

Sonny Razon: General Ramos had been asking them to move to Crame since morning pa. But at that point, they weren’t convinced yet of the need to consolidate forces. In fact, they would have preferred it if General Ramos moved to Aguinaldo instead.

i think that enrile was loathe to move in with ramos because he suspected that ramos was a coryista.   day one, when enrile asked him to join them in aguinaldo, ramos was having a dialogue with coryistas picketing his house in alabang, urging him to resign and join cory’s camp, like his sister leticia shahani had done in december 85.   ramos had given every indication that he was just waiting for the right time to make such a move.   and he took his time making chika with the coryistas, so that enrile’s men had to call several times, asking him to come, now na.

enrile may have been uncertain where ramos’s sympathies really lay.   but when news came of tadiar’s convoy of tanks and apcs leaving fort bonifacio and making its way to edsa, for real, kinabahan na rin siguro siya and moving to crame was the wisest thing to do, never mind his dream of becoming president.

Synchronous events: the people stopping tanks in Ortigas, and Enrile crossing Edsa to join Ramos. The coincidence of the people’s peak experience with Enrile’s move indicates that there was more to the crossing than a simple consolidation of forces. Ramos had earlier urged them to move but Enrile and RAM were reluctant to give up Aguinaldo and, perhaps more so, to give in to Ramos, who was by then perceived to be for Cory.

In a sense the dramatic crossing signified Enrile’s surrender to forces other than RAM, and it was as critical and momentous as the people’s encounter with tanks.

in EDSA, the crucial conflict was not between cory and marcos anymore — marcos was a goner; it was only a matter of time before he either stepped down voluntarily or was forced out, given the boycott, and later, given the ortigas stand-off, when the people stopped the tanks and the marines defied his orders.

in EDSA, the crucial conflict was between cory and enrile.   they had the same objective, to oust marcos and take over, and neither had any intention of giving way to the other, much less of joining forces.

that fateful EDSA weekend derailed both cory and enrile from their separate paths.   the people, taking matters into their own hands and demonstrating their awesome power to render marcos powerless, gave cory and enrile no choice but to reconcile their differences and submit to the people’s will.

cory had no choice but to reconcile with the same military that had caused her and ninoy so much pain and suffering (enrile was ninoy’s jailer).   enrile had no choice but to submit to cory, a civilian housewife without experience in state and military affairs.   EDSA was just too dramatic and decisive to ignore.

when he crossed edsa, leaving his own turf for safer ground, it was like enrile was bowing to the will of the people and taking the first step towards reconciliation.

so it wasn’t just a salubong, which romantic notion depoliticizes, even trivializes, that high point of the revolution.   i wonder whose idea it was.  the edsa commission has been doing a reenactment year after year after year.   and year after year after year it is played up by a gullible, uncritical, and unwittingly complicit mainstream media.

EDSA fictions

funny and factual … history a la FB … clever … great tongue-in-cheek humor, great research … super-like … sana i-publish ng mga book company pampasaya sa boring na pagtuturo …

these are facebook comments on the link to gmanews.tv’s special feature  It was complicated: EDSA 1 as told through Facebook (The events and players are true, the status updates are based on fact, and the comments are totally imagined.)

funny the comments, yes, but the status updates are not entirely factual, which might be is quite inappropriate as it adds to the confusion about EDSA as an event, given a number of key players still refusing to tell their sides of the story and who wouldn’t mind keeping us confused and uncertain.

my sources are the periodicals and snap books of the time, interviews with cory and fvr (among others), and more EDSA books, foreign titles, published from 1987 to 1991.  the storyline is pretty set, and even lately confirmed by senate president enrile, if in trickles, as in the EDSA anniversary of 2000.

so it’s disconcerting to read supposedly factual status updates that are completely false and which foster misconceptions about what really happened, how they happened, and what key personalities were thinking and saying as events unfolded.

August 31, 1983 Ninoy’s funeral. Cory Aquino invited you.

there was no way cory could have invited the people.   marcos controlled all media.   like everyone else, cory was stunned amazed overwhelmed at the million or so who came uninvited.

December 3, 1985 Cory Aquino I am running for President of the RP. [Joaquin Roces, Salvador Laurel and 1,683,114 others like this]

imposible na salvador laurel liked it.   he was long set to run for president himself but was prevailed upon to slide down and run as cory’s vp instead.   at best he was resigned if not disappointed.

February 4, 1986 Miting de Avance

my chronology says feb 5.   my source, the newspapers of those days.   correct me if i’m wrong.

February 22, 1986 (Day 1) Fabian Ver my son Col. Irwin Ver informed me that members of RAM (Reform the Armed Forces Movement) are planning a coup. They plan to storm Malacañang at around 2am and declare Juan Ponce Enrilñe as head of a ruling junta. Sorry guys…HULI KAYO! Thanks for the tip Maj. Edgardo Doromal!

as if he had just heard of the coup plot?   according to alfred mccoy in “Coup!” (Veritas Extra, Oct 1986) the vers learned of the coup plot many days before feb 19 when the presidential security guards were put on red alert.   by saturday feb 22 ver had so fortified palace defenses, there was no way gringo and RAM would take themby surprise the next morning.  if anything, saturday was a sosyal day for ver.   he and imelda were principal sponsors at an afternoon wedding in villamor air base.   he couldn’t quite believe it when, after the wedding, his men told him of the enrile-ramos defection.

Feb 22 Juan Ponce Enrile FYI lang, we are not out to seize power. We will relinquish command to the rightfully elected President,

enrile was very careful not to say anything to that effect.   what he said was that he would “heed the will of the people” … but “No, I will not serve under Mrs. Aquino even if she is installed as a president.” it would seem that he had not given up hope of heading a ruling junta.   given a choice between him and cory, the people, he hoped? would choose him as the more qualified, the more experienced in government affairs.   cory was so unsure of his support, there were no seats for him and ramos when they unexpectedly arrived to attend her inauguration.

February 23 Cory Aquino just got back from Cebu and I’m going straight to my sister’s place in Greenhills. I am calling for more Filipinos to please support the rebel soldiers. I am also calling for President Ferdinand Marcos’ resignation before there is any bloodshed.

when cory just got back from cebu, according to joker arroyo, her plan was to call the people to luneta to prove to the rebel military that it was she, and not enrile and ramos, who had popular support.   but she was dissuaded by her advisers because the people would indeed follow her to luneta, and mawawalan ng depensa ang crame, na hawak na ng mga tao. [Himagsikan sa EDSA 2000, page 165 ]

February 25 US of AFerdinand Marcos It’s time to cut and cut cleanly. [7 hours after Marcos inauguration]

laxalt said this to marcos at 5 a.m. day 4, manila time, 7 hours before his inauguration.    sources: nick joaquin’s Quartet of the Tiger Moon 1986 (page 78) and stanley karnow’s  In Our Image 1989 (page 421).

February 25 Ferdinand Marcos is leaving for Clark, then Guam. Next stop: Hawaii.

when marcos left malacanang palace he thought he was going to paoay in ilocos norte.   it was only in clark that he learned about guam and hawaii.

oh, and i would have ended with bongbong and imelda screaming KIDNAP!

cha-cha crazy

there they go again, chattering about charter change, as if it were even do-able, what a waste of time.   read fr. joaquin bernas’s Finally a new Constitution in 2011?

In my view, one major obstacle to attempts to revise the 1987 Constitution is structural. It has a built-in unintended obstacle to change. And I do not know how this can be overcome this year.

Inmany respects the 1987 Constitution consists of significant borrowings from the 1935 Constitution. Unfortunately, however, the provision on the amendatory process is a carbon copy of the provision in the 1973 Constitution. Year after year since 1987 this has been the major obstacle to change. Why so?

The text says: “Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or (2) a constitutional convention. . . . The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.”

The provision is one formulated for a unicameral legislative body but it is now meant to work for a bicameral Congress. This was not a tactical product designed by an evil genius. It is merely the result of oversight. But the oversight has spawned major problems.

First, must Senate and Housecome together in joint session before they can do anything that can lead to charter change? The 1935 Constitution was very clear on this question: Congress could not begin to work on constitutional change unless they first came together in joint session. The 1987 Constitution is non-committal.

Second, since the text of the Constitution is not clear about requiring a joint session, can Congress work on constitutional change analogously to the way it works on ordinary legislation, that is where they are and as they are? I have always maintained that Congress can, but this is by no means a settled matter. There are those who believe that the importance of Charter change demands a joint session.

Third, should Congress decide to come together in joint session, must Senate and House vote separately or may they vote jointly? The 1935 Constitution was very clear on the need for separate voting; the present Constitution is silent about this. But I am sure that the Senate will not agree to a joint voting where their number can be buried in an avalanche of House votes, an avalanche of votes which can mean the abolition of the Senate! How will this issue be settled? Howsoever the matter might be settled by agreement of the majority of both houses, someone in the minority will run to the Supreme Court to challenge the decision.

What about a constitutional convention? But the business of calling a constitutional convention is fraught with the same problems. Should Congress choose to call a constitutional convention, must the two houses be in joint session? And if in joint session, should they vote separately?

Briefly, constitutional change in 2011 or later can happen only if the members of Congress can agree to work in harmony and if the Supreme Court will not throw a monkey wrench on how Congress decides to do it. Can the members of Congress rise above self-interest and work together harmoniously? Or are we waiting for an extra-constitutional change?

i like it, this obstacle not designed by some evil genius, rather an oversight of cory’s constitutional commission.   it means that charter change can happen only if and when our legislators get their act together, and that’s just so NOT in any one’s agenda.

extra-constitutional change?   another edsa, he means?   but a successful edsa, a successful revolutionary government, one that brings about deep-seated change, is soooo not in the stars, not until a true leader rises, one in the mold of rizal or bonifacio but wise to the ways of the world today and highly-biased for the filipino.

ninoy & the hacienda

sychronicity: ninoy aquino’s 27th death anniversary (the filipino is worth dying for) and the hearing of the high-profile hacienda luisita case (scheme sdo) in the supreme court.

there’s good background stuff on the internet, thanks to gmanews.tv, and there’s lynda jumilla’s report on anc, salamat naman, altho sana sa free tv and mainstream media rin, ‘no?

because it’s interesting, revealing, if not really surprising, how inextricably linked the stories of ninoy and cory are with the hacienda’s masalimuot history.

read howie severino et al’s holding on: a hacienda luisita timeline from the spanish to the noynoy eras

read leloy claudio’s ninoy networked with everyone including the reds

if ninoy had lived, would he have handled the hacienda problem differently?   it would seem so, though it would have meant a major rift split rupturewith the cojuangcos, unless he could have been really creative and come up with a compromise that both cory and the farmers could live with.

now that noynoy is president, and he seems more of a cojuangco than a ninoy aquino — read carlos conde’s aquino is being shrewd about hacienda luisita — looks like the pattern could persist, which bodes ill for the farmers and the nation but bodes good for other haciendas and big landowners who continue to defy the law, what a drag.

here’s a partial list of other families owning vast tracts of land via KMP via mon ramirez:

Hacienda Zobel in Calatagan, Batangas – 12,000 hectares
Hacienda Yulo in Nasugbu, Batangas – 8,650 hectares
Hacienda Roxas also in Nasugbu – 7,813 hectares
Hacienda Yulo in Canlubang, Calamba – 7,100 hectares
Hacienda Luisita – 6,453 hectares
Hacienda Puyat also in Nasugbu, Batangas – 2,400 hectares
Hacienda Agoncillo in Laurel, Batangas – 2,014 hectares

There are more in other provinces and regions.

To get an idea of the size of each hacienda, compare them with the land areas of these four cities:

QC – 16,000 hectares
Manila – 3,955 hectares
Makati – 2,738 hectares
Marikina – 2,150 hectares