Category: china

Marcoleta falls for 9-dash line fiction

About Senators Kiko Pangilinan’s and Rodante Marcoleta’s heated debate over the legitimacy of the West Philippine Sea

MARCOLETA FLUNKS ELEMENTARY CARTOGRAPHY
Marlen V. Ronquillo

…  The West Philippine Sea is for real. Philippine laws have codified a specific area called by that name, and maps have been drawn to reflect. In 2012, then-president Benigno Aquino III issued Administrative Order 29 that demarcated the West Philippine Sea as “the Luzon Sea, as well as the waters around, within and adjacent to the Kalayaan Island Group and Bajo de Masinloc, also known as the Scarborough Shoal.”

A law signed by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in November 2024 — Republic Act 12064, or the Philippine Maritime Zones Act — defined anew the portions covered by the West Philippine Sea. That law also asked the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority to prepare the corresponding map covered by that sea, then circulate that map in the country and beyond.

In her many warnings about China’s territorial ambitions in Southeast Asia, former United States secretary of state Hillary Clinton spoke about real threats faced by an area she called “the West Philippine Sea.”

The West Philippine Sea is a fact of nationhood, its existence amplified by the 2016 arbitral ruling that essentially said areas officially demarcated by the Philippine government under AO 29 and RA 12064 are, indeed, Philippine territory.

What accounts for Marcoleta’s refusal to recognize a basic fact of law, international ruling and cartography, the lay of the land in a nation of which he is a citizen and senator? That’s between Marcoleta and China. But to obviously take the side of China’s fictional nine-dash line over our historic and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea-validated West Philippine Sea is beyond the pale. In nations and polities protective of their territories, a stand like Marcoleta’s will be grounds for a form of censure. In China, Marcoleta’s stand may fall under the category of treason and may end up like Lin Biao.

Some dear and basic lessons in geography and territory raise additional and troubling questions on why Marcoleta is seemingly on China’s side on the West Philippine Sea issue. With all the land, seas, and vast dominion in its possession, China’s territorial aggression looks like overkill.

China’s map occupies 9.6 million square kilometers — approximately the size of Europe. In terms of land area, it is the third largest in the world, after Russia and Canada, and much of Canada is uninhabitable tundra. The Philippines is a land-short country the size of the US state of Arizona. China, according to basic geographical data, shares boundaries with 14 other countries, and territorial disputes often arise, especially with India, due to boundary issues.

It cannot be that Marcoleta is cutting China some slack because it needs more territory, and the Philippines should play the role of a generous neighbor.

Speaking of basic generosity, has China been a generous and economically supportive neighbor, an economic superpower with zero predatory practices in economic dealings with the Philippines?

No. On the contrary — and this can be validated by the loan terms during the term of former president Rodrigo Duterte — China has imposed high interest rates on loans to the Philippine government, about 2 percent or more higher than those from, say, Japan and the European Union. Former Bayan Muna party-list representative Neri Colmenares has a compilation of China’s harsh loan terms, including provisions that allow China to seize national treasures, such as Rizal Park, in case of loan defaults.

China overall has been imposing onerous terms on foreign borrowers. After a loan default, one Latin American country found out that China demanded 80 percent of its total oil output.

So while we trade heavily with China — the only countries that do not trade with it are the imaginary trading posts Donald Trump slapped with tariffs in his April 2, 2025, “Liberation Day” tariff order — we should not forget one thing: trade is one thing, territorial aggression is another. Areas like Bajo de Masinloc — Masinloc is a town in Zambales — have been ours since time immemorial. And for Marcoleta’s information, China’s nine-dash line is a late 20th-century concoction.

Facts and cartography and history and empiricism all say there is a West Philippine Sea. Marcoleta’s West Philippine Sea distractions, at the very least, are on the wrong side of history.

China, Mao, transparency

Former Defense Sec Orly Mercado, remembering Mao and the “heady 60s”, weighs in on the Chinese embassy’s steady stream of protests against what it calls Philippine “provocations” that suggests to him “performative indignation rather than the usual quiet diplomacy.” I’m not sure about “performative” though. Parang sincerely upset sila by our “transparency initiative”, i.e., the Philippine government’s strategy to control the narrative and expose China’s coercive and unlawful actions in the West Philippine Sea. Umuubra kasi?

WHEN MAO’S WORDS COME BACK TO HAUNT BEIJING 
by Orlando Mercado

IT was the heady 1960s. As a political science student, I developed more than a purely scholarly interest in the writings of Chairman Mao Zedong. Like many of my generation, I read revolutionary tracts not only to understand China, but to make sense of a world in upheaval — about Vietnam, student movements, anti-imperialist struggles, and the seductive certainties of ideology.

Those years were saturated with manifestos and slogans, with the conviction that history itself was bending under the weight of mass movements and moral clarity. We believed ideas mattered, that words could mobilize millions, and that power was never as permanent or as invulnerable as it appeared. In that charged atmosphere, Mao’s writings were read less as dogma than as tools, frameworks that could be used for interpreting conflict, resistance and reaction.

One Mao line, in particular, has stayed with me through the decades: “To be attacked by the enemy is not a bad thing but a good thing.” At the time, it sounded almost paradoxical, even counterintuitive, especially to young minds still inclined to equate criticism with failure. Yet the more one sat with it, the clearer its strategic logic became. Attack, in Mao’s formulation, was not merely hostility; it was information. It was evidence that one’s actions had registered, that they had crossed a threshold from harmless dissent to meaningful challenge.

That line came rushing back to me recently after reading reports that China summoned Philippine Ambassador to Beijing Jaime FlorCruz over statements made by Commodore Jay Tarriela, spokesman of the Philippine Coast Guard, on developments in the West Philippine Sea. Beijing has since doubled down, with its embassy in Manila issuing a steady stream of protests against what it calls Philippine “provocations.” The language has been sharp, repetitive and unusually public, suggesting performative indignation rather than the usual quiet diplomacy.

The immediate trigger is the Philippines’ so-called transparency initiative: the systematic public release of photos, videos and accounts of Chinese maritime actions in our waters. There is nothing radical about it. They’re not “fake news.” They’re only facts placed on record for the world to know. For years, their gray-zone tactics thrived in darkness and ambiguity. Now, they are being dragged into the spotlight for all to see.

Transparency, in this sense, is almost disarmingly modest. It does not rely on rhetoric, escalation, or counter-force. It relies on documentation. It assumes that visibility itself has power, and that when actions are observed, recorded and shared, they lose some of their deniability and much of their strategic advantage.

Mao would have understood this instinctively.

In a 1939 essay delivered in Yanan, Mao argued that enemy attacks were not merely inevitable, but also proof of effectiveness. If your adversary attacks you, it means you have drawn a clear line of demarcation. It means you have become a problem. Silence from the enemy is more dangerous than criticism, because silence suggests irrelevance.

In Maoist dialectics, struggle clarifies. Attacks sharpen contradictions. Overreaction reveals weakness. So, when the response is loud, it usually means something hit home. Noise, in this framework, is diagnostic. The louder the protest, the greater the likelihood that a sensitive nerve has been touched. Calm confidence rarely needs theatrical outrage.

Seen through that lens, China’s increasingly vocal protests are not signs of strength. They are signs of irritation, and perhaps anxiety. Transparency works precisely because it disrupts a longstanding advantage: control of narrative. Gray-zone operations depend on fog. Sunlight is their natural enemy.

Every diplomatic summons, every embassy statement, every angry denial does more than rebut a Philippine claim. It advertises to the region and to the world that something is being exposed, something Beijing would rather keep blurred, contested, or buried in competing versions of events. Ironically, the protests amplify the very material they seek to delegitimize, drawing attention to incidents that might otherwise have remained localized or transient.

This is where Mao’s old doctrine becomes strategically useful in a modern, democratic setting.

First, attacks validate impact. If Beijing is protesting loudly, it means the transparency initiative is biting. It is not being ignored. It is being felt.

Second, attacks clarify lines. The choice becomes starker for third parties: between openness and opacity, between documentation and denial, between rule-based processes and coercive gray zones.

Third, attacks shift the burden of explanation. Instead of Manila constantly defending its actions, Beijing is forced to explain why transparency, of all things, is so objectionable. What, exactly, is being hidden that sunlight makes so uncomfortable?

There is a deep irony here. Mao crafted this doctrine for revolutionary movements struggling against stronger powers. Today, a democratic Philippines is applying a version of that logic not with insurgency, but with cameras, facts and public accountability against a far more powerful state.

As someone who once pored over Mao’s writings in the ferment of the 1960s, I cannot help but note the twist of history. A doctrine meant to steel revolutionaries against imperial pressure now offers a lens for understanding why a major power bristles at transparency.

When Beijing reacts loudly, it may believe it is projecting resolve. However, in the dialectical logic that Mao himself embraced, loud attacks often signal that the pressure point has been identified. They suggest discomfort — an instinctive response to loss of control over narrative and perception.

In the West Philippine Sea, sunlight is not a provocation. It is a strategy. And every angry protest may be the clearest sign yet that the strategy is working.

US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis was right. Indeed, “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”

 

July 12, 2016 was a very good day! #PNoy

Aminin na natin. It took chutzpah, audacity, what President Benigno Aquino III did in January 2013 when the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against China some months after da agawan sa Scarborough Shoal. Other presidents, from FVR to ERAP, GMA and RRD, were too careful to not antagonize China kahit anong kabastusan at kabulastugan nito sa karagatan nating pilit nitong inaangkin; or maybe they thought na madadaan pa ang Tsina sa magandang usapan LOL. No surprise then that PNoy’s closest advisers were divided on the matter, for and against arbitration court.  Read former SC Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio‘s first-hand account. Very interesting and impressive how PNoy simply stuck to his guns despite all underhanded attempts to stop him. Good good job!

AQUINO AND THE ARBITRATION AGAINST CHINA 
By Antonio T. Carpio
July 1, 2021

One of the enduring legacies of President Benigno Aquino III is the Philippines’ landmark victory against China in the South China Sea Arbitration. It took courage and wisdom to sue China, an economic giant and a nuclear-armed superpower. President Aquino made the difficult decision even as his closest advisers were bitterly divided, with one faction against the arbitration and the other in favor of the arbitration.

These two factions fought from the beginning to the end. After consulting with Law of the Sea expert Paul Reichler and his team, then Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario submitted to Malacañang his Memorandum to President Aquino recommending favorably the filing of the arbitration case against China. Unfortunately, his Memorandum was rewritten in Malacañang, making it appear that he was against the filing of the arbitration case. Secretary del Rosario swiftly found a way to give to President Aquino his original recommendation. President Aquino then convened a meeting of national leaders who, except for one, all voted to file the arbitration case.

When Paul Reichler recommended the amendment of our Statement of Claim to include the status of Itu Aba as one of the issues to be resolved by the arbitral tribunal, the two factions fought again. Secretary del Rosario arranged for Paul Reichler and his team to meet President Aquino in Malacañang so our lawyers could explain to the President the need to amend our Statement of Claim. Paul Reichler and his team waited for four hours in Malacañang for President Aquino, only to be told by then Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa Jr. that the President could not meet them. Instead, Ochoa informed them that the instruction of the President was not to amend our Statement of Claim. Over dinner that evening, I asked Paul Reicher what he would do, and he replied he would discuss the status of Itu Aba in the Memorial without including it as an issue to be resolved by the tribunal.

When Paul Reichler submitted his draft Memorial to the Office of the President for approval, the two factions fought again. One faction wanted the 15 paragraphs in the Memorial explaining the status of Itu Aba to be deleted, while Secretary del Rosario insisted on the retention of the 15 paragraphs. I met with then Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and explained to her why the 15 paragraphs should be retained. I gave her a two-page brief on the matter to give to President Aquino, which she did. When President Aquino called the two factions to a meeting, he announced his decision — the 15 paragraphs would remain in the Memorial.

Incidentally, when journalist Marites Vitug interviewed President Aquino in 2017 for her book “Rock Solid,” she asked the President why he did not meet with Paul Reichler and his team. The President replied, in the presence of Secretary del Rosario, that nobody told him that Paul Reichler and his team were in Malacañang to see him.

Finally, for the last hearing at The Hague in November 2015, Secretary del Rosario as usual submitted to Malacañang the list of names of officials who would form the Philippine delegation. The list included my name as observer, but when the approval came out my name was deleted. Secretary del Rosario wrote back that if I would not be included he would not be joining the delegation. Malacañang reinstated my name.

When I arrived at The Hague, I found Paul Reichler and his team terribly upset. Solicitor General Florin Hilbay had earlier emailed them not to answer the questions of the arbitral tribunal on Itu Aba, questions that were previously emailed by the tribunal to our lawyers. At the meeting with our lawyers the evening before the first day of the hearing, I explained that in the Supreme Court, if lawyers refused to answer questions of the Court during oral arguments, that would be taken very strongly against them and they would likely lose their cases. Thankfully, Solgen Hilbay did not argue with me anymore and Paul Reichler and his team took that as a green light to answer all the questions of the tribunal.

The nation is eternally grateful to President Aquino for bravely filing the arbitration case and for steadfastly pursuing the straight and principled path until final victory.

acarpio@inquirer.com.ph

 

 

 

Maritime Zones Act, bakit wala pa rin?

As far as I can tell from online sources, the House of Reps passed the Maritime Zones Act (MZA) in May 2023, the Senate passed it in Feb 2024, and the bicam review was passed by both chambers on the 19th of March. It should have lapsed into law 30 days after, if the President had not yet acted on it. But almost two months later, on May 15, the House of Reps recalled the ratified MZA for “further refinement.” At hanggang ngayon, wala pa rin. What’s going on? Are we “seeing” the hand of China in Congress?

WHERE’S THE LAW FOR PHL TO GET EVEN?
By Jarius Bondoc

Is there a peaceful way to retaliate against China’s attacks in the West Philippine Sea? Yes, says international maritime lawyer Jay Batongbacal, PhD.

With the Maritime Zones Act, the Philippines can demand diplomatic parity. Here’s how, says Batongbacal:

• If China assaults our resupplies and fishing in Ayungin and Panatag Shoals, then we can forbid Chinese passage through our internal waters.

• Reciprocally, if China respects our right to our own exclusive economic zone, then we will let them through.

Recall the June 17th atrocity. Five speedboats of more than 40 Chinese coastguards rammed a Philippine Navy rubber craft beside BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin. Eight Filipino sailors were about to unload food, water and equipment.

The enemy boarded, knifed and axed the rubber boat, fired lasers and looted supplies. They barred medivac of one Filipino whose thumb was severed by the ramming. All this was videoed.

China’s barbarism was well planned. Propaganda was ready. Within an hour its embassy disinformed that the Filipinos did the ramming and provoking.

On June 19th four People’s Liberation Army-Navy warships entered Philippine internal waters on “innocent passage.” Philippine Coast Watch monitored them.

Destroyer Luyang III (DDG168) and frigate Jiangkai II (FFG570) entered Balabac Strait between Palawan and Mindanao at 1:49 p.m. Destroyer Renhai (CG105) and replenishment oiler Fuchi (AOR907) followed at 3:56 p.m.

All sailed the international sea lane in our inner waters for hours then exited Surigao Strait to Pacific Ocean.

It’s impossible that the PLA-Navy didn’t know what its coastguards had done two days prior. They all report to the China Communist Party-Central Military Commission.

With the Maritime Zones Act we can bar any more Chinese naval pass through. No longer may it cross to and from South China Sea and Pacific Ocean via:

(1) Balintang and Babuyan Channels between Batanes and mainland Luzon;
(2) Balabac and Mindoro Straits on the west through Sulu Sea to Surigao Strait on the east and
(3) Sibutu Strait 16 nautical miles wide between Tawi-Tawi and Sabah onto Celebes Sea.

Without Balintang and Babuyan passage, China warships will have to sail farther north via Bashi Channel between Batanes and southern Taiwan. Or between northern Taiwan and Okinawa.

Without Mindoro, Balabac and Sibutu passage, China warships will have to veer far west between Singapore and Borneo, turn south at the Indian Ocean, then east to Celebes Sea onto the Pacific.

PLA-Navy sail times will prolong, costs will rise, operations will be hampered. As Sun Tzu said, “Begin by seizing something your opponent holds dear, then he will be amenable to your will.”

But where’s that Maritime Zones Act (MZA)? Where’s that potent legal weapon against China?

The Senate unanimously ratified the bicameral conference committee report on March 18th and the House also unanimously on March 19th. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. should have signed it or it should have lapsed into law by now.

It has been reverted to the bicam, principal Senate author Francis Tolentino told Gotcha Monday. Why that procedural breach? Because of an apparent oversight.

“We need to reconcile the legal definitions of internal and archipelagic seas,” Tolentino said. “Since Congress is in recess, the bicam can’t muster a quorum, so we’ll have to wait ‘til July resumption.” Principal House author Rufus Rodriguez was askance: “I am puzzled why the bill has not yet been sent to the President for signature despite bicam approval last March.”

Sources blamed the Office of the Solicitor General. It belatedly questioned the constitutionality of the proviso on internal and archipelagic waters, they said. That’s strange, because the Senate and House consulted OSG lawyers every step of the way.

Queried, Solicitor General Menardo Guevarra texted: “I’m not at liberty to comment on the bill. Final version is pending with Congress.”

Marcos is raring to sign the Philippine MZA, he told the Shangri-La Dialogue on global security, Singapore, May 31st. That will have to wait ‘til after his July 22nd State of the Nation.

The MZA rankles Beijing. It bad mouthed the bill for months. On April 21st the China Communist Party English-language organ Global Times lengthily quoted ex-president Duterte’s spokesman Harry Roque bashing the MZA.

In December 2021 then-Senate president Tito Sotto urged Malacañang to certify the bill as urgent. Pro-Beijing, Duterte declined.

A Philippine MZA will blunt China’s expansionism. Other Asia-Pacific states might follow suit. Only 22 states are archipelagic. [Emphases mine]

We must do whatever the enemy doesn’t want. “A great soldier fights on his own terms,” Sun Tzu also said.

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