I was anti-bases in the hey(Joe)days of Subic and Clark; there were no threats then to our waters and borders atbp. Some 20 years later China has grown into a bully of a hegemon hereabouts, with a foreign policy of aggression and expansion, encroaching on and creating artificial islands in our waters, driving our fisherman away, refusing to abide by fair and civilized rules.
So I’m just glad that America is finally coming to the rescue, even if only incidentally, their larger concern being to keep democratic ally Taiwan from falling into the clutches of communist China. I dare say, better the devil we know than the devil we don’t. At least we speak the same language as America, we know exactly (okay, more or less) what they’re up to, whether or not they do right by us. We cannot say the same of China, given the authoritarianism and censorship, the language barrier and (what Andrew Masigan) labels the “two-faced diplomacy.”
If China goes ahead as promised, despite America’s “deterrent” strategy, and war breaks out over Taiwan, yes, we would likely be in China’s crosshairs, but, hey, aren’t we there already anyway?
Readings
Out of our comfort zone and into the ‘gray zone’ by Moira G. Gallaga
The Aquino-Marcos one-two punch by Segundo Eclar Romero
Oaf by Alex Magno
Protecting PH sovereignty and territory by MG Gallaga
Expanded Edca: Benefit or liability? by MG Gallaga
China’s two-faced diplomacy by Andrew J. Masigan
Playing with the big boys by MG Gallaga
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO: The following are undisputed facts: First, China refuses to recognize Philippine rights adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal in respect to maritime zones and features in the West Philippine Sea. Second, China has acted and continues to act aggressively against Filipino fishermen in the West Philippine Sea. Third, China has shooed off Filipino fishermen from Scarborough Shoal notwithstanding the clear ruling of the tribunal that Scarborough has been “traditional fishing ground” to which Filipinos have had untrammeled access. Fourth, Chinese naval vessels have trained water cannons as well as laser-beams at our fishing and coast guard vessels. Fifth, China has expanded coral reefs, islets and other features and has transformed them into military installations.
The sum of this all is that China does not acknowledge and will not acknowledge our rights over our maritime zones, insisting, as it does, on the nine-dash line so arbitrarily drawn as to encompass virtually all of the West Philippine Sea. The Duterte administration was notorious for its policy of appeasement — and that brought us nothing in terms of the dispute over our maritime zones. To be fair to the Department of Foreign Affairs, it fired off several diplomatic protests following every aggressive maneuver on the part of China.
As matters then presently stand, China does not recognize the rights vested on the Philippines by virtue of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The second paragraph of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution directs the State to reserve the use of the resources of the territorial sea, the archipelagic waters and the exclusive economic zone to Filipino citizens — obviously present and generations to come. To allow China its unabating intrusion into these zones and its aggressive policy of excluding Filipinos from them is to violate this constitutional obligation. https://www.manilatimes.net/2023/04/17/opinion/columns/peddling-misinformation-about-edca/1887431
‘China is the one raising tensions over Taiwan’ by Paolo Romero
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2023/04/17/2259396/china-one-raising-tensions-over-taiwan
HUNTER MARSTON: While Manila’s surprisingly amorphous alignment does not neatly fit traditional definitions of hedging, which is more intentional and proactive than under balancing of ‘fence-sitting’, at times the results are similar: a refusal to take sides, signaling ambiguity, and the use of counteracting or opposite measures. Indeed, while hedging ‘is not necessarily a well-calculated or cogently designed “strategy” . . . it is best conceived of as instinctive behavior that prevails under high-stakes’ (Kuik, 2021, 302). Yet, while hedging is distinct from grand strategy, it is nevertheless more deliberate than the unintended result of bureaucratic infighting. Adopting a longer view, successive administrations under different leaders (Arroyo, Aquino III, Duterte, and now Marcos, Jr.) have tried to incrementally (or in Duterte’s case, rather abruptly) shift Manila’s strategic alignment to one side or another to best protect Philippine autonomy as those particular leaders saw fit. Since taking office in 2022, President ‘Bonging’ Marcos, Jr. has cancelled a deal by the Duterte administration to purchase Russian helicopters, opting for the United States to fill the order, and made progress in implementing the United States-Philippines EDCA (Strangio, 2022a, b). Marcos has also been careful to make conciliatory gestures toward Beijing by vowing that Philippines-China ties should not be defined by disagreements in the West Philippine Sea and signaling his interest in raising the partnership to a ‘higher level’ (Hitkari, 2022). Such ‘counteracting and opposite measures’ indicate Manila’s continued preference for hedging.
“Navigating great power competition: a neoclassical realist view of hedging”
https://academic.oup.com/irap/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/irap/lcad001/7043153?redirectedFrom=fulltext&login=true
@hmarston4
https://twitter.com/hmarston4/status/1647853180083122177/photo/1
AARON JED RABENA: It is important to note that for the Philippines, hedging vis-à-vis the U.S. and China is viable only during peacetime. In wartime, its autonomy for hedging would be extinguished, given its potential direct involvement in an SCS conflict with China or its treaty obligations to Washington as an ally in a Taiwan or South China Sea contingency. In either case, the Philippines would become a frontline state.
The EDCA expansion will help the Philippines to upgrade its military bases and defense capabilities. It remains to be seen if the expansion will deter China’s future actions in the SCS and enhance Manila’s bargaining power vis-à-vis Beijing. There is a possibility that the risk of Philippine enmeshment in an actual U.S.-China conflict, either in the SCS or the Taiwan Strait, would be heightened and cause a fallout in Philippines-China relations.
In retaliation for Manila’s possible role, Beijing could reduce trade, aid, and investment flows to deny Marcos Jr. the luxury of maximising his country’s economic opportunities with China while pursuing greater security convergence with the U.S. China’s suspension of dozens of bilateral mechanisms with the U.S. in the wake of former U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022 demonstrated how broader strategic problems can override progress on diplomatic and technical platforms. While the Philippines is not a great power, the same could hold true for Philippines-China relationship.
From Duterte’s “Pivot to China” to Marcos Jr.’s “Rebalance to the U.S.”?
https://fulcrum.sg/from-dutertes-pivot-to-china-to-marcos-jr-s-rebalance-to-the-u-s/
CHANG-TAI HSIEH and JASON HSU: Taiwan’s dominance in semiconductor manufacturing is critical to its economic security. Taiwan currently produces over 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of all high-end chips. But the current US efforts to promote domestic semiconductor manufacturing — reflected in the $280 billion CHIPS and Science Act — threatens to undermine the long-term competitiveness of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC), severely threatening the island’s so-called Silicon Shield.
The US semiconductor manufacturing push has inspired nervousness in Taiwan. TSMC founder Morris Chang recently backed the Biden administration’s imposition of sweeping export controls to curb Chinese advanced-chip production. But Chang says that he does not understand why the administration wants to move manufacturing from efficient Asian sites to the US.
How America should support Taiwan
https://www.bworldonline.com/opinion/2023/04/17/517294/how-america-should-support-taiwan/
MALOU TIQUIA: Remember, the OFWs contribute to our nation via remittances. The Philippines floats from the Asian crisis to Covid to high inflation due to remittances. They are called heroes. They are the main cogs of our foreign relations. In every security threat wherever, the Department of Foreign Affair has been engaged in rescue operations, a herculean task that needed to be done.
The West has let the genie out of the bottle for quite some time. No amount of political somersault will assuage the fears of most on the decision to allow more sites under EDCA, an agreement that is supposed to end a year from now. If the MDT has been with us for 72 years, the soon to be 10-year-old EDCA will just put us deeper into a vortex about to explode. China does not have to use missiles against us, it will just implode from within, from food to trade.
Who blinked?
https://www.manilatimes.net/2023/04/18/opinion/columns/who-blinked/1887517
ALEX MAGNO: There is nothing pro-American in affirming the need to keep the island chain strong and freedom of navigation secure. It is entirely pro-Filipino.
We have realigned our foreign policy to suit our pragmatic and long-term interests. That can only be good.
Realignment
https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2023/04/20/2260182/realignment