senators betraying public trust #cj trial

day 15, what a disaster.  i had hoped that if corona were to be impeached, it would happen fairly and squarely, and for a while there i thought the senate was doing a great job, even if it was rather lenient with the bumbling prosecution, even allowing themselves to directly question the witnesses and help make the case.  public’s right to know and all that, up to a point.  but today it was too much.

it’s as though the release of some bank records, illegally obtained at that, have brought out the predator in certain senator-jurors who must be smelling blood and are salivating for more — the dollar accounts, in particular, kasi daw, it would set a bad example for crooks in government who might put their unexplained wealth in dollar accounts, too, now that they know that dollar accounts are sacrosanct.  oh please.  as if naman people who have surplus funds don’t know that already.  and cayetano himself says, it’s a law that can be amended.  then amend it later, i say, than break the law now — enough rules and laws of court are being broken — just to satisfy their bloodlust.

it’s offensive the way these senator-jurors are suddenly behaving as though they were lily white when it comes to undeclared/doctored incomes and real estate property valuations in their SALNs and ITRs, and as if they had no dollar accounts themselves.  come on, sirs, don’t take us all for dolts naman.  and stop using “the people” as an excuse.  i daresay that the way things are going, the people would accept a decision along the lines of: okay, noted, enough-is-enough, move on.  after all there are 7 more articles to go.  or can it be that the 7 other articles are duds?  it’s the bank records or nothing?  bank records that the 188 reps + farinas didn’t even know about when they impeached the chief justice?  wow.  farinas could be right, they’re all in this together.  what a betrayal of public trust.




    The HOR initiates impeachment and the Senate tries the impeachment.

    Thus, the Congress (the HOR and the Senate) was given the enormous power TO KNOW what an impeachable offense constitutes or what it does not.

    The Supreme Court would not know and would not even venture to define what an impeachable offense carries! (Francisco vs. HOR and Gutierrez vs. HOR)

    The right to determine the elusive definition rests solely on the legislative branch of government, a political body.

    The 1987 Constitution enumerates the impeachable offenses:

    culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust

    I counted six (6) impeachable offenses; the Supreme Court in Francisco vs. HOR likewise counted six (6) “grounds for impeachment,” namely:

    1. Culpable violation of the Constitution
    2. Treason
    3. Bribery
    4. Graft and corruption
    5. Other high crimes
    6. Betrayal of public trust

    The lack of jurisprudence results to a lack of understanding of the offenses 5 and 6 respectively: “Other high crimes” and “Betrayal of public trust”. In Francisco the Supreme Court said:

    Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition.

    The Corona impeachment trial will hope to decide in concrete terms the elusive definition.

    IMHO, “betrayal of public trust” must not be equated with “other high crimes”.

    Offenses 1 to 4 are admittedly of a nature of “high crimes” already. Following the ejusdem generis (of the same kind, class or nature) rule, this is so and the offense “other high crimes” must consist of unlawful commissions similar to offenses 1 to 4.

    “Betrayal of public trust,” however, will not necessarily constitute the same offense as 1 to 5. Being the last ground for impeachment as enumerated in the Constitution, it bears a different meaning from the others. It may now be enumerated or categorized to be:

    a. Culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption
    b. Other high crimes, or
    c. Betrayal of public trust

    Thus, as the Supreme Court puts it, the offenses “other high crimes” and ” betrayal of public trust” are to be defined or dissected.

    The 6th impeachable offense may not be of the same category as a “high crime” because the rule of construction against redundancy will impose that “betrayal of public trust” is not synonymous to “high crimes”. “Betrayal of public trust” must mean another thing aside from being a “high crime”.

    Besides, if “betrayal of public trust” was considered to be a “high crime” then it must be at Number 5 instead of Number 6 in the enumeration!

    Further dissection/definition of “betrayal of public trust” will be found in two of my comments here (also with reference to the Constitutional Commission deliberations on “betrayal of public trust”):

    The question now is, “Must we therefore subscribe (hook, line, and sinker) to Fr. Bernas’ definition?”

    The HOR (and so does the Senate) must know the definition…because it is their Constitutional DUTY and POWER to know.

    However Cong. Tupas et al QUOTED Fr. Bernas in OPEN COURT and in MEDIA! I am pretty sure they also put this in their MEMORANDUM on what an impeachable offense constitute as what was required by the Impeachment Court.

    It is saddening to learn if the TRUE MEANING of “betrayal…” will elude us.

    But, what is more saddening is when, aside from the true meaning, THE ONE(S) WHO BETRAYED US will elude us.