La vida loca – corruption style

Letter from Dumaguete. Siliman U. Econ Prof. O. Roncesvalles‘s musings on the grand corruption (breathtaking) that’s finally being exposed, the easy solutions (like prayer) that won’t work, the hard solutions that would take unusual political will (like an anti-dynasty law and vote-counting reform) but that we can aim for, toward systemic change, now that the youth are awake.

LA VIDA LOCA – corruption style
When it pours, it rains
By Orlando Roncesvalles

Where we are

Corruption cannot be helped. At times, we accept it (keeping our tongues in check and cheek). We tolerate low-level corruption, but grand corruption is something else. It is breathtaking, magnificent, munificent, gargantuan, and earthshaking. It invites performative art on TV, where we get to watch legislators make general denials, and we pretend belief. We give them their presumption of innocence, but they know that the jig is up. So, our youth go to protest marches. Some of us — parents and grandparents — join in. It feels like the 1980s.

It is not my intention to excuse a particular form of corruption. Still, under certain conditions, we can tolerate or even justify corruption. The justification is both practical and academic. If corruption is small enough, we live with it. Such corruption can also address market failures. Based on this theory, Adam Smith supposedly excused a corrupt customs official. Robert Barro and Sala-i-Martin raised the same argument in a 1995 book on economic growth. We entertain the thought that as an economy advances, petty corruption tends to go away. For example, adopting a de minimis rule for imports (giving an exemption from import tariffs for small-value shipments) has cut much of petty customs corruption.

We should then be clear about the corruption we will not abide by or endure — the kind that kills. “Bill” will now turn in his grave. It isn’t because corruption is the misuse of public power for private gain. It is more than that. It is grand theft. It is the kind that takes from the poor (the taxpayer, the masa, the hapless subscribers of Facebook, X, and TikTok) and gives to the rich or powerful. It is the kind driven by greed in the dark hearts of men.

If entrepreneurs were smart enough, they might provide “corruption insurance” in the same way that insurance companies write policies to cover floods and disasters. Instead, we find several explanations in the academic literature for why corruption persists (a topic I hope to revisit soon). These explanations generate solutions to the problem of grand corruption.

Easy solutions

Some facile solutions don’t work. They are: (1) prayers, (2) asking government officials to showcase their talents, (3) looking for introverts, and (4) moralizing or “shame and blame” tactics.

Prayer is useless. We pray to the good Lord to “lead us not into temptation.” The late senator Miriam D. Santiago said, “When the government employee is poor, and he works in a corrupt agency, he can resist everything except temptation.” I would amend her observation. Those now caught in the flood control scandals are not poor. Corruption would not exist in an honest government agency. And of course, prayers would not be needed. To her credit, I cannot imagine Santiago advocating only prayers to fix our corruption mess.

An aspect of temptation is the Mt. Everest syndrome. “Why did you climb the mountain?” You respond that it was just there, so unattainable. Oh, and this RollsRoyce comes with an umbrella. And there is no way to level Mt. Everest. We all secretly want to climb the heights of (social media) fame and fortune, and be envied by our neighbors. Perhaps, we ought also to require, as a condition for public service, a high score for being an introvert. Introverts don’t fall into a honey-pot corruption scheme. They wouldn’t know what to do with the money!

It also doesn’t pay to simply “name and shame” the culprits, even if we are disgusted by the faces of legislators who are as honest as the day is long. All right, that was a line from the movie Casablanca. The truly corrupt have armies of PR and legal people who deodorize their s***. The guilty can even include famous (and possibly infamous) anti-corruption crusaders. Likely, some journalists, celebrities, and “influencers” are also on the take. How long should we put up with this charade?

Hard solutions

Moving on, we should consider the best ideas that economists have offered and documented. Our legislators should study the successes in such countries as Singapore, China (including Hong Kong SAR), New Zealand, and Rwanda.

One guardrail worth considering is a “smell test.” If the corrupt scheme has grown too large, it cannot be hidden or denied. It stinks. Such a smell test works for the recently discovered flood control schemes. Almost any whistleblower system will deter such schemes. Some reformers believe that computers, ‘blockchains’, and transparent internet portals will make it practically impossible to hide massive corruption. They may well be right. Some well-intentioned citizens have also called for publishing the SALNs of public officials and giving more teeth to the AMLA.

One solution from institutional economics lies in the design of penalties. Corruption is typically a conspiracy. Breaking up the conspiracy requires penalties that are light on the “victims” and heavy on the “predator” parties. Economists call this remedy ‘asymmetric penalties.’

Setting up a conspiracy is not cost-free. In the case of a flood control program, a senator or congressman seeking a kickback must negotiate with other parties, such as contractors, auditors, and engineers, to devise a systematic method of diverting taxpayer funds through the budget. The key player is the legislator who proposes (the “proponent”), under the guise of good intentions, “ghost” or overpriced projects. If undiscovered, this type of corruption feels like a perfect crime. However, it requires resources and coordination that are basically transaction costs.

A general solution is therefore to raise the transaction costs of corruption. One way of doing this is to introduce uncertainty or mistrust among the conspirators. A solution in China featured a twist on the bidding process for public works. There, disinterested and anonymous experts were asked to study and approve particular bids. The experts did not know beforehand which projects they would be judging. Johann Lambsdorff reported on this solution in his book, The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform.

Another approach is a direct application of asymmetric penalties. A controversial proposal to decriminalize bribe-giving was suggested in 2011 by Kaushik Basu, a former World Bank official and Chief Economic Adviser to the Indian government. Moral outrage greeted the proposal. The Chinese already had a version of the proposal in place since 1997; there, according to one observer, it was motivated by sympathy toward bribe-givers whom public officials “victimized.” The Basu proposal was to apply only to acts, such as the issuance of licenses, to which the bribe-giver was justly entitled. The bribe-taking official would be severely punished. Interestingly, the original proposal backfires if it results in zero bribes and also zero licenses!

Using the tools of game theory, Martin Dufwenberg and Giancarlo Spagnolo analyzed the Basu proposal and suggested scenarios in which it may be effective. The trick was to modify the proposal so that it achieves two objectives: reducing the cost of reporting an illegal bribe or transaction, and reducing the incentive for an official to participate in such transactions. The first objective is something we already have to some extent — incentives and amnesty for whistleblowers. The second objective is perhaps more challenging; it would be helpful if we also had an efficient legal system and a culture of honest and fair dealings among government officials — difficult but not impossible.

Old-fashioned street protests also work if enough of the citizenry have become sensitized. Studies by Erica Chenoweth at the Harvard Kennedy School suggest that nonviolent protests, involving only 3.5 percent of the affected population, are effective because such protests are often representative of underlying public sentiment. The recent demonstrations by the youth in Indonesia and Nepal serve as a warning to established politicians who think that corruption can persist.

It is evident today that the absence of a law implementing the constitutional ban on political dynasties encourages corruption. The 1987 Constitution was explicit: “The State shall… prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.” The underlying logic is straightforward: profits from corruption allow political families to maintain their grip on public office and thwart legislation that would define a ‘political dynasty,’ effectively undermining the constitutional mandate.

What we can do

We can enforce the constitutional ban against political dynasties through the necessary legislation. This is no longer a matter of wishful thinking. Many support such an initiative after waiting almost 40 years. We can demand that legislators resign if they fail to act accordingly.

We can, with political will, strengthen the existing anti-graft and anti-money laundering laws by affirming the protections and amnesties we offer to whistleblowers, and by penalizing the banks that allow their clients to use dummies or shell companies to move illicit funds. Note that under AMLA, casinos are considered banks and are required to implement anti-money laundering measures.

We can demand transparency in public office — no more secret SALNs, all budgets at every level of government should be “out there” for each citizen to scrutinize and debate, and no more secret meetings among councilors, provincial boards, and legislators when they deliberate on budgets. This “sunshine” approach is so elementary, but we are still in kindergarten. We can also enforce transparency through public ledgers, providing the public with easy access to the details of governmental revenues and expenditures, and to the SALNs of officials.

If our legislators and executive officials aren’t up to the task, we can vote them out of office. Can we, if corrupt candidates buy votes or can manipulate the votecounting process? Some quarters have suggested returning to manual and public counting at the precincts, while allowing for speedy and open-access canvassing of votes — the preferred practice in most advanced countries.

Prognosis and prescription

Our youth have awakened. No longer will they stand idly by. We can support them en masse and earn their respect. The corrupt old fogeys will wonder what hit them. Keep them guessing, and by all means, let them rot on the wrong side of history.

CORRUPTION BE GONE

Mayhem in Manila . . .

The co-incidence was too much.

In the week or so before the huge Sept 21 anti-corruption rallies in Luneta and EDSA, Duterte propagandists were exhorting their online followers to join either of the two, basta anti-Marcos at hindi anti-Duterte. Nung pareho palang anti-Duterte rin, nag-plan B sila: a Maisug rally sa Liwasang Bonifacio, come one come all. On the side, Tiktok was alive with promises that Sara would be president by September 22.

But lo and behold, not one of the Duterte bigwigs showed up in Liwasan on the 21st. VP Sara, Kitty, RobinP, VicR, LorraineB atbp. had flown to Japan for a Sept 20 OFW rally, samantalang si TrixC was on her way to Europe and has been tiktoking from The Hague’s “Duterte Street” since around the 22nd.

Anyare? So they never meant to make sipot the Liwasan rally? After all those pep talks about people power, as in, let’s-go-do-an-Edsa, bakit parang tinakbuhan nila yung event, bakit sila nag-disappearing act lahat? Dahil alam nilang hindi kakayaning tabunan ng Maisug ang mga Luneta at EDSA crowds? Magkakaalaman na, at mapapahiya sila?

It made even more sense when the ugly riots broke out in Manila, near the Palace. I couldn’t help connecting the awful turn of events to the missing Duterte VIPs.  Maybe they knew this was in the works, and they didn’t want to be around when it happened, so they could pretend to be as shocked and angry as everybody else, and point fingers at everyone else’s corruption except Duterte’s? Read “Pakana ng DDS?” https://politiko.com.ph/ 

Thanks to YouTube, I saw enough live shoots of the action, particularly yung bandang simula sa may Ayala Bridge, when one tire pa lang of a container van was on fire, and spreading, and about a dozen or more masked youths in black were throwing rocks at a phalanx of police who were blocking their way to the Palace. The police, practising maximum tolerance, could only cower behind their shields and stand their ground, even when the kids came at them and beat at their shields with wooden poles.

I wondered who these kids were. I couldn’t quite believe that these were tibaks from the Luneta rally (who were said to have moved to Mendiola for a last rite but didn’t stay), because if they were, it would mean that the progressive Left had suddenly shifted from nonviolent to violent protest tactics?

It seemed to me that these boys were a different bunch, out only to provoke the police into arresting them so they could resist, fight back, create scenes of chaos, and incite usiseros and bystanders to join the march on the Palace, the more the merrier.  In Recto and Mendiola parang mas marami na sila, may kasama nang streetkids and riffraff, at mas magulo na, naninira’t nambabato’t  nagsúsunóg, at nanlabán when the authorities finally moved to detain, arrest, some 200 of them, di na baleng maakusahan sila ng police brutality, the young thugs had to be stopped from doing even more harm.

And when it was over, what a relief that the mayhem was nothing like that of Edsa Tres (May 2001), and that the arrested youth mostly confessed quickly enough that they were primed and paid to pretend and to play at being angry anti-Marcos activists, and to attack Malacañang and call for the president’s resignation, or some DDS sheet like that.

CITO BELTRAN. Were … they “hoodlums for hire” paid to agitate the police into attacking the protesters with a plan of creating negative content and videos for online propaganda? Apparently so, after some of the people arrested confessed that they were paid P3,000 to create chaos in the streets and attempt to siege Malacañang. https://www.philstar.com/

Which is not to make light of the plight of those mistakenly arrested and detained. Gets ko naman the concern of the organized Left (militants and moderates) for these poor kids and their parents. But there’s obviously a lesson to be learned here: stay away from masked figures in black wreaking havoc, or suffer the consequences.

… Garma in The Hague

On the ICC front, it would seem that Sonny Trillanes & Royina Garma have been sighted in The Hague, which would suggest na totoo ang tsismis, the police colonel will be testifying for the prosecution. Read “Duterte and Garma: The next chapter” by Marit Stinus-Cabugon.

The police colonel, merciless and feared even by her fellow police officers, became the face of President Duterte’s war on drugs in Cebu City. The war was indeed bloody and extremely violent. In 2019, the Cebu City Police Office was furthermore used to harass then-mayor (now vice mayor) Tomas Osmeña, his slate and supporters. Osmeña was defeated, and Garma was rewarded by the president with the position of general manager of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO).

… It is an interesting twist that Trillanes, bitter foe of the former president, was the link between Garma and the ICC. Maybe Garma weighed her options. Hiding in the US was out of the picture. As for the Philippines, case or no case, she is hardly safe considering her testimonies against former colleagues. Also, the line of victims of the Duterte years’ violent law enforcement operations and extrajudicial killings is long. Some affected individuals might seek retribution.

The postponement “until further notice” of the much-anticipated Sept. 23 hearing comes as a great disappointment to those who pin their hopes on the ICC to bring former president Duterte to justice. However, it also gives the prosecution more time to prepare. What matters is that he will not be released, whether to a third country or to the Philippines. Being detained far from home may indeed have taken its toll on the mental health of the 80-year-old former president. However, allowing him to leave the Netherlands before the trial has even begun would be a victory for the very man who is on trial for crimes against humanity.

Garma doesn’t bode good for the defense, and the Duterte camp knows it. Maybe it’s why they’re suddenly on overdrive. My YouTube algo is rife with new live videos of some DDS peeps rallying in Liwasang Bonifacio demanding that BBM step down because he’s just as corrupt as everybody else in Congress and the Senate and the judiciary, and retired military officers vlogging and pushing violent versions of a people-powered government cleansed of all crooked politicians, or something like that.

Malinaw naman na ang goal ay maiupo si VP Sara, ngunit ayon kay Randy David, malabo itong mangyari nang basta-basta. Read “Don’t waste the angerhttps://opinion.inquirer.net/

The Marcos administration wants to keep the anger alive, but under control, so it can immobilize its political enemies—notably the remnants of the Duterte regime. At the same time, it seeks to purge its own ranks of officials whose greed it can no longer defend, not because it has developed an ethical skin, but because the specter of removal from power before the end of its term has become plausible.

On the other side are the Duterte forces, still smarting from the sudden arrest and detention of their leader on orders of the International Criminal Court last March. Their sole agenda is to delegitimize Marcos Jr. and replace him with the constitutional successor, Vice President Sara Duterte. Outside of impeachment, they cannot do this without the tacit support of the military and the cooperation of the middle classes. Otherwise, they will have to wait until 2028. For now, they want to keep the spotlight on the Marcos administration’s culpability in the flood control scandal, hoping to sustain public anger until the next election.

Sana’y magdilang-anghel si Randy. Because so far the Independent Commission on Infrastructure (ICI) isn’t inspiring confidence that all corrupt heads will roll. What is, and why is it all, going on behind closed doors? That Mayor Benjie Magalong has resigned in disgust has online groupchats buzzing with prominent names allegedly being exempted from investigation. Guess who.

Distorting EDSA, Dismissing Agrava

Heard a pro-Duterte lawyer vlogger telling her followers na kung maraming marami silang jo-join sa  rallies, maaaring sumama na pati ang military, just like in ’86 daw when the military went to EDSA to protect daw the people in case of violent actions from the powers-that-be.

She also said that she doesn’t believe there can be a truly credible investigative commission. “Remember the Agrava Commission? May naniwala ba?” She reminded that there were two reports “dahil hindi magkásundô” [ang commissioners].

THE MILITARY IN EDSA 86

Sinong military troops ang pumuntang EDSA in ’86 to protect the people? Enrile, FVR, and Gringo’s RAM? The Marines’ Tadiar and Balbas?

FACT.  Enrile and Gringo’s Reform the Armed Forces Movement went to Camp Aguinaldo Saturday afternoon, joined by FVR a few hours later, to defect and take a stand vs Marcos (after their coup plot to replace the dictator was discovered). Wala pang tao noon sa EDSA. It was Day 7 of Cory‘s crony-boycott campaign. Close to midnight na when the people went to EDSA upon the call of Butz Aquino and Cardinal Sin to protect the rebel military who were perceived to be possible allies against the dictator.

FACT. Marine Commander General Artemio Tadiar and his tanks went to EDSA Sunday on orders to eliminate Enrile and co. but the people stopped them in Ortigas (as Enrile was crossing the highway to join forces with FVR in Camp Crame).  Monday Col. Braulio Balbas and his howitzers were able to enter Camp Aguinaldo through Libis, with orders to bomb Crame across the highway, but Crame was full of people protecting Enrile and Ramos, and Balbas simply disobeyed orders.

So. It’s not true that the military withdrew their support from Marcos and went to EDSA to protect the people. It was the people, waving Ninoy’s and Cory’s colors and banners, who marched to EDSA to protect the rebel military, not the other way around. Let’s get that straight. https://edsarevolution.com/chronology/

AGRAVA COMMISSION

Hindi rin totoo na walang naniwala sa findings ng Agrava Fact-Finding Board on the Ninoy assasination. Kapani-paniwala ang patunay ng Board na nagsinungaling sina Marcos at Olivas when they insisted na sa tarmac binaril si Ninoy at si Galman ang bumaril sa kanya.

Based on eyewitness accounts and audio recordings, the Board established beyond doubt that Ninoy, the victim of a military conspiracy, was shot on the service stairs by the soldier right behind him. All five members of the Board agreed on this principal finding.

The Majority and Minority reports differed only on how high the military conspiracy went. Chair Corazon Agrava named only the six (6) soldiers who were on the stairs with Ninoy, plus their immediate superior Avsecom chief Gen. Luther Custodio. The majority of four (Dante Santos, Ernesto Herrera, Amado Dizon, and Luciano Salazar) went all the way up to Ver and Olivas, with 22 military men, and one civilian.

That the Majority Report (Oct 1984) dared belie the dictator’s communist-hitman-tale and lay the blame squarely at the feet of Ver, Marcos’s highest military official, was a high point in the struggle to obtain justice for Ninoy.

Unfortunately, if expectedly, following the dictator’s orders na “Mag moro-moro na lang kayo”, the 1985 Sandiganbayan trial (Pamaran Court) declared inadmissible in court the copious evidence unearthed by the Agrava Board, and acquitted all 26, ruling that Ninoy was shot by Galman who was in turn shot by the military. The very next day Cory announced that she would run for President if Marcos were to hold snap elections. We all know how that turned out.

A year after Cory assumed office, there was a Sandiganbayan retrial of the Aquino-Galman double murder case (Hermosisima Court 1987-’90), this while Marcos loyalists mounted coup attempt after coup attempt to topple Cory and bring back Marcos. Criminal Case No. 10010 and 10011 was finally decided a year after Marcos died. It was a compromise decision, upholding Agrava’s finding of a military conspiracy but convicting only 16 soldiers, Custodio the highest ranking. Perhaps a concession to the restive military that settled down only in FVR times.

That Ver and Olivas (and other culpable ones) got off scot free, and that there was no evidence directly linking Marcos to the killing — these do not reflect on the Agrava Board, rather, on the genius of the mastermind who planned and enabled the project : How to kill Ninoy and get away with it. That’s my theory anyway, after some research on what Marcos and the military were up to in the three years preceding Ninoy’s homecoming.

***

More in my Ninoy book, coming soon. This year, if I stop blogging. But these are such exceptional times. Even, desperate times for pro-Duterte vloggers, kaya nagkakalat ng fake history.

***