Category: UNACCEPTABLE!!!

what if

i had been wondering how erap or villar or gibo or gordon would have handled the aug 23 hostage-taking, in contrast of course to the low-key laid-back wait-it-out style of the new prez.   and then i read this in facebook via leslie bocobo and, oo nga naman, why wonder about losers.  instead, what if FVR?   under his watch we, and the world, would have at the very least “witnessed cogent efforts to end it without bloodshed.”

My thoughts on the Quirino tragedy
by Rafael Alunan III

In answer to queries on what might have happened in FVR’s time had the Quirino tragedy taken place during his watch, here’s a probable picture recalling that, before his presidency, he was a former head of the national police (Phil. Constabulary), AFP Chief of Staff and Sec. of National Defense.

The Secretary of Interior and Local Government (SILG) and concurrently the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) Chair and National Committee on Anti-Hijacking and Terrorism (NACAHT) Chair, an intelligence exchange and crisis management body that only a few knew about, would play a key role.

Once known that a tourist bus was hijacked and foreign nationals held hostage, SILG would immediately notify FVR, adding that it was Live on global TV. He probably would have been aware already since his office monitors the news round-the-clock. He would have deemed it a national concern paving the entry of NACAHT.

FVR would instruct his crisis center in Malacanan manned by a joint AFP/PNP task force to coordinate with NACAHT. The National Security Adviser; DFA, DND, DOJ, DILG and Press Secretaries; and the President’s spokesman would be called to support the TF for the duration of the crisis. SILG would function as the Chief of the Office of Primary Responsibility to control the strategic play and keep FVR informed.

SILG would activate NACAHT, position it at the top floor of the Manila Hotel to gain a vantage view, and have it controlled by the Vice-Chair and concurrent DILG USEC for Peace and Order. He would likely invite the MMDA Chair and Mayor of Manila to join the PNP Chief, senior reps from the national government and other experts vital to the mission.Equipment that the venue didn’t have would be brought in to provide NACAHT a functioning crisis center on the ground.

An experienced and trustworthy ground commander (GC) to head the hostage rescue operations at the scene would be chosen next. He would quickly estimate the situation based on available intelligence, map out his strategy, draw up supporting plans and choose the personnel required to negotiate, disarm/disable or neutralize the hostage-taker while ensuring the hostages’ safety.

The GC would then assemble a potent hostage-rescue team (HRT) – negotiator/s; psychologist/s; crowd / perimeter control and SWAT teams – based on capability and track record. Crucial considerations for selection would be the need for continuous intelligence gathering, communication, coordination, thinking on the run, physical stamina and split second decisions, often under duress.

After NACAHT vets his strategy and plans, and obtains the TF’s concurrence, it would then be the GC’s play all the way. NACAHT would then become the GC’s advisory team and clearing house, breaking up into work shifts to monitor 24/7 to stay on top of the situation.

Should an unforeseen factor arise along the way that could jeopardize the mission or impact on the nation’s honor and integrity, NACAHT and the GC would quickly assess and process courses of action, choose the best options, and elevate to the TF for the President’s approval.

As soon as feasible, FVR would notify the Chinese Ambassador of the government’s efforts to ensure the safety of the hostages and its quick and peaceful resolution. He could graciously ask him and his police attache to advise the TF and NACAHT on the matter. He would also call the HK Administrator to keep him in the loop.

The President’s moves would be disclosed by his spokesman in a series of controlled press conferences, while the Press Secretary would brief the press about the rules of engagement in this delicate situation. A media pool would be organized to cover the event under the strict control of the GC to ensure that no punches are telegraphed unwittingly that could put the rescue mission at risk.

Regular feedback would be streaming to the TF from NACAHT. As commander-in-chief he could, if need be under extreme circumstances, intervene to order a freeze, to accelerate operations or modify strategies based on his appreciation of the dynamic situation. NACAHT would stay put in close proximity for quick communication and easy coordination until the job got done.

That was how FVR and his senior team could have likely handled the situation. The veterans who manned their battle stations and experienced harrowing situations would only be too willing to help by sharing a thing or two with the incumbents.

Enough said on that except for these personal observations:

* SILG Jesse Robredo had/has no command and control over the PNP; his Undersecretary does, on instructions of the President. That raises serious legal issues and complicates the system of public administration and governance.

* There was no functioningcrisis management committee (CMC) either at the national or at the local levels. An inexperienced GC was all alone to figure things out without professional CMC backing.

* The fraternal links of Manila Mayor Fred Lim, the ground commander, the HRT and the Mendoza brothers to the Manila Police Brotherhood, may have blurred logic, focus, priorities and dividing lines. The risk was the absence of check and balance, fanning laxity that led to tragedy.

* A cardinal rule is to never agitate the hostage-taker. They did. There were golden chances to disarm/disable Mendoza before he could inflict any harm. They didn’t take it. A functioning CMC in support of the GC should have persuaded the Ombudsman to issue a report clearing Mendoza (non-binding because it was obtained under duress). It didn’t.

That deception might have led him to give up at that stage. Then he could have been cuffed and charged for kidnapping, illegal possession of firearms and attempted murder; and locked away for good. It was worth a try, even if it failed, given his state of mind.

* The GC must never leave his post until the crisis is over. He did, on the invitation of the Mayor who got hungry. Instead of sending for food, they proceeded to a place that was not equipped to monitor the situation, thus, was nowhere near when Mendoza started killing.

* No one was thinking: of inserting a fiber optic camera to monitor the hostages and Mendoza; that Mendoza was monitoring from the bus’ radio-TV system and his cell phone, and was getting homicidal; of clamping down on the media that wanted to be part of the story instead of just reporting it.

* A professional team would have taken a minute or less to break-in, board, blastMendoza and secure the hostages. The PNP’s Special Action Force or Aviation Security Command would have been ideal, trained by the Australian SAS and Israel’s Yamam for close quarter battle (CQB). SAF was, in fact, on standby but never used.

Could a tragedy have been avoided in any case? Assuming the right components were in place with the right mindset, probably. With bad luck, maybe not, precious lives could have still been lost. But at least the world would have witnessed cogent efforts to end it without bloodshed, and the country’s honor as well as the people’s morale and self-esteem may not have taken such a beating.

I extend my deepest sympathies for the injured and sincerest condolences to the families of those who died. And for those who tried and failed, don’t despair; your fall might yet be your springboard to redemption. Just make it happen.

holding back

there’s still so much to be said and asked about the aug 23 bloodbath but i’m holding back just because the hong kong chinese are hurt enough, enraged enough, and things are bad enough for filipinos in hong kong.   also, even if i didn’t vote for him, i don’t want to make it worse for the president who, naturally, is getting the brunt of the blame for distancing himself, treating the hostaging of foreigners as a local rather than national affair.

like philippine star‘s boo chanco says, it’s P-Noy’s leadership abilities on the line:

He is just two months into the job and I want to believe he is competent and able to do the right things. Now I am not sure because of how badly he miscalculated the gravity of the hostage crisis. I also get the impression he is not organized to handle crisis situations. I am not even sure the people around him are experienced enough to handle crisis. For some of them, including the also invisible Executive Secretary, last Monday’s event may even be their first crisis situation….

Probably the Palace didn’t think much of the situation atthe start. That’s the first mistake. That’s probably why the President confidently left the matter to the police and went on to discuss with the Health Secretary the worsening dengue epidemic and the budget message with his budget secretary.

Any crisis involving life and death situations, more so one with international repercussions, should be given high priority. Duh! If the President’s Communications Team had more experience, they should have been more persuasive with the President taking a higher profile specially after the major networks pre-empted regular programming in favor of a live coverage of the event.

So we are told P-Noy was actually engaged. He was reported to have spent time that afternoon and evening at the nearby Emerald restaurant that served as a kind of command headquarters. But no one knew that. For all we knew, he was just feasting on the excellent jumbo siopao for which Emerald is known for. I understand, he was advised to stay in the shadows. It was a bad advice as we now all know.

Worse… the first thing the public saw and heard after the carnage was a President who seemed remote and in the words of a Hong Kong legislator, frivolous and dismissive. It was unfortunate that P-Noy was seen by the world with a smirk on his face as he said that anyway, there were more casualties in similar hostage events in Russia (the one in the concert hall and the one in a schoolhouse in Beslan) and the one in Germany (possibly Munich Olympics).

That may be true and may probably provide perspective but was a most insensitive thing to say. It was also beside the point at a time when 8 lives were lost because of our inept handling of the situation….

The incident also confirmed our worse fears that Coloma and Carandang are not talking to each other. They are not synchronizing the message coming out of the Palace. They may even be trying to upstage each other. What a horrible mess!!!

If the Palace is this dysfunctional in handling a crisis involving one crazy man, how will P-Noy and his boys handle a repeat of an Ondoy situation or heaven forbid… a major earthquake along the Marikina fault line? I shudder at the thought!…

In our column last Friday, we were ready to be more understanding because we thought they (the Manila police) didn’t have enough training and equipment. But that is not the case. There were units that had the right training and equipment except that they were not used by the ground commander. If this isn’t stupidity, I don’t know what is.

If P-Noy had a more direct hand, I am sure he would have the sense to order the use of the more trained Police Special Action Force or the US-trained Light Reaction Company (LRC) which is under the military’s Joint Special Operations Group instead of the jokers in the Manila Police’s so called SWAT group….

What P-Noy ends up doing in the next few weeks will be carefully watched by everyone. What he does or fails to do will impact on how people feel about his competence and credibility as our country’s Chief Executive. Speaking for myself, I want P-Noy to succeed for our sake. But he needs to show leadership or the next six years will be a continuation of the horrible years we seem to be doomed to suffer. Right now, P-Noy seems too laid back for comfort.

enough said.   for all our sakes let’s pray that justice secretary leila de lima’s investigation proceeds as professionally and impeccably as possible, and that the chips are allowed to fall where they may, regardless of consequences to whomever.

command responsibility 3

Trip of high-level delegation cancelled (5:13 p.m.)
Thursday, August 26

MANILA — The flight of high-level delegation formed by the President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III to explain Monday’s hostage crisis to China and Hong Kong governments has been cancelled Thursday.

The members of the high-level delegation composing Vice President Jejomar Binay, Local Government Secretary, Jesse Robredo and Presidential spokesperson Edwin Lacierda were supposed to fly to Beijing, China today.

But in a statement issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs, it said that they are still awaiting for the confirmation from the Chinese government.

“The Philippine government has planned for a high-level delegation to visit the People’s Republic of China and the Hong Kong Special Administration Region, and is awaiting confirmation from the Chinese side on the arrangement that will ensure that the mission of the planned visit is achieved,” text message from the DFA forwarded by Palace Ricky Carandang read.

It added that proper announcement will be made regarding the schedule of the trip. (Jill Beltran/Sunnex)

hello?   mr. president?   you should have taken mr. tsang’s call. you should have expected he would call to ask about his people — wouldn’t you, in his place?   and you should have been ready and able to take whatever he had to dish out, AND to defend your strategy of waiting it out, AND to be open to his suggestions.   after all, the lives of 15 hong kong nationals were at stake.   after all, it was past 4 p.m., over six hours of horribly dangerous captivity for his people, and he must have wanted assurance that something everything was being done to effect their rescue.   he absolutely deserved to be listened to.   so, really, nakakagulat ba, masakit ba, that you we are now getting the silent treatment from mr. tsang?   tit for tat.   a painful snub for a painful painful snub.   maybe until heads start rolling?

meanwhile the senate hearing at least clears up one thing: it wasn’t just the media coverage of the brother’s drama resisting arrest that angered the hostage-taker.   it was also the ombudsman’s letter — basura daw — because it failed to give him what he was asking for.   and it was also the brother’s appeal not to give up until his gun (the brother’s) had been returned.   so let’s go easy on media.   i was watching tv all day; and i’m glad it was covered live by media because if not, we would be bogged down now by questions of what really happened rather than why.  yes the coverage got excessive as the drama escalated, and yes, the scoop mentality ruled at that point, so yes, next time, they should know enough to draw a line.

meanwhile on anc right now it’s manila’s mayor and vice-mayor and some cops again going through isko’s narrative of his negotiations with mendoza.   what i want to know is, it was six pm by the time he delivered that letter from the ombudsman, and it wss the first serious response to the hostage-taker’s demand?  it took them all of eight hours to come up with “garbage”?

i just saw a recreation (computer animation) of what supposedly happened inside the bus when mendoza went bloody mad, and it’s horrendous and heartbreaking.  reminds me that i kept wondering, while watching that silent bus off in the distance, what was going on inside, what was it like exactly for the hostages all throughthose horrible hours.   we were seeing nothing, hearing nothing, it was easy to believe everything was cool, and under control…

i wonder now, what if the media had been a little curious about the hostages, sino-sino ba ang nasa loob, how many males, females, kids, elders, teens. it should have been easy enough to find some pictures of them, show us their faces, remind us, and the police, and the palace, that there were, those were, real persons in there…   and what if the police had managed to stick a tiny high-tech microphone device somewhere that allowed us, them to hear what was being said, cried, screamed inside the bus…   then maybe there would have been more of a sense of urgency from the first hour?   and the police would have known not to believe the escaped driver, not everyone was dead?

yes, we’re all experts on hindsight.   for me it’s a coping mechanism.   helps me sleep nights.

command responsibility 2

here’s etta rosales, incoming chief of the commission on human rights on hostage-taker’s demands:

“Dapat binigay na nila yung hinihingi, ano ba naman yun katumbas ng buhay. Kapag tinimbang mo yung dalawa, mas mabigat ang usapin yung (They should have granted the request instantly because lives are at stake.to give protection to the lives of the innocent)” …

and check out ricardo saludo’s Lessons from the grandstand carnage.   he reminds us of the ducut hostage-taking and how successfully that was handled, oo nga naman.

Back then, top government officials were involved in handling the crisis early on, from Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, Manila Mayor Lito Atienza, and Metro Manila Development Authority Chairman Bayani Fernando to Social Welfare Secretary Esperanza Cabral, Senator Bong Revilla and former Ilocos Sur governor Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson.

Their combined efforts helped the police resolve the crisis peacefully. Secretary Ermita made sure the public and the media were briefed on what the government was doing (see his 2007 press conference on youtube). Sec. Cabral assured Ducut that the children would get a good education—his avowed reason for staging the incident. And Ducut eventually surrendered to Governor Singson.

This time around, however, Lesson No. 2—get the top state brass involved—was deemed inappropriate. On Monday the Aquino Administration preferred to let the PNP ground commander to take full charge of the tourist bus hijacking, with limited public involvement by higher-ups. In his press briefing on the incident, President Benigno Aquino 3rd defended the police and expressed the fear that involving high officials would escalate the hostage-taker’s demands.

Thankfully, in 2007 that did not happen; instead, national and city leaders helped resolve the potentially fatal standoff. Of course, Ducut, a civil engineer who founded the nursery school where his hostages studied, is a far different character than dismissed police senior superintendent Mendoza, who was fired without retirement benefits by the Ombudsman for extortion and abuse. So maybe there was good reason to use a different approach than the one that successfully harnessed top brass in 2007.

but surely a “different approach” should still have included negotiations by negotiators whose words carried weight and who could have prevailed on, worked with, the ombudsman to devise a creative way of temporarily skirting the law to prevent bloodshed.

for all we know mendoza was waiting for a bong revilla, even a chavit singson, to attend to him, so when all he got was an isko moreno, well, kaka-agitate naman talaga, di ba.   i swear, jojo binay would could have worked wonders.   i bet chavit would have loved to help.   but i suppose the palace didn’t want anyone grandstanding and upstaging the prez?