Category: history

non-violent tactics #EDSA’86

read UP professor amado mendoza jr‘s ‘People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983-86,  chapter 11 of the book  Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present by adam roberts & timothy garton ash, published by oxford university in 2009.

… It might have been expected that the Marcos regime would be overthrown violently by the ongoing communist insurgency or a military coup.  Scholars of regime change have long argued that neo-patrimonial dictatorships are particularly vulnerable to violent overthrow by armed opponents.

The peaceful outcome in the Philippines is therefore a puzzle.  Thompson argued that Marcos’s removal was the result of moderate forces successfully out-manoeuvring the different armed groups.  Boudreau acknowledged the competitive and complementary relationship between the armed and unarmed anti-dictatorship movements, but believed that the creation of an organized non-communist option that regime defectors could support was decisive. [180-181]

very interesting, and informative of poltical mindsets circa ’83-’86:

Exiled to the US in 1980, Senator Aquino returned in August 1983 hoping to persuade an ailing Marcos to step down and allow him to take over.  His brazen assassination at Manila international airport unleashed a broad civil resistance movement which eventually outstripped the communist insurgency in terms of media coverage and mass mobilization.  The Catholic Church, led by Cardinal Jaime Sin, played an active role in bringing together the non-communist opposition and Manila’s business elite.  Pro-opposition mass media outlets were opened and a citizens’ electoral watch movement was revived.  Aquino’s death also prompted US State Department officials to assist political moderates and pressure Marcos for reforms.  Marcos tried to divide the opposition anew through the 1984 parliamentary elections.  While some moderates joined a communist-led boycott, others (supported by the widowed Corazon Aquino) participate—and won a third of the contested seats despite widespread violence, cheating, and government control of the media. 

Emboldened moderates consequently spurned a commnist-dominated anti-dictatorship alliance in 1985 to form their own coalition.  While Marcos called for ‘snap’ presidential elections, they united behind Mrs. Aquino’s candidacy.  The communists, hoping to worsen intra-elite conflicts, called for another boycott.  Military officers associate with Enrile formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and tacitly supported Aquino’s candidacy while preparing for an anti-Marcos coup.  Faced by a vigorous opposition campaign, Marcos resorted to fraud and systematic violence.  The combination of a now unmuzzled press and the presence of election observers sparked large-scale civil disobedience.  The Church declared that Marcos has lost the moral right to rule.

The end-game was precipitated by a RAM coup attempt.  Pre-empted by loyalist forces, rebel officers led by Enrile and Ramos defected to Aquino on 22 February 1986 and recognized her as the country’s legitimate leader.  These events led to an internationally televised standoff between loyalist troops and millions of unarmed civilian protesters who had gathered to protect the rebels.  As the regime came under pressure, it lost the will to survive.  Defections mounted and the Reagan administration finally withdrew its support.  On 25 February 1986, the Marcos family and entourage were airlifted to exile in Hawaii.  [182-183]

indeed non-violence won the war, but whether or not it was the result of deliberate strategies and manoeuvres by the non-communist anti-marcos moderates remains to be known.  what deserves mention is that ninoy was on non-violent mode when he came home from exile in aug ’83, his homecoming speech citing ghandi no less:

According to Gandhi, the willing sacrifice of the innocent is the most powerful answer to insolent tyranny that has yet been conceived by God and man.

perhaps he had discussed gandhi and non-violence with cory, who may have relayed the message to ninoy’s brother butz, whose august twenty-one movement (ATOM)’s protest rallies were decidedly non-violent from start to finish.

so was cory’s huge Tagumpay ng Bayan rally in luneta where she declared victory in the snap elections, sabay launch ng non-violent civil disobedence and crony-boycott campaign that coryistas couldn’t wait to be part of.  by day six of the boycott, the economy was reeling and the crony-business community was looking to negotiate, but with whom?  day seven of the boycott (EDSA saturday), enrile and ramos defected.  hmmm, di ba.  enrile was a top crony, next only to danding.  with whom na nga ba?

as in august ’83, butz rose to the occasion that EDSA saturday night.  it was butz who first sounded the call for people to come to EDSA and shield the defectors with their bodies, no guns.  cardinal sin seconded the call for a nonviolent solution an hour or so later, and cory the next day, from cebu.  ATOM was all over EDSA, butz dealing directly, facing off, with police general alfredo lim (who was ordered to disperse the crowds) and then marine commander alfredo tadiar (who was ordered to ram through! the crowd).

i’ve always wondered who, if any, advised cory and butz on non-violent tactics.  that luneta rally was sheer genius.  bentang benta sa moderate forces who liked the drama of non-violence:  nasa bahay ka lang pero feeling part of the struggle ka, and feeling revenged na rin on the regime — goodbye manila bulletin hello inquirer, goodbye san miguel beer, hello lambanog, goodbye cocacola, hello buko juice — what fun.  and that call to EDSA to shield the rebels from the dictator’s forces was inspired — was it pure butz?  was he winging it? — basta walang armas, be ready to die!  and the people were.  ready to die.  (huwag ismiran, mocha uson!)

contrary to popular perception, however, enrile did not defect to join cory nor did he recognize her as the duly-elected president right away.  enrile wanted to be president, and the aborted coup plot set for 23 feb 2 AM would have quickly installed him in malacañang.  in short, he meant to beat cory in a race to the palace,  una-unahan lang.  but ver got wind of honasan’s plans, and honasan got wind of ver’s plans (arrest orders, among others), which drove enrile and RAM to hole up in camp aguinaldo, better to die fighting, while hoping against hope to win the people’s support — after all, he was more qualified to be president.

but by day two, EDSA sunday, the day the people stopped the tanks in ortigas, it was clear that the people were there for cory — shielding enrile yes, but chanting cory’s name, wearing cory’s colors, waving cory’s flags — and it was obvious that they expected cory and enrile to join forces vs. marcos.  sometime over that long night, enrile and ramos, separately, met with cory in her sister’s house in greenhills.  i suppose that’s when the two asked for the top defense positions, an end to the crony-boycott, and immunity from suit in exchange for their armed support.

it disappoints, of course, that prof mendoza characterizes the dictator’s response during the key days as “inexplicably lame and non-violent.”  as though there had been no real threat of violence?  which is to diminish, even if unintentionally, the people’s role in that stunning revolt.

the dictator’s orders were neither lame nor non-violent.  on day 3, EDSA monday, twice marcos gave orders to bomb camp crame, except that air force col. sotelo and the entire 15th strike wing defected instead, and col. balbas and the marines (like commander tadiar the day before), after much delaying, defied orders, and returned to barracks instead.

true, the dictator’s forces could have struck immediately at the rebel military “before a protective civilian cocoon had been mobilized to protect them”, but marcos actually thought he could woo enrile back to the fold.  he had no idea that there was no turning back for enrile who was off on a new trip, navigating uncharted waters, and reinventing himself.

of course, he regretted giving way to cory, but i’m glad he did.

of course cory must have regretted giving him immunity, and i’m sorry she did.

next time, we the people should have a better sense — in real time —  of what’s happening behind-the-scenes and what’s being promised / compromised in our name.  we shouldn’t make bitaw too quickly or trust in our leaders so blindly.  i would think that non-violent engagement can be sustainable and long-term.

of “mini-EDSAs” and the inability “to explain” the big one #EDSA’86

read boying pimentel‘s Never mind EDSA: Remember the battles before the uprising.  i agree with most of pimentel’s sentiments except  the “Never mind EDSA” part of the title  and, in the essay itself, these lines:

Celebrating EDSA has typically been about remembering only the last three years of the Marcos nightmare.

That’s not enough. That has even hurt our ability to explain what happened.

Time to go beyond EDSA.

fine to focus on the 10 years of martial law previous to ninoy’s assassination —  years of silence, fear, terror, and defiance, indeed.  and good to remind that the unrest and the dissidence that culminated in EDSA ’86 started long before ninoy was assassinated.  that three years into martial law, la tondena workers dared go on strike :

One of the first major open acts of rebellion against the dictatorship happened in October 1975 when about 500 workers at La Tondena went on strike, the first during martial law.

Led by former student activist Edgar Jopson and veteran labor activists, it was a bold, extremely dangerous move.  The regime, in the early years of martial law, cracked down hard on even the mildest form of dissent.

The strike was broken up. Strikers were arrested. But word of the protest action spread, and La Tondena became one of the symbols of resistance.

In fact, the strike slogan — “Tama Na! Sobra Na! Welga Na!” — would later be modified to become the battle cry of the final battle against Marcos: “Tama Na! Sobra Na! Palitan Na!”

read, too, carlos maningat‘s Before EDSA 1 was the 1975 La Tondeña strike

Defying the protest ban during the Marcos dictatorship, around 800 workers of then Palanca-owned La Tondeña distillery in Tondo, Manila launched a paralyzing strike on Oct. 24, 1975 as they called for an end to contractualization. In particular, they demanded the regularization of contractual workers, as well as the reinstatement  and regularization of all fired contractual workers. Amid the overwhelming presence of the military and goons, the workers stood their ground for at least 44 hours to assert their demands.

…In the course of the three-day strike, nuns, priests and seminarians stood guard and held a vigil, supplying food for workers and distributing manifestos to passers-by.  Student leader Edgar Jopson, former president of the National Union of Students of the Philippines, also supported the workers’ strike.

… Hundreds were arrested in La Tondeña alone. Their strike proved to be successful nevertheless as the management gave in to some of their demands, including the regularization of around 300 workers. On a larger context, the strike tore down Marcos’ autocratic ban on protest actions and signaled the outburst of more daring protests, culminating in general strikes up to the People Power uprising in 1986.

good to remind, too, of the 1978 noise barrage, but it happened on the eve of the April 7 elections, not after.  the jailed Ninoy was running for the batasang pambansa, as was imelda.  read tingting cojuangco‘s Flashback: Ninoy and the 1978 elections.

One day, a chain letter to Peping surfaced at a rally. “At seven in the evening, I will go out to the street and make noise by beating a pan, blowing a horn, or even shouting in protest.” It was a terrific idea and Peping endorsed it. So thousands of mimeographed copies of the letter were distributed in all the churches on Sunday. What a monumental success and it happened on the eve of election day. Ninoy even heard it from his prison cell in Fort Bonifacio.

i remember those exciting times.

Except for one TV appearance, Ninoy’s campaign was left to his wife Cory and seven-year old Kris, whose rallying cry was, “Help my Daddy come home!”  On April 6, the eve of elections, Ninoy’s secret admirers from left, right, and center responded under cover darkness with the historic noise barrage.  At 7:00 PM on the dot, we took to Manila’s streets yelling, “Laban!” and making the L sign with thumb and index fingers, accompanied by car horns shrieking, pots and pans banging, whistles blowing, sirens wailing, church bells pealing, alarm bells ringing, never mind if the dreaded military picked us all up.  We had no idea then that it was organized by Communist Party leader Filemon aka Popoy Lagman, and if we had known, we would have joined anyway just to spite the dictator.

The noise barrage did not win Ninoy the election that was marked by massive cheating, but it told him in no uncertain terms that there were Filipinos out there, anonymous but increasing in numbers, who like him were yearning for freedom.  These people were not to surface for another five years.  [EDSA Uno: A Narrative and Analysis with Notes on Edsa Dos and Tres (1913). 25]

pimentel does not move on to the next “mini-EDSA” five years later, when ninoy came home from US exile and was assassinated, while under military escort, in broad daylight.

Ninoy never saw the yellow ribbons adorning trees and street posts or heard the people, anonymous no longer, sing “Tie a Yellow Ribbon” in welcome. Ninoy is dead, long live Ninoy! Yellow was the color of the people and Radio Veritas the voice of the opposition. Veritas, owned and operated by the Catholic Church, was the only radio station that dared broadcast the assassination and relay the nation’s shock and dismay. No one doubted that Marcos was to blame, never mind who pulled the trigger. Even the elite minority was offended—if he could do it to Ninoy he could do it to them.

The message of Ninoy’s sacrifice was not lost on the people. Ninoy’s courage touched them, roused them from their apathy, rekindled their sense of collective worth. The Filipino is worth dying for. Then and there, thousands of his admirers who joined the ’78 noise barrage under cover of darkness dared step forward in the light of day and be counted among the grieving. They came in droves to Ninoy’s and Cory’s home in Times Street, Quezon City and quietly, bravely, lined up for a glimpse of his bloody remains and to bid their fallen hero goodbye; thousands more followed his remains to Sto. Domingo Church. On the day of the funeral, millions left their homes and workplaces to march and line the streets where Ninoy’s casket would pass, and they raised their fists, sang “Bayan Ko,” cried, “Ninoy, hindi ka nag-iisa!” [31-32]

and just to complete the narrative:  two years and some six months later came the feb 7 1986 snap elections that saw coryistas guarding ballot boxes and reporting cheating and other irregularities nationwide, broadcast by radio veritas.  eight days later the batasang pambansa declared marcos the winner anyway, and the very next day, feb 16, cory held that giant protest rally in luneta where she claimed victory and rolled out the hugely successful crony-boycott and civil disobedience campaign.  the people were already in the throes of revolution, and ripe for EDSA, when the final four days of the boycott began to unfold.  [43]

NEVER MIND EDSA?

… it’s easier for the Marcos forces to dismiss the significance of EDSA if we remember only the festive four days, the flowers and the confetti and the nuns with rosaries kneeling before tanks … but not the sacrifices of young Filipinos who were fighting back when it wasn’t fashionable and extremely dangerous to do so.

let’s face it, guys.  it’s easy for the marcos forces to dismiss the significance of EDSA not because we remember, and celebrate, only the “festive four days” but because all these years later, we still don’t really know, wala pa ring collective sense of, what really happened during those final four days. 

something the marcoses are quite happy about, of course.  the more magulo the story, the better for them.  and so the marcos-ver camp, halimbawa, continues to pedddle the lie that marcos did not issue shoot-to-kill orders, and mainstream and social media continue to be complicit in keeping the lie alive, even when the contrary — marcos gave the kill-order — is duly documented in many publications:  while on TV marcos was ordering ver not to shoot, in camp aguinaldo the marines  were receiving orders from the palace to fire! bomb camp crame, never mind the civilians. (day 3, EDSA monday, mid-morning)

and what about enrile who from day one EDSA saturday obfuscated about why they had defected, and when accused by marcos of an aborted coup plot, absolutely denied it even if it was true.  he lied about it all through the four days and long after, admitting to it only 26 years later, in his 2012 memoir (na sino naman ang nakabasa) but without explaining why he lied.

my theory has always been that admitting to the aborted coup plot would have been to admit that he and RAM wanted himself, and no one else, to replace marcos — and that would have turned off coryistas, especially cory (enrile was ninoy’s jailer).  on day two EDSA sunday, when cory returned from cebu, she wanted to call the coryistas to luneta instead but she was dissuaded from doing so as it would have divided the coryistas, the very same ones who were already stopping tanks on ortigas.

i could go on and on about all the things we don’t know yet about those four days — like how sick was marcos really?  if he was so sick, why was he still calling the shots?  what were the dynamics like with ver, with imelda, with bongbong, with imee and irene, tommy and greggy?  who wanted to go, who wanted to stay?  was paoay a real option?

but not having answers to those questions does not mean that we don’t know enough about EDSA to glean lessons from it.  the mini-EDSAs are almost-as-nothing in the magnificent light of EDSA.  if we would only read up, and give it some thought.  we ousted marcos, what a feat!  what did we do right?  what did we do wrong?

because we can actually do it better, as in, note the patterns.  level-up the goal/s.  upgrade the tactics.  but first we need to get a handle on EDSA.

*

Remembering people power still matters by Bryan Dennis Gabito Tiojanco

why sept 21 #MartialLaw

manolo quezon rightly points out that martial law did not begin on the 21st.  in the explainer The big lie manolo tells us how things unfolded over the 21st and the 22nd to the 23rd of september 1972.  as a matter of fact we were still a free people on the 21st.  in fact marcos gave the GO signal only after enrile was ambushed kuno, that is, on the evening of the 22nd.  and yes we only found out on the 23rd when we awoke to a multimedia blackout that lasted almost all day, and we went to sleep with tv images of marcos declaring that martial law was in place, like it or not.

… martial law was announced with silence: people woke up to discover that TV and radio stations were off the air. Later in the day, some stations started playing easy listening music and some stations aired cartoons. But Marcos’ speechwriters were slow, then the teleprompter broke down, and the speech had to be hand-written on kartolina. So it wasn’t until dinnertime that Marcos finally appeared on TV and the country found out martial law was in place.

So, why do so many people who actually lived through martial law, misremember when it was proclaimed?

Marcos once said that the people would accept anything so long as it was legal. Marcos said he’d imposed martial law on September 21. We know this wasn’t true, because the document itself was co-signed, not by Alejandro Melchor, his executive secretary, but by a presidential assistant. This was because Melchor had left for abroad before Marcos actually signed the martial law proclamation sometime between the evening and early morning of September 22 to 23.

marcos was known to believe in the occult, and in the magic of the number 7 and its multiples such as the lucky 21, which could be why proclamation 1081 is dated sept  21 even if it was not signed until sept 22, or maybe 23.

Marcos went further to wipe the public’s memory clean. He later proclaimed September 21 as Thanksgiving Day. And in every speech, every documentary, every poster, September 21 was the date enshrined as the birth of the New Society. So much so that the public forgot what it had actually lived through. This is the power of propaganda. By altering the date, Marcos helped erase not only September 21 as the last day of freedom, but also how that freedom was lost between September 22 and 23. His lawyerly piece of paper, his Proclamation 1081, became the ultimate instrument for national amnesia.

So, remember September 21 by all means. Not as the fake news date Marcos wanted you to remember, but for the things he wanted you to forget: a still-independent Senate, freedom of assembly, and a free press. But remember what he wanted you to forget: that it was on September 23 that the nation woke up to discover all these things were suddenly gone. And that the next day, the last institution standing, the Supreme Court, received the warning: play ball, or be abolished. They played ball.

indeed 21 worked for marcos but only in the early years of martial law.  parang 22’s vibe kicked in towards the end, but that’s another story.  anyway, 21’s vibe is good for people getting together, rising above self-interests, reconciling differences for the good of the whole.

and it’s not all that inappropriate, marking the 21st as a day of infamy, the day that marcos marked as thanksgiving day, the day marking the birth of “the new society” — THAT was the big lie.  the promise of “bagong lipunan” didn’t pan out, except for the crooks.

a marcos milestone: an admission of “questionable wealth”

so, is it to distract us from the alleged links of paolo duterte to smuggling and shabu, this startling revelation by the president that the marcoses are offering to return some of the “questionable wealth” to help the economy?

“The Marcoses, I will not name the spokesman, sabi nila (they said), ‘we’ll open everything and hopefully return yung mga nakita na talaga (those that had been discovered),’” he added. The President said the Marcoses are also willing to return a “few gold bars.”

“Sabi nila na, malaki ang deficit mo, maybe the (sic) projected spending pero hindi ito malaki baka makatulong, but we are ready to open and bring back, sabi niya, pati yung a few gold bars (They said that, your deficit is high, maybe the projected spending but this is not big, maybe it will help, but we are ready to open and bring back, they said, even a few gold bars),” he said. 

in barely coherent sentences, but yeah, we get the drift even if  the president was very careful to say just enough so we get it that there is an offer, and he is open to the offer.  gov imee marcos, for her part, does not deny it, though parang she was caught unprepared, parang the prez didn’t warn them that he would be making it public when he did?

Imee pins hopes on Duterte to end all charges vs Marcoses
MANILA – Ilocos Norte Governor Imee Marcos on Tuesday kept mum about the possible return of the family’s ill-gotten wealth to the government, saying there are no formal negotiations about the matter.

“Wala pa, wala pa. Tiwala kami sa President na siya ang makakapagtapos ng deka-dekadang kaso at yung pamilya nag-uusap pa pero nasa kamay ng mga abogado,” she said when asked if negotiations have started about the return of the Marcos wealth.  Asked if there was an intention to return, the governor said: “Pag-usapan na lang ng mga abogado.”

The governor refused to take any more questions, advising media to instead wait for the statement of their legal counsel.

this distraction is up there as the most distractive of recent times.  because this is the first time ever that the marcoses are conceding that some plundering of the nation’s wealth did happen under ferdinand’s watch.  there is even a justification offered, acc to duterte:

“Sabi nila, isauli nila para walang ano—and the only reason, sabi nila, was the father was just protecting the economy for the [eventuality] na umalis siya. He thought of regaining the Malacañang, that is why ganito ang lumabas na parang naitago,” he added.

ferdinand and fabian did plan to recapture the palace.  the story is, marcos and ver meant to regroup and set up government in paoay kaya lang the marcoses made the mistake of asking the americans, and not the presidential pilots with choppers on standby, to fly them out of the palace.  upon cory’s request and reagan’s instructions, the americans flew him to hawaii instead.  which is why imelda and bongbong insist that they were kidnapped.

this is not to say that if marcos had made it to paoay, naisoli sana agad o nagamit nang maayos para sa bayan ang questionable wealth.  the only thing that’s clear is that if he had made it to paoay and managed to regroup and challenge the legitimacy of the cory aquino government, it would have meant civil war.  at ibinato pa rin sa kanya tiyak ang isyu ng nakaw na yaman, nadiskubre pa rin tiyak ang mga secret $ accounts at ang tone-toneladang ginto, at kung ano-ano pa.

it is quite conceivable, actually, that this is a sign na suko na, give up na, si imelda at ang magkakapatid.  maaaring ngayon lang nila na-realize o natanggap na hindi bibitawan ever ang isyung plunder in the time of marcos, and they’re finally tired of being the bad guys, still the kontravidas in the current telenovela of nation.  i imagine that they must really really like to be done with this three decades old case and wipe away the stain on the marcos name if only for the sake of the grandchildren and, sige na nga, ferdinand in his centennial year.  why not indeed.  in effect, this is a win for nation, panalo ang bayan — the marcoses blinked first.

save the nation movement‘s butch valdes thinks it’s a real offer.

Butch Valdes : … but it would need the cooperation of Duterte to make official requests to intl banks holding the gold. Their previous condition was that the Marcoses are exonerated from all cases against them by the Phil govt. FM’s will indicated that 90% be given to the filipino people thru acceptable foundations. I think Imelda wants it implemented before she goes.

siyempre galit na galit ang mga anti-marcos sa parteng ito: …”we’ll open everything and hopefully return yung mga nakita na talaga (those that had been discovered),” at dito rin: ‘The President said the Marcoses are also willing to return a “few gold bars.”’  dapat daw ay isauli LAHAT ng ninakaw.  at ang tanong nila ay, ano ang kapalit, ano ang ex-deal with the marcoses.  exoneration from all cases din kaya, as with international banks?  read  Palace vows return of Marcos wealth will adhere to laws.

it would be naive to think that the marcoses would ever give up EVERYTHING.  no doubt imelda has documents galore to prove that some of the wealth is legally theirs.  and they will surely quote from the bible: the child will not be punished for the parent’s sins; nor the wife for the husband’s, yes?  heto nga’t gusto na nilang magsauli ng hindi sa kanila.

kung magmamatigasan, negotiations could take another decade before a final settlement.  but because duterte needs the money now na, who knows, baka ma-fast-track nang katakut-takot, and next thing we know, done deal na.  according to justice sec vitaliano aguirre:

“The president is authorized and has the power to make compromise or any agreement with the Marcoses. If there will be a new agreement, there should be enabling law or initiative law to be issued by the President himself,” he said.

top off my mind:  if imelda and the children are now admitting that ferdinand was guilty of some plunder, is he now still deserving of the burial as bayani?  what about imelda’s jewels?  will she continue to claim them as legally hers?  sana ibalato na niya sa taong-bayan.  she can spin it anyway she likes, basta she gives up her claim on condition that the jewels are showcased along with her shoes and ternos, soaps and perfumes, as artifacts of a time when she was quite the queen.  as tourist attraction, this would be a gift that won’t stop giving.