Category: edsa

enrile’s endgame

in my last blog i opined, in a spirit of reconciliation, that martial law was not all bad, and EDSA was not all good.  let me qualify that.  martial law was not all bad but it was mostly bad.  EDSA was not all good but it was mostly good.

i came out of the enrile-bongbong tete-a-tete feeling a little dirty, complicit, because i stayed to listen kahit obvious naman that it was more of the same spin, painting marcos a super know-all president and cory a wicked know-nothing witch.  i had been hoping against hope that the old man, for the sake of nation, would level up the discourse a little, get beyond insisting that everyone had a wonderful time noong martial law and finally admit that many gross mistakes were made on every front that continue to fester and rankle the body politic.

alas, the old man continues to disappoint (as does the silent FVR).  read randy david‘s An interview in quest of an audience.

It …  comes as no surprise that he would willingly lend himself to a project to rehabilitate Marcos in the public memory. Perhaps he thought he owed the Marcos family something for contributing to their downfall. Without sounding as though he regretted his participation at Edsa, it was obvious he was trying to patch up his relations with the family by praising the regime of which, after all, he had been very much a part. With the passage of more than four decades, many of his contemporaries who might convincingly contradict his recollection of events have passed on.

… This particular interview, videotaped and posted on social media to coincide with the 46th anniversary of the imposition of martial law, is barefaced propaganda aimed at “millennials,” who, having been born long after the actual events, are presumed to accept without question so-called eyewitness accounts of historical events. As a teacher, I would not take it seriously.  Still, propaganda like this, formatted as public affairs material, offers important lessons on what to avoid in the teaching of history.

The impact could have been different, however, if an interview like this were to be conducted by a panel of respectable historians and journalists, and the principal subjects were individuals who had been detained and tortured or stripped of their properties by the regime but never allowed their sordid experience to cloud their view of events.  I’m not saying that their accounts would be entirely free of bias. But a good impartial interviewer would have had greater success in teasing out the truth from personal narratives.

it was therefore a joy running into pop historian lourd de veyra‘s sept 20 special on my facebook feed.  watch and listen and share Martial Law Myths Busted | History, exactly the kind of martial law info and assessment that i was wishing for from historians of the academe.  de veyra should do a series, let’s hear what the economists and political and social scientists, the lawyers and the military, the artists, the communists, have to say.  let’s not ask the trapos, of course.

EPISODE 2 of the tete a tete, like episode 1, was obviously edited down — time constraints? or did the old man tend to wander and say things inconsistent with, or unsupportive of, the official story?  whatever, the EDSA episode is worth transcribing.  it’s the first time ever that bongbong has said anything about the four days.  the first time, too, (correct me if i’m wrong) that enrile has spoken up and rubber-stamped the claim that marcos did not give orders to shoot.  sabay show ng TV footage of marcos forbidding ver from attacking crame.

it would be great if de veyra could focus on that question in a special episode for EDSA 2019.  as far as i can tell from my own research for the EDSA books, marcos issued 3 kill-orders, as in, never mind kung madamay ang civilians — feb 23 tanks were ordered to ram through the crowd in ortigas (tadiar refused), feb 24 air force strike-wing gunships were ordered to bomb crame (sotelo defected instead); a few hours later marines positioned in aguinaldo were ordered to bomb crame with howitzers and other hardware (balbas managed not to, his family was among the people in EDSA) — this last around the time that  marcos was on tv telling ver not to attack.

my theory is, marcos was just being his wily old self, making the best of a bad situation by pretending to be the good guy to ver’s bad cop, hoping to fool washington dc and the vatican, if not the filipino people, a little while longer.

and then, again, is it possible that the orders did not issue from marcos himself?  then who issued them?  ver?  imelda?  bongbong?  all of the above?

time to get the story straight.  #HindiPaTaposAngLaban

whiffs of fiction, “public history” 2018

kakaiba ang timpla ng pro-marcos discourse, mas maanghang, mas palaban, mas mayabang.  para kaya maipaabot sa, and impress upon the, supremes where (they think) public sentiments lie, in aid of bongbong winning his PET case and taking over as veep?  next stop, the presidency?

sa social media, kaabang-abang ang tete-a-tete nina juan ponce enrile at ferdinand “bongbong” marcos.  on sept 20 tungkol sa martial law, on sept 22 tungkol sa EDSA.

i expect that the exercise is meant to glorify martial law and to villify EDSA.  it would be nice though if the two could be a little more candid and and even-handed. just as we, who are all set to scream revisionism!!! need to get a better handle on martial law and EDSA.  martial law was not all bad just as EDSA was not all good.

a question i hope is addressed in da tete-a-tete:  so, anong nangyari?  bakit pabagsak na ang ekonomiya by 1982, even before ninoy’s assassination?

sabihin pa natin, for the sake of argument, that marcos did all the right things re infrastructure (except for a lemon or two) and he was able to electrify almost half the archipelago (not all of it, not even close) and he got uncle sam to pay rent for the US bases (kahit binarat tayo nang katakut-takot) atbp, not to speak of how culture and the arts kinda blossomed because of (and despite) imelda:  bakit hindi na-sustain ang “progress”?  bakit biglang ayaw nang magpautang ng mga bangko?  bakit di tayo nakabayad ng mga utang?  bakit ba talaga hindi naging isang singapore ang pinas?

it would be great to hear nationalists in the academe — the historians, the political scientists, the economists — having tv tete-a-tetes with the populace and sharing their findings on questions like these.  we need answers based on facts, figures, records, documents.  so we all — the elected and the electorate alike — can learn the lessons we need to learn, so we can correct our mistakes, so we can move forward.

the last thing we need is a conference of historians perorating on a notion of “public history” (now ongoing 20-22 sept) that i fear would legitimize, validate fictional (partisan, and/or “creative”) accounts of historical events, among other historical and cultural horrors.

bakit wala silang criteria of any kind?  ano ito, let’s just be glad that we’re talking history, even if reeking of fiction and propaganda?  i would sit in judgment: is the opinion sound and balanced?  is it based on facts?  the slightest whiff of fiction should be red-flagged and merit automatic rejection from the annals of public history.

it’s not as if our historians have nothing else to do.  every september and february we hear it repeated that marcos did not give shoot orders that would have harmed civilians in EDSA.  credible eyewitness and first-person accounts say he did.  so who’s revising history?  our historians, academic or “public”, should be weighing in.  otherwise, anong silbi nila?

EDSA cheers & jeers 2018

CHEERS to president rodrigo duterte for allowing the EDSA anniversary rallies.  i was afraid he might do a gloria arroyo — as in feb 24 2006, when she was so afraid of people power, post-garci, she declared a state of national emergency (Proclamation 1017), arrested randy david and others marching to EDSA, and filled EDSA protest sites with armed soldiers (sa makati kami naki-rally noon).

president duterte, of course, is fearless.  no doubt he sees how divided the opposition is.  in metromanila, kanya-kanyang rally on different days in different places instead of coming together in one big protest rally.  i wonder what it will take for the liberal party’s tindig to join hands with, and take the lead in uniting, civil society’s cause-oriented groups behind an alternative program of government.

JEERS to DDS bloggers mocha uson and thinking pinoy whose creds are at an all-time low, uson intimating that we just made up the EDSA story of nuns stopping tanks.  the nerve!  The EDSA Revolution Happened, No Matter What Your Poll Says!  and tp saying the nuns were just making gaya the tiananmen scene, kung saan hindi naman gumagalaw ang tangke… i didn’t stay to hear more… hey nieto, tiananmen happened 3 years after EDSA.

ika nga ni daniel patrick moynihan:

… you are entitled to your own opinions, but you are not entitled to your own facts.  

CHEERS to journalist ed lingao for setting the record straight on that iconic people power moment when the marines were stopped in their tracks by crowds ready to die for country.  it was viewed by a stunned world via satellite TV and signalled the end of marcos.

JEERS to everyone who agrees with the UP poli-sci professor who says that EDSA was a chimera, meaning, an illusion, a dream, a fantasy.  meaning what, na-engkanto lang tayong lahat, including the world that was watching?  parang milagro kasi na bigla na lang umalis si marcos?  JEERS also to the UP cssp prof who recently posted an essay he wrote in 2014 for an oxford univ book, airing the allegation that marcos was totally non-violent all through the four days.  argh.

academics with no time to read about EDSA.  it’s all over google, peeps.  whatever your school of thought, there’s really no excuse for not having a factual sense of EDSA — so we can level up the discourse naman — unless you’re just not interested in knowing more?  it’s all too subversive, maybe?

and so CHEERS and MABUHAY! to the historian xiao chua, the one academic i know who has read all the books and materials on EDSA including mine, and who is very good at telling the (hi)story of people power 1986, nuances and all, with a mean vocal impersonation of marcos to boot :-)

non-violent tactics #EDSA’86

read UP professor amado mendoza jr‘s ‘People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983-86,  chapter 11 of the book  Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present by adam roberts & timothy garton ash, published by oxford university in 2009.

… It might have been expected that the Marcos regime would be overthrown violently by the ongoing communist insurgency or a military coup.  Scholars of regime change have long argued that neo-patrimonial dictatorships are particularly vulnerable to violent overthrow by armed opponents.

The peaceful outcome in the Philippines is therefore a puzzle.  Thompson argued that Marcos’s removal was the result of moderate forces successfully out-manoeuvring the different armed groups.  Boudreau acknowledged the competitive and complementary relationship between the armed and unarmed anti-dictatorship movements, but believed that the creation of an organized non-communist option that regime defectors could support was decisive. [180-181]

very interesting, and informative of poltical mindsets circa ’83-’86:

Exiled to the US in 1980, Senator Aquino returned in August 1983 hoping to persuade an ailing Marcos to step down and allow him to take over.  His brazen assassination at Manila international airport unleashed a broad civil resistance movement which eventually outstripped the communist insurgency in terms of media coverage and mass mobilization.  The Catholic Church, led by Cardinal Jaime Sin, played an active role in bringing together the non-communist opposition and Manila’s business elite.  Pro-opposition mass media outlets were opened and a citizens’ electoral watch movement was revived.  Aquino’s death also prompted US State Department officials to assist political moderates and pressure Marcos for reforms.  Marcos tried to divide the opposition anew through the 1984 parliamentary elections.  While some moderates joined a communist-led boycott, others (supported by the widowed Corazon Aquino) participate—and won a third of the contested seats despite widespread violence, cheating, and government control of the media. 

Emboldened moderates consequently spurned a commnist-dominated anti-dictatorship alliance in 1985 to form their own coalition.  While Marcos called for ‘snap’ presidential elections, they united behind Mrs. Aquino’s candidacy.  The communists, hoping to worsen intra-elite conflicts, called for another boycott.  Military officers associate with Enrile formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and tacitly supported Aquino’s candidacy while preparing for an anti-Marcos coup.  Faced by a vigorous opposition campaign, Marcos resorted to fraud and systematic violence.  The combination of a now unmuzzled press and the presence of election observers sparked large-scale civil disobedience.  The Church declared that Marcos has lost the moral right to rule.

The end-game was precipitated by a RAM coup attempt.  Pre-empted by loyalist forces, rebel officers led by Enrile and Ramos defected to Aquino on 22 February 1986 and recognized her as the country’s legitimate leader.  These events led to an internationally televised standoff between loyalist troops and millions of unarmed civilian protesters who had gathered to protect the rebels.  As the regime came under pressure, it lost the will to survive.  Defections mounted and the Reagan administration finally withdrew its support.  On 25 February 1986, the Marcos family and entourage were airlifted to exile in Hawaii.  [182-183]

indeed non-violence won the war, but whether or not it was the result of deliberate strategies and manoeuvres by the non-communist anti-marcos moderates remains to be known.  what deserves mention is that ninoy was on non-violent mode when he came home from exile in aug ’83, his homecoming speech citing ghandi no less:

According to Gandhi, the willing sacrifice of the innocent is the most powerful answer to insolent tyranny that has yet been conceived by God and man.

perhaps he had discussed gandhi and non-violence with cory, who may have relayed the message to ninoy’s brother butz, whose august twenty-one movement (ATOM)’s protest rallies were decidedly non-violent from start to finish.

so was cory’s huge Tagumpay ng Bayan rally in luneta where she declared victory in the snap elections, sabay launch ng non-violent civil disobedence and crony-boycott campaign that coryistas couldn’t wait to be part of.  by day six of the boycott, the economy was reeling and the crony-business community was looking to negotiate, but with whom?  day seven of the boycott (EDSA saturday), enrile and ramos defected.  hmmm, di ba.  enrile was a top crony, next only to danding.  with whom na nga ba?

as in august ’83, butz rose to the occasion that EDSA saturday night.  it was butz who first sounded the call for people to come to EDSA and shield the defectors with their bodies, no guns.  cardinal sin seconded the call for a nonviolent solution an hour or so later, and cory the next day, from cebu.  ATOM was all over EDSA, butz dealing directly, facing off, with police general alfredo lim (who was ordered to disperse the crowds) and then marine commander alfredo tadiar (who was ordered to ram through! the crowd).

i’ve always wondered who, if any, advised cory and butz on non-violent tactics.  that luneta rally was sheer genius.  bentang benta sa moderate forces who liked the drama of non-violence:  nasa bahay ka lang pero feeling part of the struggle ka, and feeling revenged na rin on the regime — goodbye manila bulletin hello inquirer, goodbye san miguel beer, hello lambanog, goodbye cocacola, hello buko juice — what fun.  and that call to EDSA to shield the rebels from the dictator’s forces was inspired — was it pure butz?  was he winging it? — basta walang armas, be ready to die!  and the people were.  ready to die.  (huwag ismiran, mocha uson!)

contrary to popular perception, however, enrile did not defect to join cory nor did he recognize her as the duly-elected president right away.  enrile wanted to be president, and the aborted coup plot set for 23 feb 2 AM would have quickly installed him in malacañang.  in short, he meant to beat cory in a race to the palace,  una-unahan lang.  but ver got wind of honasan’s plans, and honasan got wind of ver’s plans (arrest orders, among others), which drove enrile and RAM to hole up in camp aguinaldo, better to die fighting, while hoping against hope to win the people’s support — after all, he was more qualified to be president.

but by day two, EDSA sunday, the day the people stopped the tanks in ortigas, it was clear that the people were there for cory — shielding enrile yes, but chanting cory’s name, wearing cory’s colors, waving cory’s flags — and it was obvious that they expected cory and enrile to join forces vs. marcos.  sometime over that long night, enrile and ramos, separately, met with cory in her sister’s house in greenhills.  i suppose that’s when the two asked for the top defense positions, an end to the crony-boycott, and immunity from suit in exchange for their armed support.

it disappoints, of course, that prof mendoza characterizes the dictator’s response during the key days as “inexplicably lame and non-violent.”  as though there had been no real threat of violence?  which is to diminish, even if unintentionally, the people’s role in that stunning revolt.

the dictator’s orders were neither lame nor non-violent.  on day 3, EDSA monday, twice marcos gave orders to bomb camp crame, except that air force col. sotelo and the entire 15th strike wing defected instead, and col. balbas and the marines (like commander tadiar the day before), after much delaying, defied orders, and returned to barracks instead.

true, the dictator’s forces could have struck immediately at the rebel military “before a protective civilian cocoon had been mobilized to protect them”, but marcos actually thought he could woo enrile back to the fold.  he had no idea that there was no turning back for enrile who was off on a new trip, navigating uncharted waters, and reinventing himself.

of course, he regretted giving way to cory, but i’m glad he did.

of course cory must have regretted giving him immunity, and i’m sorry she did.

next time, we the people should have a better sense — in real time —  of what’s happening behind-the-scenes and what’s being promised / compromised in our name.  we shouldn’t make bitaw too quickly or trust in our leaders so blindly.  i would think that non-violent engagement can be sustainable and long-term.