Category: 2016

JOVITO SALONGA (1920-2016)

with deepest thanks to his children
ricky, steve, patty, eddie, and rina (victoria :)
for sharing their dad with nation.

back in 1965 when the brilliant lawyer jovito salonga first ran for the senate, my parents campaigned for him like mad.  not only was jovy’s wife lydia the sister of salvador “badong” busuego, a very close friend of theirs since UST medical school in the ’30s (the same batch as eva macaraeg macapagal, who would speak only in spanish with my mother), but salonga had also impressed them as a nationalist and followed news of his stint as congressman of rizal province in 1961 when he chaired the committee on good government, holding inquiries on graft & corruption in aid of legislation, and trouncing dynasties to boot.  my parents were  always politically engaged and, in the time of marcos, were ardent supporters of salonga and the liberal party, and then also of ninoy (who first ran for the senate in ’67).

i wasn’t into politics yet, not even during my years in UP diliman when it was the hotbed of kabataang makabayan (KM) activism.  fresh from convent school, and forewarned about “communists,” i took a while to figure out, listening to rallies happening on the AS steps, what the “ibagsaks” were all about, and yes naman!  no to imperialism and feudalism, and no to US bases!  but meanwhile i had met and was barkada for a while with the salonga sibs steve and patty who weren’t into politics either  — our group used to hang around francis lumen’s VW van (hypo, we called it) under the trees across  (but far from) the AS steps, and i remember the music best of all, steve playing guitar and singing the protest songs of dylan and baez, peter paul and mary, with patty singing second voice, what a high.  and the times they were a-changing indeed, on so many fronts.

except that, as it turned out, the changes shaping up were for the worse.  fast forward to the first quarter storm of jan 1970 by which time marcos had been re-elected amidst cheating allegations and youth org KM had morphed into a new communist party led by joma sison that was increasingly radical, bent on destabilizing, and toppling, the fascist and corrupt marcos government.  came plaza miranda, the bombing, in august 1971, that killed nine and injured more than a hundred, among them the leading lights of the liberal party, including senator salonga who was the most gravely hit but who, against all odds, lived to continue the fight and with ninoy kept the opposition alive here at home and in america all through martial law, AND when freedom was won, investigated and became convinced that it was joma sison who ordered the plaza miranda bombing that played right into marcos’s hand, gave him grounds to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, crack down on the radical left, and eventually declare martial law.

during that dark reign of greed and terror, every time senator salonga’s name would come up in the news in connection with anti-marcos events and/or elements, my parents would remind each other about packing a bag just in case they were picked up by the military; they were certain they were on a list of staunch jovy salonga and ninoy aquino supporters.  and like many others in the opposition, they started breathing easy again only after the glorious, if fleeting, triumph that was EDSA.

for a while there, things were looking up for nation and for salonga.  after a year as chair of the pcgg, laying the legal groundwork for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, salonga ran again for the senate and, as in ’65 and ’71, topped the race.  as expected, he was elected senate president — no one deserved the distinction more.  and a lesser mortal would have been inadequate to the heroic task of presiding over a split senate, withstanding intense pressure from cory and america, and casting the deciding vote that spelled the end of US bases – another fleeting triumph — never mind that it doomed, too, his run for the presidency.  read randy david’s Salonga and the Senate that said no.

Salonga’s acute sense of history kept him focused on what he felt he needed to do. He set aside all personal considerations—something that, in our culture, was hard to do without appearing rude and arrogant. But, the closing of the American bases in the Philippines took precedence over everything. It was to him a necessary condition for our emergence as a fully sovereign nation—something we needed to do for the sake of future generations, even if it meant displeasing an important and powerful ally.

He was painfully aware that his active opposition to the treaty would adversely affect his political plans. The presidential election of 1992 was just around the corner. Many influential leaders and businessmen who had supported him in his long political career and wished to see him succeed Cory, warned him against playing an assertive role on the issue.  But Salonga would not be deterred. For him, the time had come to close this colonial chapter of our history, and it fell on him to lead the Senate to that final moment.

papa didn’t live to see the bases kicked out.  when senator salonga ran for president in 1992, mama and i rooted for him, even getting into arguments with family and friends who agreed with anti-salonga propaganda that he was too old, even disabled, or that harked back to allegations of questionable deals with marcos cronies when he led the pcgg.  i had a sinking feeling that america, along with our very own amboys, had drawn a line, anyone but salonga.  but maybe that’s just me.  read randy david’s Jovito Salonga, the scholar-politician.

… in the 1992 presidential election, President Cory was torn between two loyal allies who both wanted to be president—Speaker Ramon Mitra Jr. and Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos. Endorsing Jovy Salonga was out of the question. The Americans could not forgive him for the humiliation he had dealt them on the bases question. Big business did not like him for the uncompromising stance he had taken against US interests. Like Diokno, he was the best president we could not have.

I had the privilege of moderating the 1992 presidential debate for the Commission on Elections and television station Channel 5. Blind in one eye, his right hand a deformed mass of skin and bones, the 72-year-old statesman beamed like a professor conducting a graduate class. He was the most erudite and most accomplished person in that pack. Speaking in a measured tone in fluent Filipino and English, he never switched from one code to the other to complete a thought.

But, beside the most prominent pre-martial law politicians, there were other stars in that room that had captured the imagination of a fickle public. One of them was the feisty and outspoken Miriam Defensor Santiago, a former judge, Cabinet member, and immigration commissioner. The other was businessman Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco, who had fled the country with the Marcos family in 1986. The broad support that this soft-spoken Marcos crony was getting during the campaign, just six years after the overthrow of the dictatorship, showed that the political winds were ominously shifting.

senator salonga ranked 6th in a race of 7, bested by fvr, miriam, danding, mitra, and imelda, and besting only doy laurel.   yes, danding and imelda, back so soon to reclaim their ill-gotten wealth, got more votes than salonga.  it was the saddest thing.

fast forward to 2016.  it’s even more toxic now.  the marcos son bongbong is running for VP under the banner of the nacionalista party that saw his dad elected president twice.  the salonga son steve is running for governor of rizal but, no, not under the banner of the liberal party that saw his dad topping three senatorial races, rather, he is running for governor as an independent candidate because the liberal party cares more about compromising with local dynasties and trapos, what a shame.  read Jovito Salonga’s son laments LP snub, steve’s story just before his first run for the same seat in 2013.

“Tuwid na daan may be true in the elective posts on the national level, but not on the local level,” he said.

Salonga was quick to say that he did not think President Aquino was aware of the compromises on the ground, but insisted that this was a reality he had to contend with in next month’s elections.

The “disturbing and aggressive alliances” with dynasties, warlords and traditional politicians began during the 2010 elections, he said.

Salonga said at that time, his father questioned such deals but got nowhere. He said that his father’s letters and phone calls were ignored.  “He was very disappointed,” said the son.

when senator salonga lost the race for the presidency in ’92, i felt like i did when they killed ninoy in ’83.  what a loss for nation.  six years of a salonga presidency certainly would have taken the nation to a place vastly different from, and more desirable than, where we are now.

it’s great that he was also a prolific author — there should be a university course on good government using his books and journals as bibles — who also wrote his own speeches.  this, from a speech he gave in UP in 1962 when he was rizal congressman and chairman of the committee on good government, resonates to this day, regardless of matuwid-na-daan.  to this EDSA freak, it even seems like he already saw glimmers of people power at play.

DEMOCRACY, as one writer puts it, cannot be saved either by slander or by silence.

And in the Philippines, the word “silence” can never be over-emphasized for here, particularly in places where the high and the mighty have the run of things, the poor and the lowly are so afraid to give their evidence. Entire communities are terrorized into silence and prospective witnesses are rendered mute by the forces of physical violence. Hence, it is true to say we cannot clean up the mess in the world of crime and vice unless we are also willing to clean up the civic and political life of the community in which we live. And who is going to do that? Only we, the people. It is not merely the public officials. For as Bernard Shaw puts it very aptly— “Democracy is a device that insures we shall be governed no better than we deserve.”

We can’t have a good government and at the same time have a double standard of law observance. We can’t validly complain of corruption, if we are only too prepared and willing to bribe our way through to get what we want.

And so, if you ask me: how do we attain a higher standard of ethics in government? I answer:

When we refrain from exerting pressure on our public officials for selfish, narrow ends; when we give positive applause and encouragement to the guy who is playing it straight even though we may not agree with him; when the public official gets the help he needs from people who don’t want anything from him except to be good; and when we, the people, organize and give real, solid backing to those who lead the attack on mass dishonesty and graft.

The Supreme Court and the Poe disqualification case

Raul V. Fabella

The Philippine public has been treated to many erudite and well-reasoned treatises on how the Supreme Court (SC) should decide on Senator Grace Poe’s disqualification case. The legal issues are either involved and lengthy or simple and open-and-shut depending on who is making the case. Should the SC display judicial restraint, follow precedents, and hew closely to the letter of the law? Or should it display judicial activism and blaze a new judicial trail in pursuit of some perhaps new principle of jurisprudence? The SC did display a considerable capacity for judicial activism in allowing Juan Ponce Enrile to post bail though the charge against him is legally and constitutionally non-bailable. The new principle of jurisprudence, “humanitarian grounds,” which law students now have to learn has no accepted definition and one can drive an oil tanker through its portals. Be that as it may, not being a lawyer myself, I’d rather leave that to the legal eagles.

The purpose of this piece is not how the SC “should have decided” on the Poe case but what could be expected from revealed SC decision making in general.

Three theories on the decision making of the SC are salient and competing (see, e.g., Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall, 2011): (a) the legal theory — that what governs SC decision making are no more and no less than legal precedents and the Constitution; (b) the attitudinal theory — that what governs the SC decision making are the substantive prior preferences and ideologies of the justices; (c) the strategic theory — that SC decision making is governed by strategic considerations, especially in relation to outside forces, say, the other branches, especially elected branches of government. The President, the Senate, and Lower House have the power to retaliate (as, for example, through the budget allocation) in case of open display of contempt. Granting Juan Ponce Enrile the right to post bail on an unbailable charge clearly violates the legal theory. It may be understood as flowing from ingrained preferences (or biases as sometimes it is called) or from strategic considerations (or future payoffs as sometime it is called).

Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall (2011) tried to compare how these three theories perform as explanatory (proxied) variables in actual decisions of the US Supreme Court. Their logit regressions showed that none of the three theories can be rejected as correlates of SC decisions. I prefer to dwell on the strategic motives for decision making.

What appears to be a salient instance of strategic decision making by the US Supreme Court occurred during the New Deal Era. Then-US President Franklin D. Roosevelt — frustrated by repeated rebuffs by the US Supreme Court of New Deal legislations — threatened in 1937 to emasculate the SC with his Court Reorganization Plan. Known also as Roosevelt’s court packing plan, it came in the form of the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937.

It sought to grant the President the power to appoint an additional justice of the Supreme Court for every member of the Supreme Court over the age of 70 and 6 months and up to a maximum of six new associate justices.

Since it was Congress — not the Constitution — that established the composition of the SC, it can recompose it. Soon after Roosevelt won a sweeping victory in November 1936, the SC decided 5-4 upholding a Washington minimum wage law which the New Deal (in keeping with the Keynesian view of putting purchasing power in the pockets of the poor) favored. The tie was broken by, of all people, Justice Owen Richards who had previously opposed New Deal legislations.

In 1938, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone opined in the US vs Carolene Products that the SC should show deference to the elected branches in matters involving economic policy though not in matters of civil rights and civil liberties. The SC seemed to have acted to ease the political pressure and protect its identity (exemplified by the court packing plan).

Although the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill never became law, the message seemed to have been heard loud and clear in the halls of the US SC. But that is the US SC. We are in the land of “only in the Philippines.”

The question is what strategic considerations bore on the SC’s decision on the Poe disqualification case? We may never know.

But consider that candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte has said he will cure every ill in three months. Although that is mostly campaign bluster, to accomplish within his term what he promises implies realistically that he becomes a dictator, which calls for a clash with — and eventual dismantling of — the Supreme Court.

If Poe was disqualified, it is likely that Duterte is the only alternative to Vice-President Jejomar C. Binay, Sr. whose own defense being “No court has found me guilty” fools nobody, let alone the SC justices. If Poe was not disqualified, she will likely win (she was still leading the polls as of March 6 despite the case hanging over her campaign) and the Supreme Court should feel safer in her hands than in either Duterte’s who will not stand judicial obstacle or Binay’s who will need to judicially extricate himself. That is one possible strategic motive bearing on the SC decision. There may be others.

And, of course, their own beliefs about the suitability of the candidates for president should be factored in. One thing is sure: Poe being allowed to run is nowhere near the judicial activism displayed in the doctrine of “humanitarian considerations.”

Raul V. Fabella the chairman of the Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis, a professor at the UP School of Economics, and a member of the National Academy of Science and Technology.

left out of EDSA

from carol pagaduan-araullo’s valentine column Remembering EDSA ‘People Power.’   leftist rhetoric that places the “organized progressive forces”  in EDSA in 1986 (an insignificant truth) and credits, or is it, blames, US intervention for the peaceful outcome (a significant untruth).

… EDSA “People Power” was a standoff between two armed camps, that of Ferdinand E. Marcos-Fabian C. Ver and Enrile-Ramos. The US and the anti-Marcos reactionaries as well as the organized progressive forces and the spontaneous masses occupied the gap between the two armed camps.

Violent confrontation between the two could have broken out at any moment so it is misleading to describe it as a “peaceful” phenomenon. Only US intervention and the growing numbers of people on the EDSA highway fronting Camp Crame prevented the Marcos-Ver camp from aggressively attacking the Enrile-Ramos camp.

medyo dated naman, and obscurantist rin, ang reading na ito of EDSA — as dated as the myth of a miracle peddled by cardinal sin, as obscurantist as the left’s refusal to acknowledge its mistake in refusing to support cory and boycotting the snap elections.

yes, america from the beginning warned both the enrile-RAM camp and the marcos-ver camp to desist from violent action, or else.  but marcos defied the americans, ordered marine commander tadiar’s tanks to ram through crowds on EDSA sunday and advance to attack the rebel soldiers in camps aguinaldo and crame, and again on EDSA monday morning when the marines managed to make it into camp aguinaldo (enrile had moved to crame when the people stopped the tanks) and marcos through the vers ordered colonel balbas to fire cannons and howitzers at camp crame across the highway.  both times, the marines defied marcos’s orders — throngs of civilians were all over the place, including their own families — and that was the end of marcos.  the americans, indeed, played a part in EDSA but only in giving marcos a way out of the palace, and that was already on day four, EDSA tuesday, the battle was over.

but what’s truly amazing is the blind spot of the left when it comes to cory and EDSA.  i guess because cory was so burgis and a hasyendera to boot?  they must have hated it when  EDSA practically fell on her lap, awarding her the presidency.  but it’s not as if it was a painless exercise for cory who had to rise above personal issues with enrile who was after all ninoy’s jailer for seven years and seven months.

Before the display of People Power in Ortigas, the idea of Cory meeting with Enrile in the dark of night to plot against the dictator was inconceivable. Not only did Cory and Ninoy suffer unspeakably in the hands (so to speak) of Enrile, Cory was also convinced that she could bring down Marcos (and Enrile) without violence—she did not need a military arm. Enrile, for his part, must have been loath to take orders from a woman who had no experience in running a government; and perhaps he was not convinced that Marcos could be brought down through non-violent actions alone.

But after the awesome display of People Power—when the people risked life and limb to protect Enrile in the name of Cory—the two could behave no less grandly by rising to the challenge and transcending personal interests. Cory rose above her resentment of the military, Enrile rose above his ambition to become president, and space was created where the two could face each other without rancor (if temporarily) and work out a mutually acceptable arrangement, join hands against a higher common cause.

People Power called for Cory and Enrile to reconcile their differences for the sake of the nation, and the two did, not by butting heads but through creative negotiation. No doubt Enrile came to the table with certain demands in exchange for his support. Such as, perhaps, an end to the boycott of crony businesses, and, it would seem, immunity from suit.

As for Ramos, who knows what he asked for. Cory’s anointment in the next presidential election may have been on his list.  [EDSA Uno: A Narrative and Analysis with Notes of Dos & Tres (2013) page 159]

quite funny too is how pagaduan-araullo’s rhetoric on EDSA is sounding like enrile’s who is still upset that EDSA is not celebrated on feb 22, the day of his defection with gringo’s army and fvr’s police forces that set off the four-day uprising.  here, pagaduan-araullo complains that the role of the organized left, the “progressive and revolutionary forces,” is being played down and airbrushed from historical accounts.

But “people power” was passed off as merely the massing-up of people spontaneously responding to the call of Cardinal Sin to support the Juan Ponce Enrile-Fidel V. Ramos mutinous forces. They had been galvanized by the experience of the fraud-ridden snap presidential elections that stole victory from Corazon C. Aquino.

The objective of the emphasis on the unorganized mass of people is to play down the role of people’s organizations that had initiated and sustained anti-dictatorship struggles throughout the dark years. The purpose, then and now, is to airbrush progressive and revolutionary forces from the historical account of the uprising itself.

well, not in my book, where i track what the left, right, and center were up to over the marcos years, the snap elections, the six-day crony boycott, and the four day uprising.   i even quoted from a 1992 joma interview [pages 215, 302], and of course authors like mark thompson.

Jose Maria Sison ~ The masses led by the Party were there!  In EDSA, when there was a call for the bravest spirits to take over Channel 4, 500 Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) members were there, and when I refer to BAYAN, I mean that the influence of the Party extends; I don’t mean that BAYAN is not an independent organization. But the myth that the Party obstructed or was a block, that’s not true. The most progressive  people, 500 of them from BAYAN, went over to seize Channel 4. [Kasarinlan. “Interview: Jose Maria Sison” by Kathleen Weekley. 1992. 74.]

Mark R. Thompson ~ BAYAN was caught off guard by the foiled coup, and, although some of its members joined the crowds that protected the military rebels, its role in the people-power insurrection was insignificant.  [Anti-Marcos Struggle. 1996. 157]

Jose Maria Sison ~ The highest concentration of progressive forces was at Malacañang. During the days of the downfall of Marcos, from February 22 to 25, probably 80% of the people in EDSA went there spontaneously, or came from the unorganized sector. … 20% of the people were, you might say, progressive, and most of that 20% came from the progressive mass organizations. Around Malacañang, the percentage was higher, even up to 90%. Kilusang Mayo Uno, KADENA, and the League of Filipino Students concentrated there.  [Kasarinlan. 74]

insignificant naman talaga ang presence ng “organized progressives” sa EDSA.  even if they had not shown up, the four-day uprising would have proceeded and ousted marcos without bloodshed anyway.  and while it is true that the struggles of the left during martial law deserve playing up (as it is played up by leftist pundits in mainstream and social media to this day), even more so does ninoy’s suffering and sacrifice.  imagine how much darker and uglier and dirtier the conjugal dictatorship might have played it if there had been no ninoy in jail who kept the protest alive in the hearts of many many filipinos, unorganized but totally opposed to marcos and martial rule, too, and surely our numbers were greater than the left.  naturally, the balance of power post-EDSA “overwhelmingly favored” the “unorganized” coryistas.

sa totoo lang, i would love to engage with an “organized progressive” who has read EDSA Uno the book.  i thought the left did a great job in mendiola.  EDSA monday pa lang, day three, nandoon na sila, freaking the marcoses out (so to speak).

Apparently brought by rumors that Marcos had fled the country, several hundred people gathered near Mendiola Bridge, only to find the usual dense row of barricades still in place, along with combat-ready Marines wearing white armbands.

There were at least 50 soldiers toting Armalites and grenade launchers; a sand-bagged emplacement on one side of the bridge behind the wire sprouted what looked like the muzzle of an M-60 machinegun, with a long belt of ammunition trailing onto the pavement.

Far from being daunted by the sight of arms and troops, the people started doing something which would have been unthinkable (and possibly fatal) just weeks ago: they started dismantling the barricade.

While the Marines watched, the iron horses (so long a famous symbol for frustrated demonstrators) were dragged towards waiting companions who started tearing them apart with rocks, small pliers and bare hands.

“A remembrance,” said one man as he displayed a strip of barbed wire he had twisted off. Strips were bent into circles and then decorated with yellow ribbons.

About four of the iron barriers were stripped bare before the Marines fired warning shots into the air (a student said later that someone had thrown a rock at them), sending people scampering down CM Recto Ave. [Alan C. Robles, “Mendiola Barricades Disappearing” The Manila Times. 25 February 86]

i gather “the people” referred to were leftists, i mean, organized progressives?  it would be nice to get some confirmation.  but here’s a gem from lino brocka, the activist and national artist.

Lino Brocka ~ Minsan pa, maniwala ka, nakatayong ganyan ang mga sundalo, nariyan naman ang puwersa ng BAYAN. Hintayan. Tense talaga. Biglang may tumawid sa tulay mula sa BAYAN side papunta sa mga sundalo. May dalang pagkain. Alam mo ba ang ginawa ng mga sundalo? Ibinaba ang mga baril nila at pumalakpak! Pagkatapos, kumain sila nang kumain. Diyos ko, sabi namin, tao rin pala sila. Gutom na gutom! Eh ayun, matapos nilang kumain, tinanganan uli ang mga baril nila!  [“Lino Brocka’s Election Drama” The Sunday Times Magazine. 16 March 86]

and then there was this, on the night of EDSA tuesday, an hour after the marcoses had escaped via US choppers.

10:15 P.M. • As the mob dismantled the barbed wire structures, the militants stood up, tightened their ranks, and dispersed. Why did they disperse? Why did they not lead or join the mob that “conquered” Malacañang? [Gus Mclat “Savoring a Glorious Moment in History” Sunday Magazine of Malaya. 23 Mar 86]

good question.  though i think it was quite a class act, haha.   and smart.  otherwise they would likely have been blamed for the unorganized looting of malacanang that ensued an hour or so later.

Ninotchka Rosca ~ Romeo Candazo of Selda (Prison Cell), the organization of former political prisoners, said: “ … you have to appreciate the dilemma of our people. They went to EDSA only to be confronted by the faces of those who tortured them. It was a heavy trip.” [Endgame: The  Fall of Marcos. 1987. 144]

yes, EDSA was a heavy trip for the left, but it’s been 30 years.  time to level up the discourse.

bongbong, walden, EDSA

sabi ni bongbong marcos, the people power rovolt was american-inspired.  ibig ba niyang sabihin na kung hindi sa america, hindi nagkaroon ng people power na nagpatalsik sa diktador na si ferdinand nuong pebrero 1986?

Marcos lamented how Philippine history books failed to show how the US “inspired” the bloodless revolt that led to his father’s downfall.

“It was American-inspired,” he said. “Dahil yung pagsimula ay galing sa Amerika eh, galing kay [former US President Jimmy] Carter, kung maaalala niyo. Tapos yung sa IMF, tapos yung lahat ng ginawa ng Amerikano para pahinain yung administrasyon ng aking ama.”

He said the assassination of former Senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. in August 1983 was only one of the many factors that triggered the uprising.

“Yung uprising na ganyan, ang Amerika may ginawa. Yun na nga, kagaya ng sabi ko, nag-start dun sa IMF na inipit-ipit ang ating mga pondo… Ako, nasa Palasyo ako nung panay ang message ni Ambassador [Stephen] Bosworth sa father ko na ganito, ganyan dapat gawin. Talagang involved sila. Ang sinasabi ko lang, involved sila.”

“Hindi naman isa lang bagay ang pangyayari. Kaya nangyari ang [1986 EDSA People Power Revolution], palagay ko maraming factors yan, at hindi natin masasabi. So ang sinasabi ko isang bagay diyan yung Amerikano, isang bagay diyan yung pagkapaslang kay Senator Aquino at siguro mga ibang bagay,” Marcos said.

ano daw?  that’s so convoluted and in-credible.  he’s saying that america, from the time of jimmy carter (democrat 1977-1981) to the time of ronald reagan (republican 1981-1989), conspired with the IMF to weaken the economy and bring the marcoses down?  carter was anti-marcos, yes, but it was mostly because of human rights violations.  otherwise, the marcos government had no problem borrowing billions of dollars from foreign banks, for development kuno, until 1983 when the shit hit the fan — not because ninoy was assassinated but because lumobo na ang foreign debt at walang pambayad kahit paiyakan — and the IMF had to step in.

When Marcos assumed presidency in 1966, the foreign debt of the Philippines stood below $1 billion. When he fled Malacañang in February 1986 during the first People Power, the country had a foreign debt of $28 billion…

…it was also Marcos who issued Presidential Decree (PD) 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 that automatically appropriates for debt servicing regardless of how much is left of the country’s resources to fund basic social services.

…Between 1973 and 1982, the indebtedness of the Philippines grew by 27 percent per year. From 1976 to 1982, BSP data show that the foreign debt was swelling by an annual average of $2.8 billion. In 1982, due to automatic debt service, payments reached $3.5 billion, almost the same level of total foreign borrowing for that year and larger than the total foreign debt before Martial Law was declared.

The debt level became unmanageable, forcing the Marcos government to declare a moratorium on debt payments in 1983. The Philippines never recovered from its fiscal woes ever since, in spite of painful restructuring under the tutelage of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in exchange for the moratorium and additional funding.

bongbong should google “marcos foreign debt” for pages and pages of links to the details of the story.

and really?  america inspired people power?  how?  enrile is right, reagan troubleshooter philip habib was around the week before EDSA and when he left saturday noon he was certain something was about to break but he didn’t know what; neither he nor ambassador bosworth had the mind to imagine the possibility of a military defection being used by people power in cory’s name to oust marcos.  neither had any contact with the people, only with their so-called leaders — cory, enrile, marcos, maybe even cardinal sin, the generals, and the like — who all had no idea either what was coming, and who were certainly not in command, any of them, over the four days.

the people were.  in command.  it was the height of subversion.

after a week of civil disobedience,  boycotting the goods and services of of marcos- and crony-owned companies, from banks to manila bulletin, san miguel corporation and magnolia food products, rustans and the like, these people were in the throes of revolution.  if enrile and RAM had not defected, cory’s boycott movement would have gained steam as it spread to the visayas and mindanao.  eventually the cronies and other ruling oligarchs would have thrown up their hands in surrender.  marcos would have been compelled to resign to save the economy, and cory would have taken over anyway.  writ large as a nuanced sense of revenge that we pinoys exact sometimes, even on ourselves.

this is the same successful economic boycott that no one, but no one, ever speaks of or writes about — not the left, not the right, not civil society.  as though it never happened, as though no one knows about it, no one wants to remember, i guess.  because, really, it was even more subversive than the people gathering physically in large numbers in the same space to insist that marcos resign.  imagine.  we stopped buying san miguel beer and coke, we gave up manila bulletin, we snobbed places that served crony goods, it was exciting, and fun.  nakaka-high pala pag ang nakararami ay nagkakaisa in a common cause.  the power is awesome.  the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

finally, in the slew of opinion pieces and commentaries on the EDSA revolt in the run-up to the 30th anniv, i must say i take exception to walden bello’s campaign speech in los banos where he puts EDSA in such an ugly light .

Formally launching my campaign for the Senate at UP Los Banos, before an assembly of close to 1000 students, Feb 9, 2016. My message: “We are in the midst of a dual crisis: the crisis of the EDSA system of elite democracy and the crisis of the neoliberal economic paradigm that has brought us nothing but increased poverty and inequality and the plunder of the environment.”

“the EDSA system of elite democracy”?  it started with EDSA?  really?  for the first time, bello disappoints me.  alam naman nating pre-martial law pa ang elite democracy na yan, di ba.  it’s so leftist to ignore, if not snort at, the historic high points that were the six-day boycott and the four-day manifestation of people power in the story of marcos’s ouster.

it’s understandable naman.  after all, this is the same left that snootily boycotted the snap elections, thinking there was no way cory would win.  so it’s no surprise hearing/reading the leftists making EDSA maliit, and glorifying instead only the actions and sufferings of the left during the martial law period.  but i expected more from bello the senatorial candidate.