Category: marcos

whiffs of fiction, “public history” 2018

kakaiba ang timpla ng pro-marcos discourse, mas maanghang, mas palaban, mas mayabang.  para kaya maipaabot sa, and impress upon the, supremes where (they think) public sentiments lie, in aid of bongbong winning his PET case and taking over as veep?  next stop, the presidency?

sa social media, kaabang-abang ang tete-a-tete nina juan ponce enrile at ferdinand “bongbong” marcos.  on sept 20 tungkol sa martial law, on sept 22 tungkol sa EDSA.

i expect that the exercise is meant to glorify martial law and to villify EDSA.  it would be nice though if the two could be a little more candid and and even-handed. just as we, who are all set to scream revisionism!!! need to get a better handle on martial law and EDSA.  martial law was not all bad just as EDSA was not all good.

a question i hope is addressed in da tete-a-tete:  so, anong nangyari?  bakit pabagsak na ang ekonomiya by 1982, even before ninoy’s assassination?

sabihin pa natin, for the sake of argument, that marcos did all the right things re infrastructure (except for a lemon or two) and he was able to electrify almost half the archipelago (not all of it, not even close) and he got uncle sam to pay rent for the US bases (kahit binarat tayo nang katakut-takot) atbp, not to speak of how culture and the arts kinda blossomed because of (and despite) imelda:  bakit hindi na-sustain ang “progress”?  bakit biglang ayaw nang magpautang ng mga bangko?  bakit di tayo nakabayad ng mga utang?  bakit ba talaga hindi naging isang singapore ang pinas?

it would be great to hear nationalists in the academe — the historians, the political scientists, the economists — having tv tete-a-tetes with the populace and sharing their findings on questions like these.  we need answers based on facts, figures, records, documents.  so we all — the elected and the electorate alike — can learn the lessons we need to learn, so we can correct our mistakes, so we can move forward.

the last thing we need is a conference of historians perorating on a notion of “public history” (now ongoing 20-22 sept) that i fear would legitimize, validate fictional (partisan, and/or “creative”) accounts of historical events, among other historical and cultural horrors.

bakit wala silang criteria of any kind?  ano ito, let’s just be glad that we’re talking history, even if reeking of fiction and propaganda?  i would sit in judgment: is the opinion sound and balanced?  is it based on facts?  the slightest whiff of fiction should be red-flagged and merit automatic rejection from the annals of public history.

it’s not as if our historians have nothing else to do.  every september and february we hear it repeated that marcos did not give shoot orders that would have harmed civilians in EDSA.  credible eyewitness and first-person accounts say he did.  so who’s revising history?  our historians, academic or “public”, should be weighing in.  otherwise, anong silbi nila?

duterte is ready to step down

“I would suggest to the military, if you want a junta, or if you want yourselves to be in the junta, I say line up here, I’ll put you in your proper place.”

DU30 also said he was ready to be replaced by a “more competent” leader. “If you think there is somebody more competent, then by all means, put him in place. Or a group of persons who you think could bring prosperity to this nation.”

Finally, DU30 said he is opposed to a constitutional succession in case he vacates his office, and reiterated that he does not believe in the competence of Vice President Leni Robredo. “Were it not for the fact that I do not believe in the competence of the Vice President, I’m ready to go anytime,” he said.

hindi naman ito nakakagulat.  recall how reluctant he was to run for president in 2016.  i think he was finally convinced to run only because certain federalists promised that if as candidate and as president he pushed aggressively for federalism and CHANGE,  that it would be a piece of cake, a done deal by midterm elections, and he could step down and make way for a transitory head of state.

it is clear by now, early into his third year, that it ain’t gonna happen anytime soon, not federalism, much less a transition led by a politician of his choice.  it is clear that the leaders of the federalist pack miscalculated badly — akala nila duterte only had to run the country the way he ran davao city, and okay na.  NOT at all.  the drug war on the poor is atrocious and heartbreaking, the corruption grows unabated, and a con-ass is nowhere in sight.  clearly his orders are being defied at every level, even China Hasn’t Delivered on its $24 Billion Philippines Promise, sabi ng bloomberg, and digong must be feeling mighty frustrated, if not incompetent and useless.  running a country, after all, particularly this thirdworld basketcase of a country, is an extremely complicated matter, especially for one who ran on a promise of  CHANGE.

hindi rin nakakagulat na ibig ni digong na i-dictate kung sino ang papalit sa kanya.

The chief executive reiterated his doubts about Robredo’s competence to lead the country should he step down.

“I think deep in my heart, if you follow the succession and Robredo takes over, she can’t handle it. That’s my honest opinion. I wish it were someone in the likes of Escudero or Bongbong Marcos,” Duterte said.

i think maybe he was also promised that bongbong would win the vp election, but he lost, as did chiz.  and why chiz (is that you, danding cojuangco)?  of course bongbong’s contesting leni’s win, and it would be safe to suppose that digong is counting on the supremes’ PET ruling in favor of bongbong so he can take over as VP.  so why did digong even mention chiz?  or a military junta?  could it be that he is hedging his bets, in case bongbong proves to be unacceptable to the people because #NeverAgain a marcos as president?

talk is rife that the president’s health is failing and he would step down in a heartbeat if he were sure that he would not be charged with crimes and sent to jail.  but in aug 2016 he had no such fear.  read Duterte says his old age can help him avoid jail.

Old age may be a disadvantage to some but for President Rodrigo Duterte, it is a means to avoid imprisonment.

The tough-talking Duterte said that under the law, prisoners who are 70 years old or above should be released.

More than 400 people have [had] been killed in the government’s anti-drug operations, alarming human rights advocates who believe that the law enforcement operations may be used to justify extralegal killings.

“I don’t care about human rights. I said I have a problem to solve. I must first solve the problems of the country. I am already 71 years old and according to the Revised Penal Code, you have to be released once you reach 70,” the president said.

so what has changed?  sal panelo, digong’s chief legal counsel, says the president is shaking the tree … and talk of wanting to step down is “a foreshadow of radical things to come.”  i suppose this is why buhay na naman ang revgov peeps, urging digong to declare a revolutionary government that would ram a federal constitution and another marcos down our throats?  #godforbid  #taketothestreets

non-violent tactics #EDSA’86

read UP professor amado mendoza jr‘s ‘People Power’ in the Philippines, 1983-86,  chapter 11 of the book  Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present by adam roberts & timothy garton ash, published by oxford university in 2009.

… It might have been expected that the Marcos regime would be overthrown violently by the ongoing communist insurgency or a military coup.  Scholars of regime change have long argued that neo-patrimonial dictatorships are particularly vulnerable to violent overthrow by armed opponents.

The peaceful outcome in the Philippines is therefore a puzzle.  Thompson argued that Marcos’s removal was the result of moderate forces successfully out-manoeuvring the different armed groups.  Boudreau acknowledged the competitive and complementary relationship between the armed and unarmed anti-dictatorship movements, but believed that the creation of an organized non-communist option that regime defectors could support was decisive. [180-181]

very interesting, and informative of poltical mindsets circa ’83-’86:

Exiled to the US in 1980, Senator Aquino returned in August 1983 hoping to persuade an ailing Marcos to step down and allow him to take over.  His brazen assassination at Manila international airport unleashed a broad civil resistance movement which eventually outstripped the communist insurgency in terms of media coverage and mass mobilization.  The Catholic Church, led by Cardinal Jaime Sin, played an active role in bringing together the non-communist opposition and Manila’s business elite.  Pro-opposition mass media outlets were opened and a citizens’ electoral watch movement was revived.  Aquino’s death also prompted US State Department officials to assist political moderates and pressure Marcos for reforms.  Marcos tried to divide the opposition anew through the 1984 parliamentary elections.  While some moderates joined a communist-led boycott, others (supported by the widowed Corazon Aquino) participate—and won a third of the contested seats despite widespread violence, cheating, and government control of the media. 

Emboldened moderates consequently spurned a commnist-dominated anti-dictatorship alliance in 1985 to form their own coalition.  While Marcos called for ‘snap’ presidential elections, they united behind Mrs. Aquino’s candidacy.  The communists, hoping to worsen intra-elite conflicts, called for another boycott.  Military officers associate with Enrile formed the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and tacitly supported Aquino’s candidacy while preparing for an anti-Marcos coup.  Faced by a vigorous opposition campaign, Marcos resorted to fraud and systematic violence.  The combination of a now unmuzzled press and the presence of election observers sparked large-scale civil disobedience.  The Church declared that Marcos has lost the moral right to rule.

The end-game was precipitated by a RAM coup attempt.  Pre-empted by loyalist forces, rebel officers led by Enrile and Ramos defected to Aquino on 22 February 1986 and recognized her as the country’s legitimate leader.  These events led to an internationally televised standoff between loyalist troops and millions of unarmed civilian protesters who had gathered to protect the rebels.  As the regime came under pressure, it lost the will to survive.  Defections mounted and the Reagan administration finally withdrew its support.  On 25 February 1986, the Marcos family and entourage were airlifted to exile in Hawaii.  [182-183]

indeed non-violence won the war, but whether or not it was the result of deliberate strategies and manoeuvres by the non-communist anti-marcos moderates remains to be known.  what deserves mention is that ninoy was on non-violent mode when he came home from exile in aug ’83, his homecoming speech citing ghandi no less:

According to Gandhi, the willing sacrifice of the innocent is the most powerful answer to insolent tyranny that has yet been conceived by God and man.

perhaps he had discussed gandhi and non-violence with cory, who may have relayed the message to ninoy’s brother butz, whose august twenty-one movement (ATOM)’s protest rallies were decidedly non-violent from start to finish.

so was cory’s huge Tagumpay ng Bayan rally in luneta where she declared victory in the snap elections, sabay launch ng non-violent civil disobedence and crony-boycott campaign that coryistas couldn’t wait to be part of.  by day six of the boycott, the economy was reeling and the crony-business community was looking to negotiate, but with whom?  day seven of the boycott (EDSA saturday), enrile and ramos defected.  hmmm, di ba.  enrile was a top crony, next only to danding.  with whom na nga ba?

as in august ’83, butz rose to the occasion that EDSA saturday night.  it was butz who first sounded the call for people to come to EDSA and shield the defectors with their bodies, no guns.  cardinal sin seconded the call for a nonviolent solution an hour or so later, and cory the next day, from cebu.  ATOM was all over EDSA, butz dealing directly, facing off, with police general alfredo lim (who was ordered to disperse the crowds) and then marine commander alfredo tadiar (who was ordered to ram through! the crowd).

i’ve always wondered who, if any, advised cory and butz on non-violent tactics.  that luneta rally was sheer genius.  bentang benta sa moderate forces who liked the drama of non-violence:  nasa bahay ka lang pero feeling part of the struggle ka, and feeling revenged na rin on the regime — goodbye manila bulletin hello inquirer, goodbye san miguel beer, hello lambanog, goodbye cocacola, hello buko juice — what fun.  and that call to EDSA to shield the rebels from the dictator’s forces was inspired — was it pure butz?  was he winging it? — basta walang armas, be ready to die!  and the people were.  ready to die.  (huwag ismiran, mocha uson!)

contrary to popular perception, however, enrile did not defect to join cory nor did he recognize her as the duly-elected president right away.  enrile wanted to be president, and the aborted coup plot set for 23 feb 2 AM would have quickly installed him in malacañang.  in short, he meant to beat cory in a race to the palace,  una-unahan lang.  but ver got wind of honasan’s plans, and honasan got wind of ver’s plans (arrest orders, among others), which drove enrile and RAM to hole up in camp aguinaldo, better to die fighting, while hoping against hope to win the people’s support — after all, he was more qualified to be president.

but by day two, EDSA sunday, the day the people stopped the tanks in ortigas, it was clear that the people were there for cory — shielding enrile yes, but chanting cory’s name, wearing cory’s colors, waving cory’s flags — and it was obvious that they expected cory and enrile to join forces vs. marcos.  sometime over that long night, enrile and ramos, separately, met with cory in her sister’s house in greenhills.  i suppose that’s when the two asked for the top defense positions, an end to the crony-boycott, and immunity from suit in exchange for their armed support.

it disappoints, of course, that prof mendoza characterizes the dictator’s response during the key days as “inexplicably lame and non-violent.”  as though there had been no real threat of violence?  which is to diminish, even if unintentionally, the people’s role in that stunning revolt.

the dictator’s orders were neither lame nor non-violent.  on day 3, EDSA monday, twice marcos gave orders to bomb camp crame, except that air force col. sotelo and the entire 15th strike wing defected instead, and col. balbas and the marines (like commander tadiar the day before), after much delaying, defied orders, and returned to barracks instead.

true, the dictator’s forces could have struck immediately at the rebel military “before a protective civilian cocoon had been mobilized to protect them”, but marcos actually thought he could woo enrile back to the fold.  he had no idea that there was no turning back for enrile who was off on a new trip, navigating uncharted waters, and reinventing himself.

of course, he regretted giving way to cory, but i’m glad he did.

of course cory must have regretted giving him immunity, and i’m sorry she did.

next time, we the people should have a better sense — in real time —  of what’s happening behind-the-scenes and what’s being promised / compromised in our name.  we shouldn’t make bitaw too quickly or trust in our leaders so blindly.  i would think that non-violent engagement can be sustainable and long-term.

why sept 21 #MartialLaw

manolo quezon rightly points out that martial law did not begin on the 21st.  in the explainer The big lie manolo tells us how things unfolded over the 21st and the 22nd to the 23rd of september 1972.  as a matter of fact we were still a free people on the 21st.  in fact marcos gave the GO signal only after enrile was ambushed kuno, that is, on the evening of the 22nd.  and yes we only found out on the 23rd when we awoke to a multimedia blackout that lasted almost all day, and we went to sleep with tv images of marcos declaring that martial law was in place, like it or not.

… martial law was announced with silence: people woke up to discover that TV and radio stations were off the air. Later in the day, some stations started playing easy listening music and some stations aired cartoons. But Marcos’ speechwriters were slow, then the teleprompter broke down, and the speech had to be hand-written on kartolina. So it wasn’t until dinnertime that Marcos finally appeared on TV and the country found out martial law was in place.

So, why do so many people who actually lived through martial law, misremember when it was proclaimed?

Marcos once said that the people would accept anything so long as it was legal. Marcos said he’d imposed martial law on September 21. We know this wasn’t true, because the document itself was co-signed, not by Alejandro Melchor, his executive secretary, but by a presidential assistant. This was because Melchor had left for abroad before Marcos actually signed the martial law proclamation sometime between the evening and early morning of September 22 to 23.

marcos was known to believe in the occult, and in the magic of the number 7 and its multiples such as the lucky 21, which could be why proclamation 1081 is dated sept  21 even if it was not signed until sept 22, or maybe 23.

Marcos went further to wipe the public’s memory clean. He later proclaimed September 21 as Thanksgiving Day. And in every speech, every documentary, every poster, September 21 was the date enshrined as the birth of the New Society. So much so that the public forgot what it had actually lived through. This is the power of propaganda. By altering the date, Marcos helped erase not only September 21 as the last day of freedom, but also how that freedom was lost between September 22 and 23. His lawyerly piece of paper, his Proclamation 1081, became the ultimate instrument for national amnesia.

So, remember September 21 by all means. Not as the fake news date Marcos wanted you to remember, but for the things he wanted you to forget: a still-independent Senate, freedom of assembly, and a free press. But remember what he wanted you to forget: that it was on September 23 that the nation woke up to discover all these things were suddenly gone. And that the next day, the last institution standing, the Supreme Court, received the warning: play ball, or be abolished. They played ball.

indeed 21 worked for marcos but only in the early years of martial law.  parang 22’s vibe kicked in towards the end, but that’s another story.  anyway, 21’s vibe is good for people getting together, rising above self-interests, reconciling differences for the good of the whole.

and it’s not all that inappropriate, marking the 21st as a day of infamy, the day that marcos marked as thanksgiving day, the day marking the birth of “the new society” — THAT was the big lie.  the promise of “bagong lipunan” didn’t pan out, except for the crooks.