Category: edsa

FIDEL V. RAMOS (1928-2022)

Post-EDSA what struck me most about FVR was how tight-lipped he was about the four days, refusing to tell his story to media. So unlike Juan Ponce Enrile whose story in two parts, buttressing his denial of the reformist coup plot that would have installed him in Marcos’s place, was published in the Sunday Inquirer magazine by mid-March ’86.

Could it have been because, as some pundits suggest, FVR was not really part of the aborted RAM coup — the reformists who were caught in Malacanang and presented to the public by Marcos named only Enrile’s boys of the MND and not Ramos’s of the PC-INP?  But historian Alfred McCoy (“Coup!” Veritas Special Edition, Oct 86) named Vic Batac Jr., Ramos’s chief intelligence officer, as one of the three masterminds (along with Honasan and Kapunan). And in a 1991 interview Gen. JoeAl confirmed that Ramos was in on it from the start.

JOSE ALMONTE: We planned the whole action mainly under two offices: the Ministry of National Defense and the office of Gen. Ramos, then PC Chief and AFP Vice Chief of Staff. His closest aides and the chief of his security, Sonny Razon, were members of our core group; they kept the general informed of meetings and developments [http://edsarevolution.com/chronology/day1.php]

But because Ramos didn’t rush to join Enrile in Camp Aguinaldo for the Feb 22 presscon, he gave the impression that he might have changed his mind or was having second thoughts. But I think he was just making pa-importante, choosing to flirt first with Alabang Coryistas who were urging him to resign from the Marcos government. I also think that he wanted to send the message that he was not at the beck and call of Enrile. I daresay he was confident that Enrile would not do the breakaway presscon without him.

LEWIS M. SIMONS. RAM recognized that while a significant number of officers and men were prepared to line up behind Enrile, his long political and personal association with Marcos had tainted him in the minds of many more. And this was doubly true among the civilian power structure, the wealthy businessmen who’d emerged as an anti-Marcos force and the large middle class who’d tirelessly marched and demonstrated ever sine the Aquino assassination. Ramos’s image was much cleaner. [Worth Dying For (1988) page 265]

In October 86, when historian Alfred McCoy confirmed the reformist plot that Enrile had denied (“Coup!” Veritas Special Edition, Oct ’86), I figured that FVR’s silence had to do with keeping intact what relationship he had with Enrile: he didn’t care to contradict his fellow Bandido’s account, the better to keep communication lines open perhaps, or to avoid fueling  anti-Cory sentiments, what with Enrile and his RAM-boys mounting foiled coup after foiled coup to topple Cory ’86-’89.

In August 1990 when I heard that he was running for president in ’92, and that his team was looking for a biographer, I jumped at the offer, sabay tanong if he would finally tell his EDSA story, sabay send ng print-out of my draft chronology, mostly from news reports of the four days along with Enrile’s, Butz Aquino’s, and McCoy’s accounts, along with data from Nick Joaquin’s The Quartet of the Tiger Moon (1986) and Cecilio Arillo’s Breakaway (1986), among others.

My draft was a hundred or so pages pa lang then but substantial enough, apparently, for FVR to say yes to an EDSA project, never mind the biography. In our interview sessions in Camp Aguinaldo and Ayala Alabang, he would often check out my chronology, though never  to correct any of it, rather, to remind himself of details and statements he was reported to have made during the four days. Very careful, very measured in his words, he was able to tell his story without ever commenting, one way or another, on Enrile’s own statements, except to say that he concerned himself only with military affairs and left the politics to Enrile.

And yet there he was, five years later, playing politics to the hilt, revving up for a presidential campaign that he would win, against all odds.  Never mind that he changed his mind about publishing the EDSA book he commissioned, I imagine for some greater good involving Enrile and the reformist-loyalist military who were still smarting from the last, the bloodiest, the failed 1989 coup attempt.

It is interesting, in an occult way, that FVR was rushed to Makati Med a few days before he died, which may have been a day or two after, if not the day itself of, Enrile’s oathtaking as Marcos Jr.’s Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. The outpouring of tributes for FVR hailing him as the best president ever hopefully gives Marcos Jr. and Enrile pause, to take stock, and maybe resolve to do FVR even better.

***

President Fidel V. Ramos — an appreciation by Stephen CuUnjieng

FVR’s firm and soft legacies by Cielito F. Habito

Philippines’ Fidel Ramos sought Beijing ties but also showed South China Sea defiance by Raissa Robles

‘Tabako’ by Ma. Lourdes Tiquia

Once he’d been a statesman by Manuel L. Quezon III

The president who freed the skies by Milwida Guevarra

FVR: The unwritten biography by Ambeth Ocampo

FVR’s out-of-the-box style of leadership by Jarius Bondoc

Statesman by Alex Magno

WHY Cory stopped U.S. from taking Marcos to Ilocos

While it is true that Cory’s final order to the Americans was to take Marcos away from the Philippines ASAP, it was NOT her first reaction when she was informed early Tuesday evening (Feb 25) that the Marcoses were preparing to leave the Palace.

CORY: Early in the evening, I was back in Wack Wack, talking with opposition leaders, when Ambassador Bosworth called me up to say that the Marcoses had finally been persuaded to leave. Their sons-in-law had been able to convince them that it would be the best thing to do.
http://edsarevolution.com/chronology/day4.php

Close to 9 p.m., Cory received another phone call from Bosworth telling her that Marcos was ready to leave the Palace but was asking to stay for at least two days in Paoay, his home in the north.

Her first reaction was, “Poor man, let us give him two days.” This, according to former Supreme Court Justice, then MP, Cecilia Muñoz Palma, one of her close advisers who overheard, and disagreed. Like  other advisers who were with Cory then, she believed that given the chance, Marcos might regroup his forces or extend his stay indefinitely.

True enough. It is said that when the Marcos party got to Clark Air Base, Marcos got on the phone to his ministers and supporters, allegedly with plans of organizing an “Ilocano army” to fight its way to Metro Manila and “recover” the capital. http://edsarevolution.com/chronology/theflight.php  Some of these supporters reported his calls to Enrile and Ramos who began asking Cory and Bosworth what Marcos was up to.

According to Time correspondent Sandra Burton, Cory had wanted to be “magnanimous in victory,” remembering how Marcos and Imelda had released Ninoy from jail and allowed him to fly to the U.S. for heart surgery in 1980. But her advisers warned her of likely consequences, and once Bosworth assured her that Marcos was not dying, just very tired, she decided that Marcos simply had to go after a night in Clark.

SANDRA BURTON: Although General Ramos denied having been consulted on the matter, sources close to the negotiations claimed not only that he was consulted, but that he was particularly strong in urging that Marcos be given no more leash. … He explained that loyalist generals still controlled much of the north. Once Marcos returned to his province, he would be protected, and he was likely to become a magnet for hundreds of thousand of discontented supporters. “Get him out of there” is the way one of the parties to the negotiation described Ramos’s advice to Aquino. [Impossible Dream | The Marcoses, The Aquinos, and The Unfinished Revolution (1989) page 412]

FIDEL RAMOS: Both Minister Enrile and I wanted whatever was for the greater good of the greater number of Filipinos, which was to have the thing settled as fast as possible and in a bloodless, peaceful way. There are still many emotional Ilocanos who think I should have stepped in and provided Mr. Marcos the chance to go to Ilocos Norte at least to say goodbye. But at the time any deviation from the plan would have given the remaining loyalist forces the opportunity to create a rallying point, mobilize military units, and come storming back to Manila. We couldn’t let that happen while the Aquino government was still consolidating its forces. http://edsarevolution.com/chronology/day4.php  

PAMPANGA PEOPLE POWER

Clark Air Base, 9:45 P.M. — Marcos was met by US Ambassador Stephen Bosworth. He also got a “welcome” from hundreds who massed at the main gate of the base to chant “Co-ree!” while a convoy of some fifty vehicles held a noise barrage for twenty minutes along the base’s perimeter fence. http://edsarevolution.com/chronology/day4.php

JUSMAG Commander, Brigadier General Teddy Allen, who had promised to take Marcos anywhere he wished just to get him out of the Palace was in a bind.

— Deputy base commander Colonel Romeo David had already pledged his loyalty to General Ramos. “I told the head of U.S. intelligence inside Clark that I could not guarantee the safety of Marcos. If our people saw the president, they might shoot him.”

Just as threatening, said Allen, “Word went out in the province to mobilize People Power around the base, and I had visions of one million people converging on the gate by morning.”

Newly aware of the political pressures to get the ex-president out of the country soon, and worried about Marcos’s security inside the base, which was in rebel hands, General Allen sought permission from Washington to leave for Guam as soon as possible.

— At 2:30 A.M. Allen contacted Tommy Manotoc and Bong Bong Marcos and informed them of the necessity of leaving before daybreak for Guam, where he could guarantee the family’s safety until it could decide upon a final destination. 

— There was a bitter exchange between Ferdinand and American officials. He demanded to be flown to his home in the Ilocos. They had orders from President Reagan and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to fly him to America. At 4:00 A.M, Ferdinand stopped arguing.  [EDSA UNO (2013) page 318]

WHAT IF
What if the Marcoses had not so distrusted the pilots of the presidential helicopters who were prepared, since Monday morning, to fly them anywhere in the islands; or what if Marcos had motored to Paoay in an equipped ambulance. Then, again, perhaps Marcos was just too sick for a long road trip, which would render impressive the fact that he was able to walk out of the palace on his own two feet.

Still and all, if they had snubbed the American offer, if they had left under their own steam, chances are they would have made it to Paoay, and People Power would have had to regroup.

So do we owe the Americans a debt of gratitude for taking him away into exile? I have always thought the better ending would have been if the Marcoses had taken the presidential choppers, and the pilots turned out to be reformists and took the First Couple to Crame instead. With Enrile in charge, no harm would have come to them, but they would have had to face the judgement of the people in a revolutionary court, and maybe, just maybe, People Power would have levelled up to the challenge of standing strong for the greater good vs. elite and crony interests represented by Cory and Enrile.

That would have brought closure, and ushered in a new order. [EDSA UNO (2013)]

#yellowpink

i am yellow and i am pink.  yellow for ninoy, cory, and EDSA.  pink for leni, a no to the sad yellow politics of the liberal party.

pink and yellow go together, literally n figuratively.  they are natural colors that we see everywhere, though never before so blooming everywhere.

meanwhile it’s good to remember, and to talk about, EDSA.  what did we do right, what did we do wrong.  how could we have done it better.

#yellowpink #b4i4get

Si Marcos daw ang “true hero” of EDSA ?!?

SABI-SABI NG MGA MARCOS #2

Si Marcos daw ang tunay na bayani ng EDSA.

Kung hindi daw kay Marcos, tiyak na dumanak ang dugo at maraming sibilyan ang nasaktan nuong apat na araw ng EDSA.

Malinaw daw ang utos ni Marcos kay Ver on nationwide TV: “My order is to disperse the crowd without shooting them.”

MALINAW PERO HINDI TOTOO

Behind the scenes, nung sinasabi niya kay Ver na my-order-is-not-to-shoot, sunud-sunod ang order ni Army Gen. Josephus Ramas kay Marine Col. Braulio Balbas sa Camp Aguinalo na bombahin na ng artillery ang Camp Crame.  May order din sa jet bombers ng Air Force na pasabugin ang kampo.  All orders were cleared by Marcos.

Mabuti na lang, kitang kita ng Marines at ng jet bombers ang sandamakmak na tao sa EDSA at sa Crame grounds.  Minabuti nilang huwag kumilos kaysa makapatay ng unarmed civilians.  Bahala na kung ma-court martial o makulong sila for not following orders.

IT WAS THESE SOLDIERS WHO SAVED EDSA FROM CARNAGE WHILE THE WORLD WATCHED. 

Unlike Air Force Col Antonio Sotelo na nag-defect bitbit ang 15th Strike Wing sa Crame, ang Marines ay bumalik sa barracks at tumulong na lang sa defense ng palasyo, samantalang ang jet bombers ay sa Clark Air Base nagpalipas ng rebolusyon.

Lahat sila, ke nag-defect a la Sotelo, ke nag-back to barracks a la Tadiar at Balbas, ke nagtago sa Clark Air Base a la jet bombers – lahat sila BAYANI na dapat ay naipagbunyi at taos-puso nating napasalamatan nung napaalis na si Marcos.

Sila ang unsung heroes of EDSA.   Mas bayani sila kaysa mga rebeldeng sundalong nag-defect only to hide behind the skirts of nuns and other civilians.

MARCOS FAIL

There was no way Marcos could have come out of EDSA smelling like a hero.  Bukung-buko na ng  taongbayan ang kanyang big-time panlilinlang at pangungulimbat habang pahirap nang pahirap ang buhay ng nakararaming Pinoy.

Tapos eto na naman, huling-huli na nandadaya, ayaw pa ring umamin, at ayaw magbitiw.  Kinailangan pa siyang takutin ng People Power bago mag-alsa balutan. Heroic ba yon?

There was never anything heroic about Marcos.  Brilliant and self-serving, yes, but heroic?  Wala siyang binatbat kay Ninoy.  Wala siyang  panama kina Tadiar, Sotelo, at Balbas.

WHAT IF

What MIGHT have been heroic, I dare think, ay kung (1) umamin si Marcos na nandaya siya, (2) nagbitiw siya nang kusa sa pagka-pangulo, at (3) iniuwi niya sa Ilocos ang kanyang buong pamilya, never again (any of them, born and unborn) to return to politics.

Imagine. What if.

Imbis na nagpondo ng mga kudeta, imbis na siniraan si Cory at ang EDSA, imbis na nag-ambisyong makabalik sa palasyo, WHAT IF nag-retire na lang silang lahat from politics at nagkawanggawa na lang, bilang pasasalamat na buhay pa sila, or something classy and remorseful like that ?!?

Tiyak, mas maayos ang Pilipinas ngayon.

Tiyak, hindi ako tumutol nung ilibing siyang bayani.