Category: edsa

the edsa tradition

a friend texted after reading my blog on the trillanes trip: “OMG the blogger wants blood!?! how demanding!”

not at all. i was just trying to point out (maybe i failed) that trillanes was doomed yet again unless he was on non-violent mode and willing to die for his beliefs a la ninoy-cory-butz, seeing as the arroyo police was on shock-awe-and-destroy mode a la marcos-ver.

let’s not forget that what was remarkable, and what deserves re-creating, about edsa one was not so much the military rebellion as it was the non-violent action of the people, stopping tanks with their warm bodies and ardent prayers, which “disarmed” so to speak, and rendered non-violent too, the marcos military.

cardinal sin “forgot” this noong edsa dos. and juan ponce enrile, miriam defensor santiago, and tito sotto “forgot” this noong edsa tres. this is why when historian rey ileto asked me, soon after edsa dos and tres, what differences i saw between “the original EDSA and its pale reflections,” i could only agree. pale reflections, indeed. poor imitations, in fact.

the edsa tradition would have been better re-lived by edsa dos if cardinal sin had not stopped the youth from moving the action to mendiola. noong edsa uno, day 3 pa lang, unarmed militant groups were already gathering in mendiola; coryistas marched in from edsa the next day. the mission: to scare marcos, make him think violent mobs were at the gates, on the verge of breaking in. in fact, non-violent pa rin ang strategy. some stones and bottles were thrown at the marines guardingthe palace gates and barricades but not to hit or hurt, only to provoke the soldiers to shoot their guns in the air and thus freak out the marcoses.

but during edsa dos, cardinal sin was so afraid that violence would break out, remembering only the violent entry into and looting of the palace. in fact all that violence happened only after the choppers had lifted off with the marcoses and the marines had withdrawn. and had ramos and gringo/the new armed forces bothered to send troops to the palace along with the people (it’s not as if they didn’t know marcos was leaving), the transition would have been completely orderly.

and so, had the edsa dos crowd been allowed to march to mendiola a la edsa uno, with the mission in mind of peacefully, through sheer numbers, pressuring erap into signing an unequivocal letter of resignation drafted by the people, then that particular issue would truly be closed. instead, erap freaked out only enough to leave the seat of the presidency, but not to resign the office.

as for edsa tres. imagine if the edsa tres “mob” had been better informed by their leaders about edsa 1986, in particular how the non-violent strategy worked to neutralize the armed forces and freak the marcoses out. imagine if the masses who marched to mendiola marched peacefully instead and surrounded malacanang in a giant sit-in, filling the streets, stopping traffic, with priests saying mass and nuns leading the praying of the rosary24/7… the armed forces would have been helpless, gloria would have had to negotiate, the erap question could have been more quickly and more clearly resolved.

our problem is, we’re fixated on a rebel military as the key to mobilizing people power. our problem is, we don’t see, or we forget, that by the time enrile and ramos defected in february ’86, people power was already mobilized, it was already day 7 of cory’s civil disobedience campaign, coryistas were on non-violent revolutionary mode, the boycott of Marcos-crony businesses was peaking, and the economy was reeling from bank runs and capital flight. there was no doubt by then that cory’s strategy, to compel the business community to force marcos to step down, was succeeding. in fact it was succeeding so well, the military reformists just had to get into the act, and that’s when people power was diverted to edsa.

in other words, change is not up to the military, change is up to us. cory showed us the way, if we would only see.

EDSA lost

nakakalungkot ang hatol kay erap – enough to make a grown man cry, ika nga ni fr. bernas. so harsh, as though the sandiganbayan were making up for the bigger fish that get off scot free.and so deadly, as though erap were the most wicked of all, when really, the only thing he has over marcos is that mas marami siyang querida and lovechildren. otherwise, he wasn’t even in the palace long enough to do serious plunder a la marcos, or, who knows, gma.

even sadder is how EDSA has been corrupted and demeaned by self-serving politicians, manipulated generals, holier-than-thou bishops, sensationalist media, greedy globalists, gloating leftists and, let’s not forget, bible-reading magistrates OMG — a whole cast of characters that had no place in EDSA ’86 but who wanted to show off that they could do an edsa kuno too, two, wow, ang galing.

i wonder when and if we’ll ever get closure on this one.we have a real problem with endings.with marcos we were happy enough that he left the country, punishment na rin yon, di ba.with erap i was just surprised when he continued to insist that he hadn’t resigned the presidency, he was innocent of any wrongdoing, and preferred to face the courts rather than go into exile. e yun pala he isn’t that innocent, he was just naïve and ill-advised.

so really, next time, it shouldn’t end until we get a resignation – nothing creative or “constructive” please, but a real one, duly witnessed and notarized.then we give the ousted one a choice: exile with limited immunity, or we take him/her to a special court and convict him/her a la erap.who knows.if erap’s options had been as clearcut in 2001, he might have happily flown the coop and spared us all, and himself, such a sorry mess.

Edsa ’98: The Dating Game

Inquirer 3 Mar 1998

At least the level of discourse on the Edsa Revolution has progressed from simple stuff answerable by yes or no – was Cory in Edsa or not? did Ramos hesitate to join Enrile or not? did Marcos order the soldiers to shoot or not? were the Marcoses kidnapped or not? – to a real question: When should the nation celebrate Edsa?

As an astrologer with a fetish for correct birth times, I would say it depends on what we want to celebrate.

If we want to celebrate the defection of the military reformists which led to the display of People Power, then the 22nd it is. What time? Juan Ponce Enrile says 3 p.m., when (according to my chronology) he rejected Gregorio Honasan’s and Eduardo Kapunan’s suggestion that he escape to Cagayan and decided instead to make a last stand in Camp Aguinaldo. Fidel Ramos, however, might prefer a 6:45 birth time, when together he and Enrile faced the press and announced their rebellion. And then, again, if we’re going to be true to story of Edsa, which is all about People Power, I would push for a 9 to 10 o’clock birth time, when the people first got into the picture through Butz Aquino and Manila Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin.

But if what we want to celebrate is the inauguration of the new democracy ushered in by Corazon C. Aquino, then the 25th it is. What hour of the day? Corystas would say 10:46 a.m., when she was sworn in as President. Except that at the time, Marcos was still in Malacañang Palace and still held legitimate power. He did not leave the Palace until 9:10 p.m. and he didn’t leave Clark Air Base in Pampanga until 5 a.m. the next morning. Until either time, the old government was arguably still in place. Only when Marcos was really gone did the new democracy begin.

Actually we should be celebrating Edsa neither on the 22nd nor on the 25th but on the 23rd of February, when unarmed throngs stopped the tanks (the first of such encounters) at the EDSA-Ortigas intersection. That display of People Power, captured on satellite TV for all the world to see, not only rendered the tyrant and his army powerless, it also forced the reconciliation, for the sake of peace, of the two anti-Marcos camps (Cory’s end Enrile’s) that were poised to grab power. That mind-boggling manifestation of People Power between 2:30 and 4:30 in the afternoon of the 23rd – and none other – was the high point of Edsa.

So why haven’t we been celebrating that? Basically, because it’s taken this long for our political leaders to acknowledge that Edsa wasn’t just one big blur of miraculous events but a definite series of explainable events with a beginning, a middle, and an ed. There was no miracle in Edsa – no sick were healed, no water turned into wine, the sun didn’t dance, and the Marian apparition is all in the cardinal’s mind. Edsa was about ordinary people in great numbers who dared to confront, unarmed, the military might of the dictator and discovered in the process their extraordinary powers when united by a common intent. Walang himala! As it turned out, the formidable task of removing a dictator was well within a people’s power, and the Filipino people proved it in Edsa.

Everything that happened during those four days, from the Enrile-Ramos defection to the stunning debut of People Power to the Marcos-Ver escape can be explained. None of it happened by miracle. Enrile and Ramos, for instance, didn’t wake up on the 22nd to the voice of God telling them to drop Marcos and join Cory. They defected so that Enrile could challenge Cory for the presidency. Unfortunately for Enrile, the people wanted no other than Cory, and the rest is verifiable history, except that the defectors have yet to straighten out their twisted accounts, allowing instead the Church’s miracle myth to prosper.

The effect has been not only to diminish the people’s part in the Edsa uprising but also to place it beyond the reach of human comprehension and recreation. Unlike other peak human experiences, Edsa is one that we are not being encouraged to recreate in our minds and analyze and learn from. I suspect it’s a conspiracy (shades of Hillary’s right wing), deliberate or not, to suppress what may be perceived as subversive material.

But truth has a way of coming out. And hope springs eternal. At least now (even if it has taken 12 years) we are clear about a beginning, a middle, and an ending. Same time next year, we might even be celebrating People Power. For a change.

People Power Knocked Them Out

Inquirer 5 March 1997

Contrary to military lore, it was the people—not Fidel Ramos, not Juan Ponce Enrile, not Gregorio Honasan—who were the true heroes of Edsa.

The military defection was only a catalyst for the display of People Power. Remove the defectors, and some other catalyst would have come along eventually—perhaps a dramatic climax to Cory’s boycott campaign that was preempted by Edsa, maybe a coup d’etat of sorts in the business community (with the military reformists falling in)—and it would have worked just as stunningly.

But remove the people, and the defectors would have been wiped out. Remove the people, and there would have been no reconciliation between Cory and the reformist military. In essence, Edsa was a political exercise in conflict resolution brokered by the people.

The crucial conflict was, not between Cory and Marcos or between Ramos/Enrile/ RAM and Marcos, but between Cory and Ramos/Enrile/RAM. The two camps had a common objective, to oust Marcos and take over, but no attempts were made by either camp to join forces with the other.

With the people squarely behind her, Cory was supremely confident that she didn’t need RAM. She was convinced that on her own, through nonviolent destabilizing tactics, she could pressure Marcos to step down.

On the other hand, with Enrile’s and Ramos’s backing, RAM was supremely confident that it could remove Marcos by force and replace him with a military junta headed by Enrile. RAM was certain that the military establishment would fall in line and, eventually, the people.

That fateful Edsa weekend derailed both Cory and Ramos/Enrile/RAM, giving the people the break they needed to resolve matters once and for all. In Edsa, the people gave them no choice but to reconcile their differences and submit to the people’s will.

Cory had no choice but to reconcile with the same military that had caused her and Ninoy so much pain and suffering. Ramos/Enrile/RAM had no choice but to submit to Cory, a civilian housewife without experience in state and military affairs.

Edsa was too dramatic and decisive to ignore. Cory and Ramos/Enrile/RAM could not but bow to the people’s will, which demanded that they rise above their differences and begin anew, begin as friends.

It is said that the 50,000 to 100,000 people who left their homes and marched to Edsa that Saturday evening did so because of Jaime Cardinal Sin’s appeal over Radio Veritas that the people bring food and support to the rebels.

In fact, the cardinal had to be coaxed into calling Veritas and going on the air that first night. And it was only on his secondcall, and only on the insistence of Corystas, that the cardinal gathered the nerve to tell the people that it was all right to go to Edsa.

The cardinal’s sanction was important, but there were others—in particular, June Keithley, Cecilia Muñoz Palma, and Butz Aquino—whose endorsements were just as crucial.

An unabashed Corysta and popular TV host, Keithley gave the greatest performance of her life as the sosyal broadcaster turned rebel. Fiercely enamored of the reformists, Keithley had listeners hanging on to her every word and was the rebel military’s all-important link to the people.

Member of Parliament Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, a respected jurist and Cory supporter, was the first government official to call Radio Veritas and express support for the rebels. Her endorsement carried a lot of weight.

Ninoy’s kid brother Butz, the original street parliamentarian, was in top form. Defying his group’s decision to await orders from Cory, Butz went ahead to Camp Aguinaldo to offer his support to the rebels. It was Butz, calling direct from Camp Aguinaldo at 10:20 p.m., who first assured the people that the rebel military was prepared to follow the people’s will. It was he who first suggested a course consistent with Cory’s non-violent strategy.

Synchronous events: the people stopping tanks and Enrile crossing Edsa to join Ramos. The coincidence of the people’s peak experience with Enrile’s move indicates that there was more to the crossing than a simple consolidation of forces. Ramos had had earlier urged them to move but Enrile and RAM were reluctant to give up Aguinaldo and, perhaps more so, to give in to Ramos, who was by then perceived to be for Cory.

In a sense the dramatic crossing signified Enrile’s surrender to forces other than RAM, and it was as critical and momentous as the people’s encounter with tanks.

Just when things were looking good for the people, and just when Keithley was peaking, her stock rising with every scoop, she announced, mistakenly, that the Marcoses had left Malacañang. Unwittingly, Keithley played into what may have been a plot to discredit her and confuse the people. Though she rallied somewhat with the liberation of Channel 4, she never recovered the strength of her words.

Entertainers were quick to recover their show biz senses. Everyone wanted to do a June Keithley (in her happier credible moments). Once Channel 4 was liberated, self-serving ones took to the spotlight and hogged it.

It’s not clear who was in command, only that a group of entertainers, mostly TV stars and recording artists, was allowed to dominate the broadcast and wax euphoric hour after hour, which was terribly boring, and disappointing. But there was a warning up against leftists. And so political scientists, sociologists, historians, activists, academe, everyone intelligent, was suspect, except for the show biz clowns.

There were leftists in Edsa but they did not come as communist party members with an official agenda. They came as ordinary people and helped in the best way they knew how—improvising and manning barricades—giving nonviolence and peace a chance, and linking arms, even, with capitalists.

It is said that Edsa was not a completely Filipino revolution since the US played a major part in the abduction and exile of the Marcoses. They may as well cite, too, the help that the reformist forces received from the CIA in terms of information on Marcos’s and Ver’s moves and a direct line to the US ambassador.

Just the same, the Americans were only on the sidelines, as stunned as everyone else (Marcos and Ver, Enrile and Ramos, included) at every unexpected turn of events. The Enrile-Ramos defection caught the Americans napping. People Power knocked them out.

Just like with Enrile and Ramos, Edsa gave the anti-Cory Americans no choice but to heed the people’s will and clear the way for Cory.