sunday night through the dark hours of monday, day three, was the scariest night for the throngs of people camped out around crame all the way to the corner of santolan and libis along camp aguinaldo. and monday was the longest, most eventful day.

june keithley was back on the air, this time on radyo bandido (pahabol: veritas’s signal from an emergency transmitter had died out 6 pm sunday, thanks to an early morning pc assault on the transmitter farm in bulacan).

news of defections trickled in through the night, cory spoke briefly, and whenever keithley ran out of things to say, or whenever the tension needed easing, she spinned an old scratchy version of “mambo magsaysay” and played “bayan ko” intermittently.

she also had a phonepatch to crame through which came all sorts of reports of impending attacks. the call for more people to come and shield the rebels was practically non-stop. in fact it was already 3 a.m. by the time tadiar, again, was ordered to inject marines by way of the libis backdoor into camp aguinaldo from where an assault on camp crame would be launched. crowd dispersal units would be used to sweep away human barricades.

sey ni ninotchka rosca sa endgame: the fall of marcos (1987):

The crowd had lost its middle-class character and was now diluted with legions of workers, squatter area residents, and urban poor-the great unwashed. Although there was some resentment at their presence, they could not be driven away. They provided the mass necessary to keep the rebellion’s leadership viable. Cause-oriented groups had also broken out their banners and occupied strategic spots in EDSA, in Santolan Road, in the Cubao district, and in Bohol Avenue, as well as in the intersection of streets leading to the Palace. Like night flowers, the banners flapped in the wind: KASAPI, BANDILA, ATOM, BAYAN, NATIONALIST ALLIANCE, GABRIELA.”

4:14 a.m. the marine regiment led by col. braulio balbas jumped off from fort bonifacio accompanied by crowd dispersal and control units under the direction of brig. gen. victor natividad.

keithley reported on the deteriorating defense situation; appealed to the loyalist soldiers, “magkakapatid tayo!” 5:00 a.m. ramos went on the air and appealed for more people. “an overwhelming military force has been assembled and directed to move against us!”

u.s. ambassador stephen bosworth relayed a message from the reagan white house to marcos: your time is up. marcos angrily rejected bosworth and, going on television, claimed to be in control, and that enrile and ramos were guilty of rebellion and inciting to rebellion.

the u.s. announced it would cut off all military aid if marcos used force against the rebels. too late. at 5:15 a.m., shortly after the message was released, several tear gas bombs exploded in the santolan, libis area. riot troopers dispersed the crowds and col. balbas’s column broke through the east wall of camp aguinaldo to take up positions facing the rebel camp crame.

also at 5:15 a.m. in villamor air base, col. antonio sotelo, commander of the 15th strike wing of the air force was ordered to fly two gunships to fort bonifacio.

at 5:55 a.m. major charles hotchkiss, commander of the 20th air commando squadron of the 15th strike wing led five sikorsky gunships up into the sky.

on edsa at 6:00 a.m. col. mariano santiago called for volunteers to open a “new front” to ease the pressure on the two camps. channel 4 the government tv station was the target. around a thousand people, 200 of them members of ATOM-Bayan, joined santiago. as they marched off, gunships were sighted winging towards camp crame.

the roar of their approach filled the air. on the ground the outnumbered outarmed rebel soldiers on the ground took cover, cocked their guns, waiting for the worst, the first shot; they had orders not to shoot until then. the gunships, bristling with rockets and cannon circled the camp once, then proceeded to land on the parade ground with lights blazing. it was 6:20 a.m.

out came airmen waving white flags and flashing the Laban sign. stunned silence, then a burst of clapping and cheering, a gigantic sigh of relief. sotelo said he was defecting with the entire elite 15th strike wing of the philippine air force. he was cheered wildly by the crowd of soldiers and civilians who were expecting an air bombardment.

it was a major turning point for the rebel military. biglang meron na silang air force. why not a symbolic attack on malacanang, just to let them know the rebels could launch an assault by air.

but just a few minutes later, at 6:27 a.m. keithley announced on radyo bandido that marcos and bongbong had just taken off from the manila international airport, that ver’s wife and imelda left earlier, at 3 p.m., and that imee and irene had left the night before, leaving ver alone in the malacanang.

wrote louie beltran for the inquirer:

the rejoicing at marcos’s departure (whether supposed or real) was almost manic. people cried in joy, ran out in the streets, embraced and hugged each other as if someone had announced that the bubonic plague was over.”

around 7:30 a.m. enrile and ramos, surrounded by rebel troops, went out and addressed the wildly cheering crowds inside and outside the camp. enrile declared it the “day of our liberation.” ramos was so happy he did a frog jump into the air, which drew squeals of delight from the crowd.

unfortunately nakoryente lang pala si keithley, said to be the handiwork of loyalists who hoped the news would disperse the crowds.

the moment marcos was told, he ordered information minister gregorio cendana to put him on television with imelda, kids, and apos. he was still very much around, as were balbas and his marines in camp aguinaldo with their cannons aimed on camp crame.

at 9 a.m. as preparations for the presscon proceeded, army commander gen. josephus ramas ordered balbas to fire at crame immediately. balbas had awesome firepower targeted on the rebel headquarters 200 meters away: 3 howitzers, 28 mortars, 6 rocket launchers, 6 machine guns, and 1000 rifles. balbas said they were still getting into position. again at 9:10 and at 9:20 ramas barked out the order to fire through radio. again and again balbas said his men were still getting into position.

at 9:30 marcos went on television over the government station channel 4 surrounded by imelda, imee, irene, greggy araneta, tommy manotoc, grandchildren, and bongbong in fatigues, and the vers, father and sons. grandson borgy was running all over the place. marcos announced that his inauguration would go on as scheduled the next day at noon. he appealed to civilians making up human barricades to get out of the line of fire in case of hostilities.

instead, people were streaming back to edsa, back to the barricades.

inside the crame war room, the rebels thudded down to earth. enrile and ramos sent a team to take control of channel 4 and a gunship to fly over malacanang and cripple its radio transmitter. the gunship returned within minutes. the pilots could not find the transmitter. they were sent back, this time to hit malacanang with a few rockets, but only to rattle, not hurt, its occupants.

on channel 4, while a battle for the station was raging between rebel and loyalist soldiers outside, marcos was still on the air, having his famous exchange with ver who approached, pleading with the president to give the order to attack, and marcos said no, his order was not to attack. kuno. ver had just confirmed with tadiar that the order for balbas to fire at camp crame was cleared by marcos.

9:56 a.m. people who were watching tv were stunned when, as marcos was about to answer a reporter’s question as to how he was in control, the screen blacked out. a transmitter had been hit in an exchange of gunfire with a sniper from the tower.

around 10:15 a.m. six rockets were fired on the palace, hitting the room of imelda and the garden. damage was negligible but it sent the message that the rebel force could strike any target at will. all the marcoses, from the president to the smallest grandchild, descended to the ground floor, near the elevator, huddled in a room, and came out of the attack unscathed.

in a rage following the rocket attack, ver radioed wing commander of the f-5 fighters then flying over malacanang and ordered him to bomb camp crame immediately. the squadron commander’s reply: yes sir, proceeding to bomb malacanang palace now! marcos had lost his jet fighters.

this while irwin ver was calling balbas and ordering a full attack on the rebels, saying that the palace was hit and suffered ten casualties. but balbas couldn’t bring himself to fire; there would be an unacceptable number of civilian casualties as people had been allowed inside crame grounds, perhaps among them his wife and kids.

11:30 a.m. channel 4 finally fell into rebel hands.

11:45 a.m. radio veritas began broadcasting with channel 4 facilities.

12 noon. sotelo dispatched three gunships that strafed villamor air base and destroyed five choppers on the ground. all were completely crippled. one exploded.

12:30 p.m. on orders of tadiar, balbas pulled the marines pulled out of camp aguinaldo.

from then on it was downhill all the way for marcos.

1:25 p.m. channel 4 was born again, live. in came the superstars, the not-so stars. the station became a cory-enrile-ramos propaganda machine nonstop.

2:00 p.m. batasan members of parliament met in doy laurel’s residence. they recommended that the new government not be provisional in nature but constitutional, de jure, and permanent.

at three o’clock in the afternoon, as the moon waxed full, edsa was packed with people. no doubt the false alarm of marcos’s departure was partly to blame. it gave the people a taste of victory, short-lived but oh-so-sweet and worth dying for.

also at 3 p.m. marcos received an offer of asylum from singapore prime minister lee kuan yew. the president was grateful but said he had no intention of leaving the country.

4:30 p.m. ver and ramas decided to launch a final “suicide assault” on the rebels. tadiar was alerted to prepare a marine battalion to operate with brawner’s rangers in an assault on crame. both the marines and the rangers refused to take part.

also at 4:30 the political opposition finally got its act together. in a closed-door meeting, opposition and some kbl batasan members signed a proclamation naming corazon aquino and salvador laurel as the duly elected candidates in the february 7 elections. a provisional government was set up immediately after.

around 5 p.m. cory finally made it to edsa. in the company of family members and close supporters, mrs. aquino emerged from the main entrance of the poea building and spoke from a makeshift stage on the front steps: “…we have recovered our freedoms, our rights, and our dignity with much courage and, we thank god, with little blood.”

6 p.m. enrile and ramos faced the press for the first time since the take-over of channel 4. they announced an “almost complete” take-over and control of the new armed forces of the people. defections had rendered loyalists practically without air and naval strength.

7:30 p.m. the united states endorsed the provisional government of mrs. corazon aquino, abandoning a 20-year ally in mr. marcos for the sake of a “peaceful transition” in the Philippines.

8:10 p.m. marcos appeared live on channels 2, 9, and 13 tv with imelda, bongbong, imee, and grandchildren. the president called on loyal followers to report to the mendiola barricade to enlist and be issued firearms, or call him by phone, or come to his inauguration at the palace the next day. he reiterated that the country was under a state of emergency under which the government could take over broadcast media. and, “i hereby declare curfew all over the country from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. effective tonight.”

meanwhile, the cory camp and the enrile-ramos camp were arguing over where to hold her inauguration the next day. three groups of aquino advisers said it should take place at club filipino. enrile wanted it at the multi-purpose hall of camp crame, the rebel headquarters, citing security problems if they left the camp. the politicians, however, could not accept the idea of a new president sworn in inside a military camp.

and in the palace, the chief justice of the supreme court ramon aquino and his son had dinner with the marcos girls and their husbands. imee talked about the metro pop. irene made plans to go out with her music crowd. bongbong was dressed in fatigues and relished it. “feel na feel ko ang get-up ko ngayon,” he told the aquinos. only the sons-in-law seemed worried about the situation. the palace was one big fortress, with military men sleeping all over the place, including the corridors. they sat up till 11:00 p.m. talking.

as for the curfew, it was blithely defied. the crowds roaming all over downtown manila as well as the tourist belt were as large as the crowds manning edsa, santolan, and ortigas, and the militant sectors of san rafael, mendiola, legarda, and sta. mesa. more people were out and about than on any other night of the revolution.

day two of EDSA, the 23rd of february, was the day we surprised ourselves, and the world, with People Power.

that sunday morning the people came streaming in to edsa in the tens of thousands, prepared to stay the whole day or longer, prepared to act as human shields and protect the small rebel forces from the military might of marcos. the enrile-ramos campaign had worked, the people were offering support, except that it was obviously a conditional kind, as they were wearing cory’s yellow colors and chanting cory’s name.

earlier that morning general ramos, who had moved back to camp crame headquarters across the highway (his turf as chief of the pc and integrated national police) had jogged to aguinaldo. because defections were not pouring in, he suggested that enrile and his reformists consolidate forces with him in crame, which was smaller and easier to defend. but the reformists were not hot about it; anyway there was no immediate threat. or, why not the other way around, that is, ramos could move his forces to aguinaldo.

but as the sun rose to its zenith things started coming to a head. in cebu cory faced the press and called for marcos to resign, before flying back to manila. in fort bonifacio the marines who had to be pulled out of the palace were finally gathering and preparing for the assault on the edsa camps under the command of general artemio tadiar.

at 12 noon marcos was on tv again, scoffing at demands that he resign. he also presented two more soldiers who confessed to being part of the coup plot led by the reformist forces of enrile and ramos.

at 1:30 p.m. while marcos was still facing the press, saying that the presence of a large number of civilians outside the camps did not bother him at all, ver finally ordered the marines to move out and head for edsa.

at 2:00 p.m. enrile prepared to move out of the defense ministry in camp aguinaldo.

at 2:15 p.m. the 1^st Marine Provisional Division finally jumped off fort bonifacio with tadiar in the lead vehicle. it was a formidable column, spearheaded by armor. witnesses counted 6 (others say 7) tanks, 10 APC’s, 8 jeeps, and 13 six-by-six trucks. the column rolled through forbes road and turned right into EDSA.

at 2:20 p.m. cory’s plane landed in manila.

at 2:24 p.m. enrile and his men moved out of camp aguinaldo in tight formation. the sea of people parted to let them pass, linked arms to create a protective wall to shield them from snipers.

at 2:47 tanks were sighted along guadalupe rolling towards the camps. cory saw them, too. she was on edsa on the way to wackwack; her car moved alongside the tanks.

the crowds outside the rebel camps had grown from 500 at dawn (a lot of people had gone home to get some sleep) to over 500,000 by mid-afternoon.

as enrile crossed the highway to camp crame, the people were stopping tadiar’s tanks at the ortigas intersection. the high point of the uprising – synchronously significant events.

by abandoning aguinaldo and joining forces with ramos in crame, enrile betrayed the weakness of his position. it was an admission that he needed ramos more than ramos needed him, and, worse, it put him in no position to further pursue the presidency, which point must have been painfully driven home when he saw for himself how yellow the crowds were.

when the unarmed crowds stopped the tanks in that awesome display of people power, it sent the message loud and clear that the marcos regime was moribund and it was time for cory and enrile to get their act together and finish marcos off. easier said than done. cory was cold to the prospect of reconciliation — enrile was ninoy’s jailer. for his part, enrile considered himself more qualified for the presidency than an ordinary housewife.

that evening, doy laurel, just back from a meeting with enrile and ramos in crame, told cory of their proposal to set up a military-civilian junta. cory would be among the civilians along with cecilia munoz palma and senator lorenzo tananda. cory was cold to the idea. a junta arrangement presupposed military leadership. why should she allow herself to be sidelined when she had won the votes of ten million pinoys and enrile had not.

cory did not go public with any of this; rather, she continued to express support for the rebels on the airwaves. but behind the scenes, she sent a message, summoning enrile and ramos to wackwack. feeling and acting president na siya.

siyempre hindi magkasabay dumating ang dalawang bandido. they couldn’t both be gone from crame while there was a threat of an impending attack.

clearly, cory and enrile could behave no less grandly than the people who had risked and continued to risk life and limb to protect enrile in the name of cory. the two simply had to rise to the occasion and transcend personal interests. andso they did, if temporarily. cory rose above her resentment of the military, enrile rose above his ambition to become president, and space was created where the two could face each other without rancor, work out a deal acceptable to both, and join hands in a higher, common, cause.

in short, cory and enrile reconciled their differences for the sake of the nation, and not by butting heads but through creative negotiation. no doubt enrile came to the table with certain demands in exchange for his support. such as, surely, an end to the boycott of crony businesses, and, i’d bet, immunity from suit.

as for ramos, who knows what he asked for. possibly, cory’s annointment in the ’92 presidential elections.

check out www.stuartxchange.com [publications] for sources/documentation.

it was a saturday, day 7 of cory’s civil disobedience campaign. what a heady time that was when we were defying the dictator by changing day-to-day habits of a lifetime, like dropping the crony-owned manila bulletin and going for the mosquito press’ inquirer, malaya, or the manila times. snubbing coke and san miguel beer and going for fruit juices and gold eagle beer ba yon, even lambanog instead. and giving up magnolia ice cream and going for “dirty” ice cream na lang, sarap!

which was of course freaking out big business. how much of that, added to the huge withdrawals from crony banks, could the economy take? the pressure was building up on marcos to resign before the economy collapsed. it certainly looked like cory would be taking over sooner than later.

but unknown to us then, enrile and honasan’s reformist forces were poised to preempt cory. enrile was not only a crony, he was also the defense minister who had been edged out by ver from marcos’s inner circle and who wanted to be president. enrile and honasan had long been planning to stage a coup, except that they had to keep postponing it because the timing was bad – the first plan was for late ’83 but ninoy was assassinated while under the custody of the military; there was no way they’d get the support of the people whose hatred of the military was at its height. the second plan was for december 85 but marcos called snap elections; so nagpapogi na lang muna ang reformists by providing security for cory, even if they were sure na walang panalo si cory vs. marcos.

so nung biglang umarangkada si cory, refusing to concede and alleging cheating at the polls, at mabilis namayagpag ang kanyang civil disobedience campaign, biglang red alert sina enrile’t honasan, papayag ba silang maunahan, ma-preempt ng isang cory, isang ordinary housewife? malay niyang magpatakbo ng gobierno, ng military, ng bureaucracy?

by day 5 of the crony boycott, the reformists had set the coup for sunday, the 23rd, when they would launch a surprise attack on malacanang. ang problema, ver got wind of their plans and was fortifying the palace in anticipation of the attack. honasan realized it only that saturday morning when he reconnoitered the palace perimeter and found the gates heavily guarded by combat-ready marines. biglang no choice but to call off the planned coup. the question was, what to do. rumors were rife daw that they were going to be arrested, should they run and hide? enrile decided no, he would rather hole up in the defense ministry in camp aguinaldo, take a stand, die fighting.

defection
siyempre wala namang kamalay-malay ang madlang pipol. so when radio veritas came out with the news late in the afternoon that enrile and ramos had defected and were about to hold a presscon in camp aguinaldo, wow, that was electrifying. perfect timing, i thought then, surely they would take cory’s side, just what she needed, her own armed forces. and in the presscon that was replayed over and over that night, enrile and ramos were clever enough to raise our hopes, saying  that indeed there was cheating in the snap polls, indeed marcos no longer represented the will of the people, sabay, we have no food.

cardinal sin
contrary to the notion that it was cardinal sin’s calls that brought the people to edsa, the fact is that the cardinal, until then a “critical collaborator” of the marcoses, took his sweet time before going on radio veritas, and the first time he did so was only to say that it was all right for the people to bring the rebels food if they wished, “they are our friends,” and only because people had been calling him, urging him to endorse the rebels.

butz
in fact, marcos oppositionist/justice cecilia munoz palma was the first to go on air to declare support for the rebels. this encouraged butz aquino whose own gut feel was that it was no sarsuela, rather a chance to truly split the military, so he went to camp aguinaldo and offered enrile his support. (cory was in cebu attending a rally where she added more cronies to her boycott list). butz was the audacious one (kuya ninoy would have been proud of him) who was first to call on the people to come and protect the rebels, shield them with warm bodies to avert bloodshed. it was this non-violent strategy that finally convinced cardinal sin (that it was safe?) to call the people to edsa.

marcos
it helped of course that the cardinal eventually got around to it, but i’m convinced that had he not done so, edsa would have unfolded as it did anyway. because the people did not march to edsa just on his say-so or even butz’s. nakinig muna sila at nag-isip sila. people everywhere were tuned in to veritas, listening closely to replays of the presscon. and then around ten-thirty in the evening, marcos himself went on television to say he was in control of the situation and, more importantly, to accuse the rebels of a failed coup attempt. to prove it he paraded one witness after another, palace soldiers who were part of the plot and who read their confessions on cam.

the people
the president was telling the truth, but he had lied so many times in the past that the people thought he was just lying again to save his skin. the presscon ended around 11:15 pm. by butz’s account it was around 11:30 when people started streaming in to join his group in isetann, cubao, and that by the time they arrived at the camp gates, they had grown to an estimated 20 to 30 thousand in addition to other small groups already gathered there.

but many many more just went on listening to radio veritas, heard more opposition stalwarts endorsing the rebels, heard enrile deny the attempted coup, and then they slept on it.

for more details and thorough documentation, check out my brother’s website www.stuartxchange.com. click on publications. take your pick, a chronology in english (1996) or a critical essay in filipino (2000).